Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, August 10, 1962, 6:44 p.m.

235. From Under Secretary Ball for Gullion. Léopoldville’s 340² and Geneva’s 168 to Dept.³ We have long been impressed with probability Tshombe, due to advice from Struelens and others, does not really believe in USG determination bring about satisfactory reintegration Katanga. Your point appears sound that Tshombe’s desire to see prominent American in Geneva is motivated by his increasingly desperate desire to find some way out of developing pressures on him to accept reintegration. We would not wish to take an action which might deflect or slow down the proposal and course of action we have now laboriously worked out with the Belgians and British and which, we have reason to believe, will shortly be approved by the SYG. Phase II of the course of action envisages efforts by the participating governments to persuade Tshombe that his acceptance of the proposal for national reconciliation is not only reasonable but offers him the only path which he can follow without risking disastrous consequences for himself.

I will be in Western Europe until Tuesday⁴ on Common Market purposes and can find ostensible reason to be in Geneva and meet Tshombe Monday afternoon.⁵

I believe Tshombe’s presence in Geneva offers us an opportunity to bring home to him effectively our determination and at the same time avoid the pitfalls mentioned above. Ideally this could be achieved if SYG’s concurrence in our proposal and course of action could be obtained today and if Gardiner could then tomorrow obtain Adoula’s concurrence. A meeting between Tshombe and me for the sole purpose of making abundantly clear to Tshombe the USG determination could then be explained to Adoula as an implementation of the course of action which Adoula would have already approved. However, USUN tells us that U Thant has only this morning begun staff consultations on our papers and action in New York and Léopoldville which would be required to move these papers through acceptance by Adoula could not be completed before Monday at the earliest.

Accordingly, we are hopeful you believe you can, in the light of your discussions with Adoula to date on the effort we have been endeavoring to mount plus description in general terms of its present status, be able to convince Adoula that my receiving Tshombe would be in our mutual interest.

Request you see Adoula Saturday along these lines and emphasize that the success of the effort we are mounting will depend to a very considerable extent on convincing Tshombe that the analyses of American determination he has been obtaining from Struelens and others are inaccurate. I would decline to countenance any Tshombe proposal or effort to discuss substance in mediatory fashion and advise Tshombe to return immediately to Elisabethville and in his own interests react favorably to the proposals which will shortly be put to him.

If necessary, am prepared to deprive Tshombe of possibility misrepresenting this talk by myself or Dept explaining to press exactly what I told him either immediately after seeing him or later if news of talk reaches press.

We would inform Belgian, British and French Govts at high level and SYG all in utmost secrecy of this meeting only after it has occurred taking position that it was impromptu meeting arranged while I was in Geneva for disarmament consultation. You should ask Adoula to say nothing of this to anyone until we have had opportunity tell SYG, following which you would inform Gardiner.

Geneva has told Tshombe some high ranking American might be in Europe who could conceivably receive him although no assurance whatever given along this line. Tshombe has stated he remaining Geneva until Tuesday.

Request Niact message on Adoula meeting repeating reply Paris Eyes Only for Ball attention Mrs. Helen Hanainy.⁶

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–1062. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only; No Distribution. Drafted by Vance; cleared in draft by Burdett, Fredericks, and Cleveland’s Special Assistant Thomas W. Wilson; and approved by Ball.
2. Telegram 340 from Léopoldville, August 9, commented on the reports of Tshombe’s interest in meeting with Harriman. Gullion thought a meeting with Tshombe would alarm Adoula, prejudice chances for success of the new approach to the Congo, and lead to the United States being held responsible when Tshombe again failed, as Gullion anticipated, to carry out his promises. (Ibid., 770G.00/8–962)
3. Telegram 168 from Geneva, August 10, reported that Tshombe was postponing his departure from Geneva in the hope of seeing a U.S. official. (Ibid., 770G.00/8–1062)
4. August 14.
5. In a telephone conversation that afternoon, Bundy told Ball that the President thought someone, perhaps both Harriman and Ball, should see Tshombe. Bundy said he thought that “the President would like to have Ball’s convictions and Averell’s blarney.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation, August 10, 5 p.m.; Kennedy Library, Ball Papers) In a telephone conversation shortly afterward with Bundy, Rusk told him that both Harriman and Ball would “make too much noise” but that Ball would see Tshombe. Bundy said the President had an idea that “Harriman might pull it off” but Rusk said “not for this particular job.” (Notes by Phyllis Bernau of telephone conversation, August 10, 5:09 p.m.; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
6. Ball’s personal assistant.