270. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee) to President Kennedy1
SUBJECT
- U.S. Contact with Tshombe in Geneva
The Consulate General in Geneva has learned indirectly that Mr. Tshombe would like to talk on a secret basis to Assistant Secretary Harriman or someone designated by you during his stay in Geneva.2
A talk with Tshombe by a high-ranking American might be helpful in bringing home to Tshombe the determination of the United States Government that the Katangan issue be settled promptly. It would further weaken Tshombe’s spurious claim that there has never been an effort to negotiate with him. It could also help convince him of the pressures building up against his secession throughout the world.
However, in balance, the Department is persuaded that a visit by a ranking American to Geneva to contact Tshombe now would not be desirable for the following reasons:
- 1)
- Contact with Tshombe at this stage would jump the gun on our national reconciliation proposal and course of action which still need UN and GOC approval; it would be out of phase with the timing of the national demarches envisaged by the course of action worked out, after lengthy negotiations, with the other governments and the UN, which provides for such demarches only after UN presentation of the proposal to the two men.
- 2)
- Unless Adoula agreed and cleared the proposed visit with his cabinet, the knowledge in Léopoldville that the Americans are contacting Tshombe before their new proposals have been cleared with Adoula would undermine Adoula’s position and that of the U.S.
- 3)
- It would not be possible to keep Mr. Harriman’s meeting with Tshombe from becoming public knowledge. Even if we attempted to do this, Tshombe would have every incentive to exploit the visit. The result would be not only to enhance Tshombe’s prestige but to strengthen him in his contest with Adoula.
- 4)
- Mr. Harriman would not at this stage be able to present Mr. Tshombe with a definite proposal which he could urge him to accept. Tshombe would unquestionably make proposals making it difficult for Mr. Harriman to avoid getting into the position of mediator. This would not be considered an appropriate role for an important American official at this time.
- 5)
- Tshombe would, in all probability, attempt to use such a meeting as a further excuse for delaying tactics, thus making it difficult for us to carry out our coordinated reconciliation proposals.
After the national reconciliation proposal has been presented to Adoula and Tshombe by the United Nations, which is the present plan, it might well be appropriate for Mr. Harriman or some other senior American to see Tshombe as a means of emphasizing the need to accept the proposal. National efforts in this regard were envisaged by the cooperating countries in the course of action agreed to.
Mr. Spaak has suggested that he might speak with Tshombe, and has sought Adoula’s reaction. If Tshombe should come to Europe for this purpose, it might be desirable for Mr. Harriman to see him, not necessarily at the same time and place. Both Mr. Harriman and Mr. Spaak might assume the role of “Dutch Uncle” as a means of persuading Mr. Tshombe to accept the national reconciliation proposals.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo. Secret. The source text includes no drafting information, but the Department of State copy indicates the memorandum was drafted by Vance, Carlucci, and McGhee. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.70G/8–962)↩
- Telegrams 148 and 151 from Geneva, August 7, reported that Tshombe had told David Morse, Director General of the International Labor Organization, who had met him at a dinner party, that he wanted to talk to Harriman. (Ibid., 770G.00/8–762) Telegram 161, August 9, reported that Tshombe had told Morse he was “ready now for settlement.” (Ibid., 770G.00/8–962)↩