336. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State1
738. Eyes only Secretary and McGhee from MacArthur. Congo. Department telegram 7792and Embassy telegrams 729 and 730.3 I saw Spaak again this afternoon after Cabinet meeting. He said he had studied memo I gave him (based on Department telegram 779) very carefully and wished to speak with same frankness we had used in proposing that McGhee plan be dropped and UMHK be asked to proceed to Léopoldville alone to tell Adoula that it wished to discuss arrangements for making of payments directly to GOC.
Spaak said Gardiner assertion that proposed UMHK action in making payments to GOC was “commercial matter” was absurd. Spaak assumed we shared this view since McGhee himself had stressed last week to him that change in UMHK payments from GOK to GOC was political act of greatest significance.
He is deeply disturbed by position UN has taken as set forth in Embassy telegram 779. In effect, he said, UN and US appear to have gone back to “unsound” position held many months ago that if only UMHK would stop making payments to Tshombe, Katanga secession would be ended. It was not only unsound but downright dangerous for UN to base its future actions on such concept which was in contradiction with Thant reconciliation plan which had been hammered out by US, Belgium and Britain. Thant plan itself recognized that there had to be a balanced solution and that question of payments to GOC and constitutional aspects were integral part of overall plan which was highly political and not, definitely not, commercial. It seemed evident that in absence of constitutional guarantees Tshombe would fight rather than surrender.
Spaak is convinced that if at this juncture UMHK starts making payments to GOC Tshombe will make strong reprisals. He recalled [Page 677] there are many hundreds Belgian lives at stake and tremendous investment, much of which is held by small shareholders in Belgium. Spaak does not see how anyone can expect Belgian Government to force UMHK to take action which GOB itself believes will probably result in retaliation unless UMHK and GOB knew precisely a) what meaningful guarantee of protection UN would give to UMHK if Tshombe acted against it, b) actual UN capability to protect Belgian lives and property, and c) what guarantee or assurances UN and US would give UMHK in terms of sharing economic losses which would certainly occur if Tshombe retaliated.
Spaak said he is particularly concerned about Tshombe because in last several days Tshombe has become much more confident and all reports seem indicate Tshombe has or is cooking something up (possibly proposal for a Central African federation) with blacks and whites in Africa, including Rhodesia, South Africa, perhaps Angola and one or two other African states. Furthermore British have been very reticent with GOB re Congo in last four days.
Long discussion with Spaak that ensued during which he reiterated grave concern over apparent UN abandonment of balanced solution whereby Tshombe would give up control of company money and his armed forces in return for adequate and reasonable concept of federal constitution which was, Spaak felt, indispensable element in any solution. He insisted that if UMHK refused to make payments to Tshombe, latter would not only take retaliatory action against UMHK but if necessary would take to the bush where he could hold out for months if not indefinitely. In light existing circumstances he continued to think that proposals McGhee had made in Brussels, although complicated and dependent on both UN and Adoula, at least held some hope whereas Thant-Gardiner position held none whatsoever.
I urged Spaak to go to New York and talk directly with Thant and Bunche, saying that only he could explain Belgian position and view authoritatively to Thant. In urging that he go to New York I advanced some of the arguments that I had used earlier with Rothschild (Embassy telegram 730).
After some further talk Spaak said he agreed since war or peace in Africa were in fact at stake that he should go to New York and he would fly there Sunday taking Robiliart or some other high UMHK official with him to discuss guarantees UN could give to UMHK. He would plan to see Thant Monday but since he also felt it imperative to talk with President and Secretary he would fly down to Washington late Monday or Tuesday morning for such talks. In light of discussion with President, Secretary and McGhee it could be decided whether it useful for Spaak [Page 678] and McGhee to return New York for further talk with Thant, Bunche and Gardiner.
He said he would see Robiliart later today and, despite his own misgivings, would follow tactic of being very tough with him in effort to soften UMHK up.
I told Spaak I would telephone McGhee at once informing him of Spaak’s plans and his desire to see President.
Following my telephone conversation with McGhee I informed Spaak that McGhee believed his visit most useful and thought his plans were in general very good. While everybody in Washington would be glad to see him, he could not make definite commitment for appointment with President until he had checked President’s schedule with White House. Spaak expressed understanding and said his visit should be as short as possible but he recognized several days would be required complete such talks in New York and Washington. As I was leaving he emphasized again he attaches greatest importance to seeing both President and Secretary.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2362. Confidential; Niact; Noforn.↩
- Document 334.↩
- Telegram 729, November 23, reported that MacArthur had given Spaak a memorandum based on telegram 779, Document 334. Spaak replied that it was necessary to reassess the situation, since he thought Union Minie re would not send Robiliart to talk to Adoula unless he was accompanied by official Belgian and U.S. representatives. Spaak thought he might go to New York for talks with Thant and Bunche. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2362)Telegram 730, November 23, reported that McGhee had met with Rothschild and told him that unless the Belgian Government could persuade Union Minie re to do what was necessary, it would inevitably be held responsible for any subsequent unfortunate developments in the Congo. (Ibid.)↩