Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

301. Paper Prepared by Acting Secretary of State Ball¹

Washington, undated.

TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT INLUNCHEON MEETING WITH LORD HOME

I. The prospects for a Congo solution are rapidly deteriorating. At the moment the situation appears as follows:

A. Adoula’s position is rapidly weakening. He is under great pressure from extreme elements to take rigid anti-Tshombe positions.

B. Gardiner is operating on the principle that he will not start mediating until Tshombe starts cooperating. But the policy of isolating Tshombe is showing no dividends.

C. The draft constitution prepared by the UN-appointed commission is an over-sophisticated and probably unworkable document, calling for much greater centralization than will ever be accepted by the Katanganese; at the same time the extremist opposition in Léopoldville has become so strong that the parliament in Léopoldville would probably not approve any constitution.

D. Tshombe is exploiting his genius for filibustering; he is trumping up grievances, making pious and self-righteous noises, and displaying every intention of frustrating any serious integration. The work of the Financial Commission in Elisabethville charged with devising plan for allocation of revenue is being undercut by Tshombe’s legalisms. Meanwhile there is evidence that he is adding to his air capability and building up his forces.²

E. The President has sent McGhee to the Congo in the hope of improving the situation. At the same time President has taken steps to blunt influence of US right-wing support for Tshombe by engaging cooperation of Senator Dodd.

F. With a view to improving economic conditions favorable not only to the Central Government but to the Katanga new economic and financial controls have been proclaimed by the Léopoldville Government after consultations with the UN, Belgium, UK, US.

II. There is a desperate need to get Congo off dead center.

A. The Congo is diverting Western energies and weakening solidarity of West at time of increasing Bloc pressures.

B. The fall of Adoula in favor of extremist elements would almost certainly mean civil war against Katanga.

C. While ANC could not conquer south Katanga without substantial outside help—either from UN, the USSR and its African friends or from the West—and the Katanga forces would probably not try to take over the rest of the country, there would be continuous civil war. This would:

(1) Endanger all whites in area—provoke massacres, etc.

(2) Bring about the fragmentation of the Congo. Additional provinces would probably secede; the result would be a reversion to tribalism.

(3) Create a power vacuum into which the USSR would almost certainly try to move.

(4) Increase the likelihood of disturbances in the Rhodesias and Angola.

III. If integration is not achieved soon the UN will have to get out of the Congo, inviting total collapse.

A. The UN cannot afford to go on spending $10 million a month to keep 17,000 men in the Congo, while its policies are visibly failing. (Quite clearly the US Congress will not permit us to go on picking up the check.)

B. If integration can be achieved within the near future, a reduced UN force can be justified and presumably financed.

C. If the UN leaves under present conditions the extremist elements in Léopoldville will almost certainly force an invitation to the Soviet Union to intervene by itself or through its African friends. This could well mean a confrontation between East and West in the heart of Africa.

D. Withdrawal of the UN will greatly discredit its usefulness and will presumably mean the resignation of U Thant. (He has threatened to resign if integration is not achieved before his term expires.) At the same time the Afro-Asian bloc is likely to be driven to new heights of irresponsibility; they will strike out at the Western powers on the ground they have deserted the UN. This can create great difficulties for Britain in Rhodesia and elsewhere.

IV. We must bring this situation to a resolution within the next few weeks by maximum pressure both on Léopoldville and Elisabethville. The Western powers cannot continue in the ridiculous position of being paralyzed by not being able to bring these two factions together.

A. The minimum objective is for the differences between Léopoldville and Elisabethville to be accommodated sufficiently to enable the withdrawal of most of the UN Force while assuring the maintenance of Western influence in the Central Government. Continued political rivalry among the various Congolese factions, and even some minor fighting for years to come, is probable and need not worry us too much.

B. The appearance of disarray and dissension of the Western side is hurting our entire position and giving an impression of impotence.

C. Tshombe’s arrogant disregard of the Western powers stems from his belief that the strong financial and economic interests involved prevent effective pressure on him.

D. While no firm decision was ever made by the Western side to impose economic sanctions on Tshombe—since that stage had not been reached under the agreed procedure—public expressions by the British Government of their opposition to sanctions tended to undercut the Western position.³

E. Spaak has gone all out in trying to hold the Belgian Government in line and bring pressure on the UMHK but his position has been weakened by the influence of the City.

Recommended Action

A. The British should make a maximum effort through Welensky to persuade Tshombe to cooperate since the whole Rhodesian situation will be endangered if the Congo bursts into flame.

B. The UK Government should try to persuade the City to refrain from giving further encouragement to Tshombe’s intransigeance.

C. In the event that McGhee’s mission does not radically improve the posture of negotiations in the Congo, the UK should join with the US in encouraging Spaak to persuade the Belgian Government to order the closure of the UMHK mines.

D. We do not believe that the action of the Belgian Government in closing the mines at the request of the UN would be any precedent for UN sanctions against the UK in the Rhodesian situation. However—without getting into a discussion of Rhodesia—the President might suggest that the extent to which we can assist the British in getting through their Rhodesian difficulties both in and out of the UN will be not unrelated to the extent to which they support a viable Congo policy.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Congo Security 1962. Confidential. Filed with a September 29 covering memorandum from Ball to the President, which reads as follows: “All evidence indicates that—barring some new major effort—our plans for the Congo are slowly sinking in the African ooze. I have drafted the attached talking paper with the thought that you will wish to make a strong pitch to Lord Home to enlist active British support.” The President was to meet with Lord Home on September 30.
2. Telegram 745 from Léopoldville, September 26, reported that aerial photographs showed 16 aircraft at and around the Kolwezi airport and that this represented a considerable increase in Katangan air capability. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.5622/9–2622) A September 29 memorandum from the CIA Office of Current Intelligence called attention to this report. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo) Further documentation on this subject, including U.S. efforts to prevent the shipment of aircraft, spare parts, and ammunition to Katanga, is in Department of State, Central File 770G.5622.
3. A note in an unidentified handwriting on the source text reads: “We have now determined that Lord Home did not send the letter to Tshombe which McGhee described the other day in your office.” Another September 29 memorandum from Ball to Kennedy refers to a report by McGhee that Home had sent a message to Tshombe that the British would oppose the imposition of sanctions. It states that Ball had spoken to Ambassador Ormsby Gore about this. Ormsby Gore had told him later that no such message had been sent to Tshombe and that to the extent the British had indicated they would not impose sanctions, they had made it clear that others would do so and that Tshombe should therefore move quickly toward integration. (Ibid., 770G.00/9–2962)