Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

265. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, July 24, 1962, 9:59 p.m.

186. Following based uncleared memcon.² McGhee called in Belgian Charge de Bassompierre, British Counselor Greenhill, French Counselor Winckler to discuss Congo. Also present were Gullion, Williams, Cleveland and Tyler.

In response McGhee’s request, Gullion gave his evaluation Adoula’s weakening domestic political situation with combination of left and right wing forces against him. Under these circumstances Adoula fatigued and discouraged and cannot afford long drawn-out discussion constitutional principles. Gullion believed Adoula would be willing to accept liberal set of constitutional principles giving genuine autonomy to provinces (perhaps modeled on US Constitution) provided he knows he will get effective backing from US, Western countries, and UN for pressures on Tshombe. Not much future in path of Commissions in view absence time limit and executive functions and Gardiner and UN also pessimistic about Commission framework. We therefore tending towards introduction package solution, as is UN.³

McGhee then said that we did not wish let situation drift as inaction dangerous. Not technical question of negotiations, but of Tshombe’s willingness negotiate and come to agreement, which depends upon effectiveness pressures which could be brought to bear on him. We therefore believe package solution should be introduced through UN, through U Thant if possible and if not through Gardiner, which would include constitutional principles and would include immediate steps by Tshombe toward reintegration.

McGhee then handed out memorandum to de Bassompierre, Greenhill and Winckler for their consideration, which being sent in immediately following cable.⁴ McGhee explained contents of memorandum not new and had been discussed previously with Belgians, British and French. USG conceived of this proposal as analogous to Bunker’s, not necessarily acceptable either side, but which has chance acceptance both sides. If U Thant or Gardiner would agree introduce this proposal, we would envisage UN showing it first privately to Adoula to obtain his agreement and then officially, but not publicly, to Adoula and Tshombe. Critical point would come if Tshombe refused accept package. Before going on describe possible pressures which could be brought bear on Tshombe, McGhee asked for reactions to contents of proposal. All three replied memorandum appeared reasonable in principle although they would of course have to check with their governments. De Bassompierre and Greenhill also questioned short time limits of five days attached to fulfillment of some of measures.

In presenting this package to Adoula, McGhee continued, we would inform him that increased Western aid, subject to controls, would be given if he accepted proposal and re-unified Congo resulted. We would also give him assurances about type pressures West would be willing exert on Tshombe in order to get Adoula accept this proposal. Of pressures which could be used on Tshombe there are some which might result in use of force but we wish keep those far in future. Similarly other proposals made, such as embargo of copper, which would involve UN Security Council action, which we prefer not pursue at this meeting.

Intermediate steps, not involving use of force or UN action, we now wished discuss with GOB include following three steps: 1) withdrawal Belgian technicians Katanga; 2) institution legal proceedings by GOC against UMHK in Congo to force payment UMHK taxes GOC; 3) Belgian cooperation with GOC in allowing latter to exercise voting rights on shares in Congo portfolio. Points 2 and 3, McGhee explained, in framework of recent UMHK statements it would be willing cooperate against Tshombe if legal basis laid. UMHK would go to Tshombe and explain it being forced into position of paying taxes to GOC and that present arrangement whereby it paid all taxes to Katanga would have to come to end. Additional steps which could be taken could include: refusal USG, GOB, French and British issue visas to Katangans except on basis GOC passports; collection Congolese import duties at Antwerp; UN could stop positive actions aiding Katanga and UMHK such as facilitating rail transportation sulphuric acid, etc. Above represented range of first round pressures, McGhee indicated which we hoped, but did not know, would be sufficient induce Tshombe accept package. Key to their effectiveness lay primarily in UMHK willingness cooperate. If they not sufficient or successful, next step would be UN sanctions or embargo, which, however, we not discussing now.

Bassompierre posed three questions: 1) Whether USG should discuss above course action with U Thant before receiving reactions from Belgium, Britain, and France, to which McGhee replied we would obtain U Thant’s and Gardiner’s views on memorandum, but would not go into details of pressures envisaged, since these depended upon agreement and cooperation Western countries concerned; 2) What US reply to Spaak’s proposal for Wachuku mediation was since would be difficult send report Brussels for new plan without reply on earlier Belgian initiative, to which McGhee and Cleveland replied that USG not enthusiastic about Wachuku mediation at present time in view U Thant’s view of him as unreliable, although if U Thant and Gardiner refused mediation role, we would wish look around for other suitable mediator who could be introduced in UN framework. Gullion added Adoula would reject outside mediator, and recalled Adoula had done so in December when Wachuku, Senghor and others considered; 3) Finally, Bassompierre raised question UMHK, saying GOB had no legal power over UMHK and difficult Spaak exert pressure on UMHK. Bassompierre, speaking frankly, asked if it possible avoid pointing finger publicly at UMHK since this would make it appear UMHK acting under pressure USG, which difficult psychologically.

In response latter point, McGhee said our objective give UMHK pretext or excuse cut off tax payments to Katanga, in line recent UMHK statements. McGhee stated in all frankness he had, as Bassompierre knew, done his best on previous occasions by going on TV dampen criticism of UMHK, but feeling in USG was that UMHK had not done enough, and this feeling extended to President, as evidenced his recent press conference.⁵ Plain fact is that income of UMHK subsidizes Tshombe’s secession and intransigence, and that ridiculous situation results from West being seriously threatened as result actions of Western company. Williams added question is one of alternatives. USG willing assume responsibility for tax collection plan, but we thought interim measures referred to earlier would be more palatable to GOB. McGhee emphasized USG determined see Katangan reintegration through, and that President fully agreed.

Gullion added Adoula needed friendly gestures from Europeans he could point to, and mentioned examples UMHK personnel flying into Elisabethville on Sabena planes without GOC visas or GOC agreement Sabena flights. Bassompierre agreed this point.

Greenhill at end mentioned US press had given impression British dragging feet on Congo policy which decreased effectiveness British demarches to Tshombe who tended discount them. McGhee said reports reaching USG indicated British, through their Embassy here and their spokesmen in Geneva and London had themselves disclaimed willingness support pressures on Tshombe.

Meeting ended with understanding that three Counselors would obtain their Governments’ views as soon as possible to package proposal, including both memorandum and program pressures, and that US would in meantime obtain UN reaction to memorandum and discuss possibilities U Thant or Gardiner pursuing mediatory role.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–2462. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Andrews, cleared by the Executive Secretariat, and approved by Cleveland. Also sent to Brussels, Léopoldville, London, and Paris and repeated to Elisabethville and to Geneva for Rusk.
2. Not found.
3. Gullion set forth his views in an untitled paper dated July 23, which is unsigned but indicates that he was the drafter. It begins as follows: “Time has run out. Shortly, Adoula will resign rather than be forced out. The MNC/Lumumba would dominate any new government but Mobutu would seize power first. The extremists would retire again to a Pathet Lao status in Orientale, but this time with wide support in Africa and Asia.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Files, Congo, May–July 1962)
4. Telegram 502 to London, July 24, transmitted the text of the paper, headed “Proposal for National Reconciliation.” It proposed the immediate creation of a tripartite drafting committee to draft a constitution providing for a federal government with provincial autonomy in local matters and a series of “Immediate Practical Measures,” including appointment of representatives to tripartite commissions, sharing on a 50–50 basis by the Congolese Government and the Katangan provincial government of all tax revenues raised in Katanga, and the appointment of at least three Conakat nominees as Cabinet ministers. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–2462)
5. At a press conference on July 23, the President replied to a question on the Congo in part as follows: “The Union Miniere, the company which controls these vast resources in the Katanga, pays its taxes just to the Katanga, not to the central government. It leaves Mr. Adoula without resources. It has weakened his position and I think that those who are sympathetic to the Katanga’s effort are liable to find complete chaos in the rest of the Congo.” (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 877) For complete transcript of the press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 568–576.