Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

325. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, November 8, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with the President on The Congo, Wednesday, November 7, 1962, at 4:00 P.M., Cabinet Room²

PRESENT

• Secretary of State Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Under Secretary McGhee, Mr. G. Mennen Williams, Mr. Harlan Cleveland, Mr. Wayne Fredericks

The Secretary of State gave the President the proposed contingency plan for the Congo (attached).³ He opened the meeting by asking Mr. Williams to review recent military moves. Mr. Williams said that Kongolo had been besieged for several days and had now probably surrendered to the ANC. This was the climax of activity which went back for a long period in the past. In response to the President’s question, Mr. Williams said he thought it meant that Adoula was now a little stronger. The reaction of Tshombe might be twofold. He certainly would be angry, but it might have the effect also of forcing him to recognize Adoula’s strength. Mr. Cleveland then reported on his conversation with Bunche at the UN in New York this morning.⁴ Bunche’s assessment of the situation was more sanguine than that presented in the Department memorandum. Bunche emphasized Adoula’s increased strength in the Congo at large. By contrast, Tshombe had really not gained strength in Katanga. He also stood well with his Parliament in Bunche’s judgment. In his view, the major block to forward movement in the UN re-integration plan was now the amnesty, rather than the constitution. In response to the President’s question, Mr. Cleveland and Mr. Williams indicated that the problem was how to hold the amnesty in such a way as to cover Tshombe’s concerns, but not result in the release of Gizenga and Gbenye. Mr. McGhee indicated that the UN felt it was inappropriate to limit the amnesty to Kantanga. There was some discussion of the possibilities of staging, in time and geographically, and perhaps using Senator Dodd to approach Tshombe. Mr. Cleveland went on to talk about U Thant’s letters to Adoula and Tshombe, which did not contain a fixed deadline. It was Bunche’s present thought that after November 15 the noose on Tshombe would be tightened gradually, starting with what Adoula himself could do; then, such UN actions as the closing of the railway in Elisabethville which did not depend on the consent of Belgium and the United Kingdom. At the same time, the UN would get the consent of the U.S., Belgium and the United Kingdom for the further sanctions envisioned. Bunche promised to consult the U.S. fully throughout this process. Further, Bunche thinks all this could be done without a great risk that force would be involved. He mentioned that the UN is now negotiating with Tshombe on the stationing of observers in Kolwezi, Jadotville, Kipushi. In addition to the observers, the UN might also station detachments of guard troops with them. The UN has asked the Greeks and Filipinos for fighters; the Paks have already turned them down. The Secretary indicated that he thought the Italians were a better source. Mr. Cleveland raised the desirability of countries with F–86’s, and it was agreed that efforts should be concentrated on the Greeks and Italians. Mr. Cleveland then talked about providing aircraft for the UN which could move its troops and vehicles. In response to the President’s question, he indicated that the problem was to maintain a position of self-defense and make its military power appear more effective. In Cleveland’s view the UN’s ideas were realistic, and the fears raised by Bunche’s visit to Léopoldville⁵ were unfounded. In response to the President’s question as to how far all of them went in putting meaningful pressure on Tshombe, Mr. McGhee and Mr. Cleveland talked about loss of control of North Katanga, what the fall of Kongolo meant, and the further steps proposed in the plan.

The President asked whether his impression of last week that Tshombe had made some ostensible steps toward cooperation while Adoula had been holding back wasn’t correct. Mr. McGhee indicated that he was correct, and it was clear that Adoula’s holding back was deliberate and related to the attack on Kongolo. The President repeated the necessity for putting pressure on Adoula, as well as on Tshombe. He asked whether we hadn’t indicated to Tshombe and Adoula that the assistance we promised last week was in fact given with the expectation that they would move.

The Secretary observed that the attack was not necessarily all bad. It might be a useful reminder to Tshombe as to what would happen if he were not cooperative. It could also form the basis for an appeal to both sides.

The President asked what we would do after the points for action by Adoula stated on page 5 were taken up. The Secretary responded that in the next two weeks we would push to strengthen the UN as prescribed, and we had to consult with the Belgians and get them to agree on the measures proposed.

The President again repeated that he did not think that the measures of strengthening the UN would in themselves exert sufficient pressure on Tshombe to cause him to move further. He urged that we make it clear to Adoula that our assistance to him and to the UN was conditional on his action.

The President asked when we should talk to the Belgians. Mr. Cleveland responded that we must now decide what to do at the end of next week, and he thinks that we should consult with the Belgians now. In response to the President’s question, the Secretary and Mr. Cleveland agreed that we must make it clear to the Belgians and to Adoula that our joint effort to squeeze Tshombe would be conditional on Adoula’s movement along the lines indicated. Mr. Williams emphasized the need to show Tshombe the firmness of our intention. He said that the effect on Adoula of an increase in his and UN strength should be highly beneficial. This in turn would do much to make clear to Tshombe what our intentions were. The President was dubious of this. He referred to the problem of the Indian contingent and to the UN problems, and concluded that we cannot depend on UN troops to apply the kind of force or threat of force to Tshombe that would lead them to make a major step. The Secretary thought the UN could hold its own at least. Mr. McGhee thought that they could do better and might be able to get to Jadotville and Kolwezi. The Secretary stated the problem is how we build up pressures without involving the ultimate military threat that we are not prepared to support a UN war. Mr. McGhee thought we should move now on both tracks; in the Congo, of pressing Adoula again; and Tshombe, with the Belgians on sanctions. Mr. McGhee raised the question of the constitution issue and the use of Gardiner as an emissary between Adoula and Tshombe. Mr. Cleveland indicated that Bunche opposed this. The Secretary expressed his view that they had to surmount the UN’s objections in one way or another, and that discussion between Tshombe and Adoula on the constitution was necessary and inevitable. Gardiner was the natural channel for doing it, and we should see that it got done either that way or another way.

The question of Senator Keating’s trip arose. Keating has already left the country, and the Secretary undertook to call him and write him a letter.⁶ It was agreed that Mr. McGhee and Mr. Williams would look into the question of other trips, and that perhaps Humphrey could be induced to go with Senator Dodd.

The President summed up by saying that the issue was the relative staying power of Adoula and Tshombe, and their relative virtue. We must strengthen Adoula at the same time that we make it clear to him that movement on his part was a necessary condition of a successful re-integration program.

Mr. Cleveland raised the question of Struelens. He and Mr. Williams indicated what the symbolism will be of a move against Struelens to both the Belgians and the Africans. The President asked Mr. Kaysen to review the problem of taking action against Struelens.⁷

The President then approved going ahead with the program. In so doing, he emphasized that we must make it clear the inter-connection between our negotiations with the Belgians on sanctions and our pressure on Adoula before moving. He also emphasized the importance of doing something on the constitution problem. He requested Mr. McGhee to go to Brussels for discussions with Spaak as soon as feasible. Mr. Williams indicated that he was ready to go to talk to Adoula whenever this was required.⁸

Carl Kaysen⁹

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Congo. Secret. Drafted by Kaysen.
2. Another memorandum of the conversation by Fredericks, together with some additions by Kaysen, is in Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–762.
3. Not attached to the source text. See footnote 5, Document 323, and Document 324.
4. The conversation is recorded in telegram 1672 from USUN, November 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–762)
5. Bunche visited the Congo in late October.
6. Senator Kenneth Keating of New York was planning to visit both Léopoldville and Elisabethville after attending a meeting in Lagos, Nigeria. Rusk telephoned him in Lagos on November 9 and urged him to see Gullion for a briefing as soon as he arrived in Léopoldville. Documentation concerning Keating’s visit to the Congo is in Department of State, Central File 033.1100–KE.
7. A November 14 memorandum from Department of State Legal Adviser Abram Chayes on the possible deportation of Struelens was sent to Bundy under cover of a November 16 memorandum from Brubeck. (Ibid., 711.0155/11 –1662)
8. A November 7 memorandum from Kaysen to Brubeck summarized the decisions at the meeting. It stated that the President approved the plan of action in the “Proposed Contingency Plan for the Congo” and directed that McGhee go to Brussels as soon as possible to discuss the question of sanctions, requested that Rusk and McGhee brief all Senators going to the Congo on U.S. policy and try to see that those who went were a well-balanced group, and directed an examination of the problem of moving to expel Struelens. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Congo)
9. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.