300. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State1
777. Department also pass information White House. Eyes only Acting Secretary from McGhee. Eyes only Ambassador MacArthur. USUN eyes only for Secretary and Stevenson. Following is evaluation situation following further talks UN Force Commander Kebede, Gardiner and Mobutu. These views are of course subject to modification following trip to Elisabethville, yet situation created by lack progress reconciliation plan is moving rapidly to climax and important decisions must be taken shortly.
Consensus is that Tshombe, using usual thinly veiled delaying tactics, will not proceed with plan but will probably not make open break. This is paralleled by continuing buildup of combat planes and mercenaries in apparent anticipation military showdown. He is reported to be convinced Belgium and other Western nations will not take economic measures against him.
I would like to believe that Tshombe could be favorably influenced by an open and sympathetic approach combined with a show of US determination and will during my visit with him give this thorough try. I believe we must be prepared, however, for eventuality that he will not change his present course until presented with an accomplished fact, or convincing evidence of its inevitability, into area affecting his vital interests.
UNNY has approved proposed letters from Adoula to UMHK, Belgian Government and UN re deposit taxes and royalties from mining operations with GOC but have come to view that they should not be revealed publicly until it becomes known as accomplished fact. This is apparently to protect Spaak from political pressures announcement would engender and because of conviction Tshombe is influenced only by action not by prospective action.
Although decision is up to UNNY and Spaak, the opposing view, which I consider stronger, is that fact of letters will become known anyway, that Spaak must have taken this factor into account when he agreed to them with U Thant, and that knowledge their existence combined with show determination our part that they will be carried out might have sufficient effect on Tshombe induce him carry out plan.
Apart from this hope I believe that if plan fails, carrying out of Adoula request will put UN and supporting governments in best possible [Page 592] light for showdown with Tshombe, which will be only alternative to UN withdrawal. There is, I believe, chance that Tshombe, even though he has not been willing to carry out plan, would acquiesce to a real show Western strength and unity symbolized by UMHK payment to Adoula, particularly if his 50 percent were remitted promptly. This could lead either to a resumption of real negotiations along lines of plan or toward a less ambitious modus vivendi.
If Tshombe does react, however, this procedure will put him in position of having to take initiative for any aggressive retaliatory move. This may be made against UMHK personnel and installations, in which case UN could do what it can to assist or, as Gardiner believes, against UN forces in Elisabethville themselves.
UN reaction to either move would then be entirely defensive and fully justified in U.S. and world public opinion. It could assume form of defending UN position when attacked at Elisabethville which according to UN, can be done with only minimum extension of present perimeter to avoid being cut off, surrounded and overwhelmed. This defense would require from us only airlift, which I believe we should be willing assure in view high stakes for ourselves, and fact that would be required as result action we supported. If this defense is successful, as UN believes, we will be no worse off than before.
Principal weak link in this chain and one to which I believe we have not given adequate consideration is uncertainty as to Spaak’s ability to act, pointed out by Ambassador MacArthur in his excellent Brussels telegram 518,2 which I believe reflects doubts we have all had despite Spaak’s forthcoming position in meeting New York on 24th. No one with whom I have talked in Léopoldville thinks Spaak will be able politically to request UMHK to take action proposed or that UMHK would do it if requested.
I believe time has come for U.S. to face fact that we must offer to back up both UMHK and Spaak if we expect them to follow through. It has perhaps been unrealistic to expect UMHK to stick its head in noose without any assurance of assistance and only slightly less so to ask this of Spaak. Although we can do little to protect UMHK personnel except through UN we can offer to share in some ways consistent with availability U.S. funds UMHK losses in destruction of plant and losses of operating revenue that would result from Tshombe’s actions. I realize that it would be difficult find source of funds and justify to Congress. I believe, [Page 593] however, it would be good investment in light of demands on us which might result from alternative courses of action. Perhaps a part could be in form of generous EXIMBANK loan for equipment available in U.S., part as grant for reconstruction and rehabilitation Katangese economy.
We should, in addition, be willing share in providing assistance to tens of thousands UMHK personnel who may be temporarily out of employment in event plants are closed down, and to supply temporarily some of basic needs Katanga economy now met from UMHK payments.
Spaak will also need strong moral support from U.S. and other governments. It should be noted that Lord Home in his meeting with Stevenson and myself in New York on 24th drew line between type of action contemplated and sanctions. Both we and British should strongly support UN and Belgian Government in action re revenue deposits as means of giving Spaak necessary political strength to accomplish it. There is comparatively little we can do directly to apply effective economic pressures against Tshombe. Spaak alone is in position take action short of direct application of force. It is too risky for us to take chance that he might falter.
Request urgent consideration so assurances can be given Spaak before political pressures start building up on him. In event plan fails and no economic measures are forthcoming, Adoula may as reported my conversation with him September 28, request UN to withdraw so he can face Tshombe himself; or as SYG has only recently stated he will himself go to SC and ask for UN withdrawal (USUN 905).3 Consequences of such withdrawal to U.S. interests are too obvious to belabor.
Gullion and Fredericks concur.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.12–McG/9–2962. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Brussels and USUN.↩
- In telegram 518, September 27, MacArthur referred to Spaak’s September 24 statement to Rusk and McGhee that if negotiations failed, he would have his government persuade Union Miniere to close down its plants in Katanga (see Document 294). MacArthur expressed doubt that Spaak could make this position prevail with the Cabinet, Parliament, and public. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–2762)↩
- Document 297.↩