326. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1
1724. Congo. Reference: Deptel 1237.2 McGhee, Yost and Fredericks had forty-five minute conversation with SYG and Bunche on Congo today.
McGhee opened conversation by asking SYG what he had in mind after November 15 date he set at CAC meeting for receipt replies Gardiner’s letters. When SYG parried question by asking McGhee about his trip to Congo, Bunche stated date had no significance other than deadline for replies. If replies unsatisfactory UN would discuss with US, UK and Belgium “abandonment of plan and adoption of new courses of action.” SYG then said Tshombe’s reply would no doubt be affirmative. Tshombe has been saying all along he will comply with plan. SYG had presented plan, knowing he had US approval and to a degree that of UK and even France.
However, Tshombe’s acceptance had been in principle only. Seven weeks had gone by since without any results. SYG had from beginning made plan non-negotiable. Also had thought he had US and, to degree, UK support on this. He had not thought through what should be done next if replies to letters not satisfactory. Said he had obtained agreement from Indians not withdraw their troops for time being. They had also agreed defer decision on withdrawal of aircraft for four weeks. Filipinos had responded to request for F–86s with question concerning reimbursement, so were apparently giving consideration to request.
When McGhee remarked that means of implementing reconciliation plan not yet exhausted, Bunche reviewed his assessment of progress, stressing fact that Adoula had placed Constitution before Parliament. He added that Gardiner had taken copy of draft Constitution to Elisabethville with him “for possible use” with Tshombe.
When McGhee stressed necessity Constitution meeting minimum demands of Tshombe, Bunche replied that Tshombe would never be satisfied except with Tananarive type confederal arrangement. Stressed that Stavropoulos (UN legal adviser) and Embassy Leo thought draft met requirements of plan, which was essential thing. McGhee then explained [Page 658] Department’s position as outlined in reftel. He proposed acceleration of pressure combined with continued effort implement plan.
SYG then said that Tshombe had been stalling, spending large sums of money in Léopoldville in effort bring down Adoula. He asked what would happen if Adoula lost vote of confidence and Tshombe became PM. Said latter would not last six months. Tshombe was running against winds of change in Africa. Something would have to be done very soon.
McGhee assured SYG US fully supported plan and shared SYG’s sense of urgency. There were certain things US could do, he said. For example it could provide UN with airlift in Congo. Bunche said this badly needed and would be glad provide details. Said “we are not in or out of plan.” Added that Tshombe was already feeling pressure. General Prem Chand had recently visited Kolwezi with Tshombe and had discussed matter of/stationing UN forces there. However, even if UN forces could be put in Kolwezi and Jadotville, they would need bridging equipment in order keep road open and avoid situation similar to that when Irish troops isolated.
McGhee said we wanted to help; that we had in mind economic measures. He was going to Brussels where he would see Spaak on November 13 in order to see what Spaak would be able to do to help. However, it was important for Spaak that Adoula make right kind of progress on Constitution. He hoped conversations with Spaak would produce means by which US and Belgium could help UN put further pressure on Tshombe, but at the same time reconciliation efforts should be continued. One thing he hoped work out with Spaak was how to arrange for UMHK make payments direct to GOC. Adoula, however, must do his part, make concessions where necessary. SYG again said he believed Tshombe was stalling. In fact Adoula and everyone else thought this. Seven weeks had gone by. If Tshombe reply to letter should be unsatisfactory he promised consult with us on “new ideas I have.” Problem was urgent; February was his time limit. Said he hoped talk with McGhee after his return from Belgium.
McGhee agreed to do this. Said however US would be unable to support unprovoked military action by UN. Moreover this was not only his position but that of President Kennedy. Both SYG and Bunche immediately disclaimed any intention of taking such action. McGhee said we had heard rumors from Congo, nevertheless, that such action might be contemplated. Bunche said that Struelens was behind such rumors. UN had thought that after bond issue was settled US would put Struelens out of business. McGhee replied that we certainly wanted do this and would do so as soon as such action were possible without doing more harm than good.
[Page 659]Meeting ended with agreement that SYG and McGhee would consult again as soon as latter returned from Brussels.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–962. Confidential. Repeated to Léopoldville, Elisabethville, Brussels, and London.↩
- Telegram 1237 to USUN, November 8, stated that, despite Bunche’s reluctance to have U.N. involvement in a mediatory effort between Adoula and Tshombe, especially with regard to the constitution, the Department continued to believe that such an effort should be undertaken as soon as possible. (Ibid., 770G.00/11–862)↩