266. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1
263. Congo. Reference: Department’s telegram 187.2 Cleveland, Yost, Gullion and Fredericks had two-hour mtg with SYG yesterday to discuss Congo. Also present were Bunche, Narasimhan, Amachree and Gardiner.
SYG first reported on his recent consultations in Europe. He stated he had found the English negative and the French more so. Both opposed [Page 523] economic measures to coerce Tshombe. Ireland opposed “dispersion” of UN troops in Katanga and their stationing in Jadotville and Kolwezi. No doubt they were influenced in this stand by the experience of their troops in earlier fighting. SYG had come back convinced that SC mtg was not desirable because nothing would come out of it.
SYG then described his mtg with Congo Advisory Comite July 24 (he was indignant at “distortions” in Hamilton N Y Times story and had authorized issuance corrective UN statement to press). He had asked CAC members whether they thought he should call SC mtg and had encountered no pressure to do so at this time. Only Quaison-Sackey (Ghana) wanted mtg now which would be confined to oral report by SYG. Guinea wanted subject discussed by GA and indicated Sekou Toure would like mediate. SYG informed us he intends submit written report on situation and his intentions to SC in near future.
He had also described to CAC economic measures for which he had sought support from European govts during his trip. These included: freezing UMHK assets in Belgium accompanied by UN protection UMHK properties in Jadotville, etc., protecting copper exports via Lubilash Bridge to Matadi and, if necessary blocking copper exports on other routes. He had informed CAC that he had met with considerable reluctance from European govts on these points. He had emphasized that he was firmly opposed to any UN military initiative and CAC had supported this stand.
He told us that he is at present inclined to give somewhat different interpretation to provision in SC res Feb 21, 1961 urging UN take all appropriate measures to prevent civil war. At that time there was, he maintained, no central govt in Congo. Now that there is central govt he would not interpret this provision to oblige UN to resist military action by that govt to restore its authority throughout Congo. He would also interpret broadly provision of Nov 24 SC res authorizing assistance to central govt in maintaining “law and order and national integrity.” In his view, he has authority to assist ANC in transport and logistics, indeed in all ways short of actual participation in combat. These interpretations of existing SC reses account for his belief that his present mandate is adequate and no further SC mtg required at this time.
Cleveland presented “proposal for national reconciliation” (reftel). SYG asked whether constitutional proposal was based on premise Tshombe would negotiate seriously. Cleveland replied it not necessarily so based. It was put forward in belief that reasonable federal constitutional proposal published by Adoula or with his consent would convince interested govts and world opinion of his reasonableness and would permit govts, if Tshombe rejected this proposal, to participate in necessary pressures upon him.
[Page 524]SYG and other UN Reps present raised several serious objections to proposal, primarily on basis that Adoula is politically too weak to risk making further public concessions, which this would be, until Tshombe had demonstrated more convincing readiness to accept integration. Bunche objected “tripartite drafting comite” unjustifiably grants powers over constitutional revision to Katanga and Tshombe to detriment of Parliament and other provinces. He argued that what are required at this time are measures to strengthen Adoula and weaken Tshombe, not the contrary.
Gardiner then made following specific comments on Dept paper:
[Here follow his comments on five specific provisions of the paper.]
SYG agreed on desirability of proposals contained in paper, but reiterated Tshombe could not be trusted to accept them.
Cleveland agreed but reemphasized importance of Adoula adopting forthcoming public opinion. In response to question how proposals should be presented, Cleveland said he believed Gardiner, backed by 4 Western Ambassadors in Leo, should sell proposal to Adoula. Gardiner emphasized that this would be feasible only if Adoula were informed that simultaneous announcement would be made of series of agreed measures to be taken vis-a–vis Tshombe to assure his compliance. These measures must all be agreed in advance and implemented one after the other at intervals of hours or days, thus convincing Tshombe his house falling in on him. Cleveland emphatically agreed.
SYG reiterated his basic position that funds likely to permit continuance Congo operation only until end 1962 (unless GA decides not to pay all outstanding debts with proceeds bond issue, which might permit continuance into spring). Thant stated he anxious disengage UN from Congo and outlined steps he proposes to take shortly: (1) He would write letter to Belgium requesting it withdraw technicians from Katanga; (2) He would write all member states asking them apply all possible economic pressures on Katanga; (3) He would write Adoula informing him UN intends assist with integration by all possible means; (4) He would ask Tshombe withdraw his troops from their positions in northern Katanga (Congolo, Kabongo and Badouinville) and would replace them with UN troops; (5) He would ask Adoula request UN assistance in fields immigration and customs control; (6) He would request UPU and ITU to cease recognizing separate Katanga postal and communications activities.
SYG promised prior consultation with USUN on drafts of letters mentioned above. He also promised further comments on Dept paper shortly. He concluded with suggestion further mtg with Cleveland after Jul 31 CAC mtg.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–2662. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels, Léopoldville, Paris, and London.↩
- Sent to London as telegram 502; see footnote 3, Document 265.↩