Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

334. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium¹

Washington, November 22, 1962, 2:58 p.m.

779. Eyes only MacArthur from McGhee. Part I of Two. Our two-hour meeting yesterday with Bunche and Gardiner and subsequent hour meeting with U Thant fully reported USUN 1901 to Dept.²Since this followed long meeting with SYG and Bunche on November 19,³ there has now been ample opportunity for very complete exchange and mutual understanding of the issues and points of view involved in new GOB–USG initiative in Congo. The following summarizes our views with respect to results of meetings and indicated course for the future.

I initiated meeting by presenting almost verbatim agreed talking paper given Deptel 773,⁴ as modified in accordance with Brussels 718.⁵ Gardiner, who had been previously reported by Bunche as cool to new initiative, remained so throughout discussions. It was in the end agreed, however, that an initiative along lines indicated would be worth trying and, if successful, would be much preferred alternative to plan of economic pressures which UN has been developing for use as a last resort. Gardiner’s views on tactics differed widely, however, from those in USG–GOB proposal, along following lines and for following reasons:

1. Gardiner believes strongly that commercial aspects of UMHK–GOC relations must be disassociated from their political aspects. UMHK, ostensibly in response to Adoula’s recent letter to them requesting that they pay revenues to GOC, could send a high level representative to Leo for purpose of discussing how this might be brought about. They would seek obtain those assurances they feel they need of purely commercial nature to permit them to comply with Adoula’s request. Precedent would appear to exist for such action in recent GOC agreement with South Kasai diamond industry which had come directly to Adoula when faced with end of South Kasai secession and made very favorable deal with him. Indeed, Adoula’s inclination would probably be to be generous with UMHK if approached directly and forthrightly, since he has every incentive obtain their cooperation in ending Katanga secession and in providing immediate additional revenues and foreign exchange to GOC.

2. In connection with assurances of a purely commercial nature, Gardiner doubted Adoula would be willing allow IMF, towards which he has particular antipathy because of their refusal to grant Congo membership, or perhaps any other outside body, make determination as to foreign exchange or revenue allocations for UMHK and Katanga. He pointed out that other companies had been receiving fair treatment and difficult to make UMHK special case—also, difficulty in permitting outside group to determine GOC financial arrangements with one province.

3. Gardiner felt strongly that UMHK reps should come first, without GOB political rep, since in his judgment it would be fatal to mix political and commercial considerations. It would be unlikely that Adoula would be willing make concessions on constitution or amnesty in return for commercial considerations. He pointed to well known difficulties in dealing with constitutional problem, i.e., neither Tshombe nor GOB have made specific suggestions that can be dealt with, and there is no assurance that new meeting of Provincial Presidents would be more successful than the last. Correct procedure for dealing with Constitution, as described by Loi Fondamentale, is through action of parliament and ratification by Provincial Assemblies. UMHK reps, if they were able reach satisfactory agreement with Adoula on commercial matters, could then state that they must return to Brussels for final decision.

4. Gardiner agreed he could as follow-up to visit by UMHK rep attempt to achieve such political objectives as GOB desire as are consistent with the Plan. He should not, however, appear to be acting in support of UMHK negotiations. Perhaps at this juncture it might be desirable for Belgian political reps come to Leo but visit should not be related to UMHK negotiations.

5. Gardiner felt strongly USG should not associate itself openly with commercial aspect this effort. Although he did not say so, there is background of feeling that UN is somewhat embarrassed by appearance of US pressures in the Congo. My visit to Katanga drew down some of our credit with GOC in that it appeared to represent a “Be Kind to Tshombe Movement” and to prolong the negotiating phase of the execution of the Plan. Our open association with a Belgian commercial interest, particularly with background of UMHK, together with efforts on our part to link political concessions with commercial considerations would be embarrassing not just to us but to the UN. In any event, any action on our part whether by Gullion or myself should follow UMHK negotiations so as not to appear to be related to them.

As indicated USUN’s summary, SYG felt there was little time for testing whether or not such an approach would be profitable. UN feeling pressure of CAC, tremendous drain on resources, deteriorating situation of the Congo must move soon toward more effective pressures. He outlined some 16 measures ranging in severity from minor economic actions to stopping of trains in Eville which he could take in context present UN resolutions. In essence, however, many amount to actions damaging Belgian interests in the Congo which also do business with Katanga or are associated with companies who do.

In discussion question inevitably arose as to what would happen if UMHK reached agreement with Adoula to which Tshombe did not agree. To this I could but reply, in light of our understanding with GOB, that with full support of UN, GOB and UMHK, I felt we had adequate means to assure Tshombe’s acceptance or acquiescence. In any event, further action by the companies at this point would be a matter for Spaak.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 870G.25/11–2262. Secret; Niact. Drafted by McGhee, cleared by Wallner and Davis, and approved by Williams.
2. Telegram 1901, November 21, reported that McGhee, Williams, Yost, Gullion, and Wallner had met that day with Bunche and Gardiner and subsequently with Thant. McGhee had reviewed the proposal set forth in telegram 773, Document 333, but Gardiner had taken the position that the United Nations could not participate; he thought Union Miniere should go directly to the Congolese Government without U.N. involvement. Thant said the United Nations could not continue in the Congo beyond March. If the present proposal was unsuccessful, and if, as he expected, the General Assembly refused to provide further financial support for the Congo operation, he would have to take the problem to the Security Council in December. (Ibid., 770G.00/11–2162)
3. See Document 332.
4. Document 333.
5. Telegram 718, November 21, reported that MacArthur had given Rothschild the talking points in telegram 773. Rothschild had agreed to the substitution of “urge” for “recommend” in paragraph 4 but thought the specific reference to “3 million monthly” should be omitted. (Department of State, Central Files, 870G.25/11–2162) Telegram 722 from Brussels, November 21, reported that Spaak had approved the changes. (Ibid.)