Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

268. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy¹

Washington, August 3, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Proposed Action on the Congo

Since our last discussion on the Congo crisis with you on July 25, Prime Minister Adoula has announced his commitment to the adoption of a federal constitution with a division of powers similar to the US Constitution.²The Acting Secretary General on August 1 issued an appeal to all UN member countries to use their influence to persuade the principal parties in the Congo that a peaceful solution is in their own interest. He also announced his intention, if such persuasion should finally prove ineffective, to urge the UN member countries to propose economic pressures upon the Katangese authorities, and, in the last resort, bar all trade and financial relations with secessionist Katanga.³

In working level talks held in Washington with the Belgian, British, and French Embassies, we have drafted on an ad referendum basis, a program of action to achieve the prompt integration of Katanga. (See the enclosed “Course of Action” and “Proposal for National Reconciliation”,⁴ to be submitted to the interested parties.)

Adoula’s Position

Prime Minister Adoula’s commitment to a federal constitution constitutes a crucial concession to Tshombe’s demands for local autonomy and was made with considerable risk for Adoula’s domestic political position. While Tshombe has indicated his readiness to negotiate on this basis, the need for early practical measures towards integration of Katanga remains paramount. Without such measures Tshombe could drag out the negotiations and break off the talks at any given moment, relying on the assumption that the West is unwilling to support a vigorous UN action against Katanga. If we were to allow the situation to continue to drift, Adoula’s position would become untenable. The fall of the Adoula government would be followed either by a government supported and controlled by Lumumbist parliamentarians or, more probably, by a Mobutu-led military coup. Such a coup is likely to fragment the Congo into a pro-communist regime in Stanleyville—this time with much wider international support (including logistics), a military dictatorship in Léopoldville, and the continuance of Tshombe’s secessionist regime in Elisabethville.

Agreement on Program

A new series of meetings was held in Washington on July 31 and August 2 with Belgian, British and French representatives. The papers which emerged from those discussions reflect a real effort by the participants to accommodate each other’s views. In these meetings, agreement was reached ad referendum, with the Belgians on a vigorous program to achieve the prompt reintegration of Katanga.

The Belgians were represented by their Charge d’Affaires and by Viscount Davignon, Mr. Spaak’s personal secretary sent to Washington to present Spaak’s views directly.

The British were represented by Counselor Greenhill and Embassy Secretary Shaw, who indicated that the British Government would probably associate itself with the Proposal for National Reconciliation and join in the first two phases of our Course of Action and possibly the third. The British would not, however, join a boycott or approve any action that would risk hostilities. On the other hand, they may conceivably not try to hinder others from taking such measures.

The French Government was represented by Counselor de Commines, who stated that he was not certain of the attitude his government would take but believed that it could agree to the Proposal and at least Phases I and II of the Course of Action. Government views will be conveyed to us urgently.

Proposed Program

The program drafted in these meetings and now submitted to the respective governments for approval follows the general approach which was outlined in the discussions with you on July 25.

Phase One:

The first phase of our program calls for presentation of our Proposal for National Reconciliation and the Course of Action to the Acting Secretary-General and, if he approves, to Prime Minister Adoula by a representative of U Thant. The Proposal for National Reconciliation calls for Adoula to make firm his commitment to submit to Parliament a federal constitution.

The Proposal also calls for: the immediate sharing of tax revenues and foreign exchange earnings between the Central Government and the provinces; rapid reunification of currency; integration of armed forces; closing of provincial “foreign offices” and withdrawal of representatives abroad; a general political amnesty; freedom of movement of UN personnel (including forces) over all the Congo; and representation of the Tshombe party in the National Government.

Acceptance and implementation of this proposal would therefore bring Katanga secession to an end. Tshombe would no longer be able to administer Katanga as an independent state.

Simultaneously with the presentation of our proposal to Adoula, the participating governments and the UN will undertake a series of measures. These are designed to strengthen Adoula’s position and demonstrate to Tshombe our determination to see an early end to Katanga secession. The measures are spelled out under Phase I. E, items 1 through 11 of the enclosed “Course of Action.”

They involve: public statements; collection at Antwerp of Congolese duties on goods exported from Belgium to the Congo; a small impact shipment of US military equipment for the Congolese army; additional economic aid to the Congo by the US and hopefully also by other governments; appeals to Congolese neighbors and all UN member nations to help prevent the entry of mercenaries, arms and military equipment into Katanga; refusal of visas and entry to Katangans unless they have Congo passports; and similar measures.

Phase Two:

The second phase of the program provides that the Proposal for National Reconciliation, if acceptable to Adoula, will be presented to Tshombe. Tshombe will be asked to give a definite answer within 10 days. The US and other governments will urge Tshombe to accept the proposal. If he indicates any intent to refuse or delay decision, these governments will advise him that refusal will result in a boycott of Katanga copper. He will be warned that, if necessary, even more stringent measures will occur. These could include, he will be informed, the withdrawal of Belgian technicians; the suspension of postal and tele-communications with Katanga; UN control of air traffic into Elisabethville; the stoppage of petroleum imports; and the blockade of Katanga exports and imports on the rail lines in Katanga.

Phase Three:

Under Phase III of the program, if Katanga does not accept the Proposal within the specified time, the Government of the Congo will ask all governments to boycott Katanga copper unless it is exported under its authority. The US and Belgian Governments (Belgium imports approximately 75% of Katanga’s copper exports) will comply and urge all other governments to do likewise (the UK still has reservations on joining in this action and the French position is not yet known).

Phase Four:

If the foregoing steps do not achieve Katangan reintegration, the US and Belgium and as many other governments as possible will consult with regard to supporting the UN in more stringent measures. It is important to note that possible application of such measures will have been announced earlier to Tshombe (see Phase II).

The significant step in Phase IV would envisage UN action in Katanga to block copper exports in support of a Congolese request if all else, including the voluntary boycott, failed. It should be clearly recognized that this step, if carried out, would risk the outbreak of hostilities. The Belgian representatives have indicated that Spaak, if necessary, is prepared to consider such a blockade. However, the position of our allies can only be definitely known at the time when firm decision on Phase IV may be required.

Relation of Program Phases

Although the Department believes that we should at this time resolve to take such measures as are required to assure the reintegration of the Katanga, a final decision to proceed with Phase IV would be made only after further consultation with our allies and decision by you. We propose at this time to proceed only with steps outlined in Phases I–III. A decision as to which of these actions may be necessary or appropriate will be made in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time.

The Belgian Ambassador to the UN and Viscount Davignon outlined the main elements of the program to U Thant who, they said, indicated his willingness to back the plan. We have explored for many months every conceivable means of applying pressure that would not risk renewed hostilities in Katanga. The West’s determination to force Tshombe to act on other than his own terms has not, however, been credible and, accordingly, his position has remained essentially unchanged.

There is reason to believe that fighting is not inevitable and may be entirely avoided if the UN and the US are able to make clear to Tshombe their determination to see an end to Katanga’s secession. Tshombe is not likely to go down fighting if he is convinced that prompt reintegration of Katanga is inevitable and if reasonable terms are available.

The Military Problem

It is clear that the UN is not able to and will not embark on an effective course of action to end Katanga’s secession unless it is assured of US support. It is equally clear that, regardless of what happens with reference to Katanga, the UN cannot remain in the Congo indefinitely.

In order to develop a basis for its withdrawal, the UN is now discussing a plan calling for the gradual disengagement of UN forces. There would be a contemporaneous build-up, under UN supervision, of a responsible Congolese army. As the training and re-equipping of that army progresses, the UN will gradually relinquish to it military control, first over areas outside of South Katanga.

The Department would regard this plan favorably only if the Congo army were retrained and became a responsible force, which it is not at present. Building a responsible Congo army as rapidly as possible will result in the development of a Congolese capability to maintain law and order. This is essential to the launching of a much needed comprehensive effort at national economic rehabilitation.

The early initiation of this program of assistance will also have a desirable psychological effect on Tshombe. It should contribute to the effective implementation of our proposed action program. Indeed, if the program is not successful the Central Government will conclude it has no alternative to reliance on its army to end secession. We would then have all the more reason to wish this army to be disciplined and responsible.

We are planning to assist the UN in training and equipping the Congolese army. The Department of Defense has already sent a small informal military assistance survey team to the Congo. The team’s report,⁵ and the actions to be taken on the basis of it, are now under study in the Departments of State and Defense. Initially, a small impact shipment of military equipment is planned for the immediate future as part of the Phase I measures in the proposed action program.

Recommendation

Your authority is requested to adopt this program and carry it through to the extent necessary to achieve our objectives. It is understood that if Phase IV actions become necessary at a later time, they will then be presented to you for decision.

As you are aware, we may lose the active cooperation of one or more of the Western European Governments as the course of action moves into the late phases. We expect to obtain the approval of the Government of Belgium. We hope that the British and French Governments, if they do not agree to all the program, will go along with most of it and will not oppose any of it outright.

In support of the foregoing program, we intend with the help of all interested agencies to conduct an intensified effort to enlighten public opinion and Congress on the situation in the Congo and on US policy. As appropriate we will explain the need for the application of this program, including such stringent measures as may become necessary.

George W. Ball⁶

[Here follows a draft National Security Action Memorandum stating the President’s approval of the course of action outlined in the enclosures. It was not signed, but see Document 269.]

1. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Congo Security 1962. Confidential. The source text includes no drafting information, nor does the Department of State copy. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–362) A covering memorandum of August 3 from Brubeck to Dungan states that the memorandum reflected revisions directed by Ball but that he had not seen it in its final form. Another covering memorandum of August 3 from Dungan to the President states that he had reviewed the memorandum, found it consistent with his understanding of the President’s wishes, and recommended approval.
2. For text of the Congolese Government’s July 28 communique outlining the principles for a Constitution, see U.N. doc. S/5053/Add.11/Annex XII; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 877–878.
3. The statement was issued on July 31; for text, see U.N. doc. S/5053/Add.11/Annex XXVII; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 880–881.
4. Not printed. Revised texts are printed as enclosures to Document 274, which summarizes the revisions.
5. A Special Military Advisory Team headed by Colonel Greene visited the Congo June 7–July 12; it set forth its findings and recommendations in a 116-page report dated July 23. The report recommended that the United States propose a broad program under a U.N. umbrella for the modernization and training of the Congolese armed forces and indicate U.S. willingness to organize such a program. (Report of Special Military Advisory Team, Republic of the Congo, July 23; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, 320.2 Congo) The recommendations are filed as an attachment to an August 1 letter from Johnson to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul H. Nitze. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.5/8–162)
6. Signed for Ball in an unknown hand; see the source note above.