Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

267. Record of Understanding¹

Washington, undated.

Record of Understanding of the Meeting with the President, July 25, on the Congo

Following is our understanding of the course of discussion with the President on July 25:²

The Department reported to the President that the situation produced by Adoula’s weakness, Tshombe’s intransigence and the unwillingness of Union Miniere to put effective pressure on Tshombe, cannot be allowed to continue to drift. A continuation of the present inconclusive trend would probably result in the fall of the Adoula Government within weeks due to the combined opposition of the Lumumbist and Katanga parliamentarians; Adoula’s successor would doubtless be from a group more prone to work with the radical Africans and sooner or later to accept an intimate association with the Soviet Bloc.

In a meeting in Washington on July 24, we tried out on the British, French and Belgian Governments a proposal which in our judgment should be saleable as a least common denominator of Western policy in the Congo:

1. A collection of constitutional precepts for a federal structure of the Congo nation (allocating essential functions to the Central Government and reserving other powers to the provinces) would be proposed publicly by Adoula, together with a proposal for a series of irreversible steps to carry out these principles. Adoula himself could not indicate receptiveness toward such a project by renewing negotiations unless he could at the same time counter his critics by pointing out that such measures were being applied, largely as a result of his diplomatic activity.

2. At the same time, a series of measures would be instituted, designed to induce Union Miniere, and through it the Katangese authorities, to cooperate in integrating the Katanga into the Congo. These are measures which do not seem to involve the risk of force being used against the United Nations by the Katanga; their purpose would be to rebuild the political position and morale of the Adoula Government, and to indicate to Union Miniere and Tshombe that the game of waiting and equivocating is up. These measures would be scheduled in such a way as to produce a cumulative effect, a new measure being instituted every day or two as a demonstration that the United Nations and the main Western governments mean business.

3. Accompanying these measures would be steps by the United States and hopefully other governments to create in other ways increased confidence on the part of Adoula and a better atmosphere between his government and others. These might include a statement by the President indicating his support for Adoula, and an early token shipment of aid from the United States to the Congolese National Army subject to approval of the United Nations.

4. Beyond these measures, the actions contemplated would realistically involve the risk of fighting. Under no circumstances will the United Nations take a military initiative; U Thant has made this abundantly and publicly clear in each of the European capitals he recently visited. Such actions would have to be done at the request of the Government of the Congo. These might involve the following:

(a) The United Nations would cease to cooperate in facilitating UMHK shipments (especially the makings of sulphuric acid) through the UN-held perimeter in Elisabethville.

(b) ONUC would interdict the rail lines which carry Katanga’s exports out through Angola and Rhodesia.

It was agreed that we should continue to explore the foregoing possibilities with our Allies in an effort to assure the maximum amount of support for an agreed course of action.

It was also reported to the President that the Acting Secretary General is considering a new policy whereby the United Nations would no longer interpret its mandate “to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo”, even by “the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort”, as requiring ONUC to interfere with military efforts of the Central Government to establish its authority over the whole of the Congo, including the Katanga. The Acting Secretary General is also considering the possibility that the United Nations might assist the Central Government’s military forces to fulfill this objective, by providing training, supply and logistic support.

U Thant has abandoned the idea of seeking a new mandate from the Security Council. Instead he has asked the Congo Advisory Committee, and particularly the nations which now have contingents in ONUC, some hard questions about “exactly where we stand with regard to the use that can be made of each contingent” of the UN Force in the Congo in circumstances that would entail the defensive use of force by United Nations troops or United Nations assistance and support to a more active role by the Congolese National Army. The answers from the governments concerned, most importantly India, Ireland, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Malaya, are expected at another meeting of the Congo Advisory Committee, Tuesday, July 31.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Files, Congo, August 1962. Confidential. The source text is unsigned and includes no drafting information, but it was evidently prepared in the Department of State. It is filed as an attachment to a memorandum of August 2 from Brubeck to Bundy headed “Progress Report on the Congo,” which summarized developments since July 25 and stated that a detailed report would be submitted to the President the next day.
2. According to Kennedy’s appointment book, the meeting began at 5:17 p.m. and ended at 5:56. Present were Williams, Ball, McGhee, Cleveland, Gullion, Fredericks, Dungan, and Military Aide to the President Major General Chester V. Clifton. (Kennedy Library) No other record of the discussion has been found.