Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

324. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy¹

Washington, November 7, 1962.

Mr. President:

1. The attached paper from the Department of State² gives their estimate of the Congo situation and proposals for a U.S. course of action.³ It has been reviewed by the Secretary; he has approved its transmission to you, but it does not necessarily represent his own final view of what should be done.

2. In brief, the paper argues that the present stationary situation will soon dissolve in a way highly unfavorable to the U.S. unless we take positive action now. If we fail to take action, the results will at best be a serious loss of U.S. and Western position throughout Africa and in the UN, the replacement of Adoula by a radical, irresponsible and probably Soviet-influenced government in Léopoldville, and at least sporadic fighting in Katanga and other parts of the Congo. At worst, there might be a full-scale war in which the other African states will join in with the Central Congo Government, while the Central Africa Federation, South Africa and the Portuguese will join in support of the Katanga: something like White –Black war in Africa. The recommended course of action contains three elements: (a) Strengthening Adoula along the lines previously discussed. (b) Strengthening the UN in the Congo, especially increasing its military capacity by additional transport and combat aircraft and perhaps by additional troops. (c) Putting pressure on Tshombe by diplomatic means, but holding in reserve and making known to Tshombe a definite decision to impose economic sanctions after a firm deadline of one month. State estimates that this course of action would succeed, although it might conceivably involve some fighting between UN troops and Katanga gendarmerie.

3. As I see it, there are two major problems in the paper. First, what confidence can we have in State’s assessment of the urgency of the situation? The view expressed in the paper is very strongly held by Governor Williams and the whole Bureau, as well as by Ed Gullion in Léopoldville. If it is not correct, it is obvious that we have more time to continue the more cautious policy represented by McGhee’s efforts to promote some conciliatory steps by both Tshombe and Adoula. Second, the means of enforcing sanctions lie mainly in Belgian, and, to some extent, in British hands. So far we have no indication that the Belgians will in fact agree to commit themselves now to imposing sanctions on a specified deadline. At a minimum, we must get them to share our view of the urgency of the situation, before they are at all likely to consider this step. So far, they do not seem to share this view.

As I indicated to you this morning, Governor Williams and all his staff feel very strongly that decision to go ahead along the lines proposed is absolutely necessary to the maintenance of an effective U.S. and Western presence in Africa. I think Williams would like to go a little further than the plan in the paper, by moving to expel Struelens now, and by a high-level U.S. statement indicating that we were determined to move ahead on a settlement of the Katanga issue within a specified time.

4. Yesterday at the Congo Advisory Committee meeting, U Thant expressed his view that time was running out in the Congo. He gave November 15 as a deadline for satisfactory replies to the Gardiner letters to Adoula and Tshombe.⁴ These had urged them to get on with their respective moves under the UN plan. If no satisfactory replies were received, U Thant said he would consider the reconciliation plan scrapped and adopt an as yet unspecified alternative policy. The Indian representative of the Advisory Committee said that they had no intention of withdrawing their troops from the Congo.

C.K.⁵

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Congo. Confidential.
2. The attachment is a copy of the “Proposed Contingency Plan for the Congo;” see footnote 5, Document 323.
3. A November 5 memorandum from Kennedy to Rusk, signed but never sent, reads as follows: “I wish you and George Ball would take a long look as to where we are in the Congo. “If the UN effort is going to collapse we should work out some alternatives. We should at least be laying our ground work. “A handwritten note on a copy of the memorandum states that it was not sent because a meeting had already been arranged for the following day; see Document 325. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Congo)
4. Gardiner wrote to both Adoula and Tshombe on November 1 urging them to take the steps necessary for the implementation of the U.N. Plan. (U.N. doc. S/5053/Add.13, Annex XVII; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 896–897)
5. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.