Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

261. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, July 21, 1962, 6:38 p.m.

164. Re Congo. For Yost. As indicated by Cleveland in telecon, we will be discussing next steps on Congo with Gullion Monday July 23, with UK, Belgians and French here July 24, and with U Thant July 25 or 26 during Cleveland New York trip. As preparation for these talks, following is indication our tentative line of thinking. Would like your reaction by Monday A.M.

1. Failure establish resumption meaningful dialogue between Adoula and Tshombe after breakdown recent talks, series of events demonstrating Tshombe’s complete intransigence, Adoula’s decreasing parliamentary support and probability early Security Council meeting lead us conclude that time is fast running out in Congo.

2. US has engaged in extensive consultations in recent weeks with UK, Belgium, and France to explore possibilities breaking current deadlock. Prevailing opinion holds that Tshombe will not reach agreement unless convinced to do so will mean he deprived of means maintain independent operation. It equally clear, despite our concerted efforts, UMHK not prepared take actions necessary to cut off Tshombe’s income. Studies also reveal effective measures against Tshombe cannot be taken by turning valves outside of Congo but can only be applied on ground. However, before it feasible undertake far reaching steps, described later, it essential Adoula convince world public opinion he has made reasonable negotiating offer to Tshombe which latter rejects or accepts. We believe major weakness in Adoula’s public position is failure make public convincing case he has been prepared grant Tshombe reasonable amount regional authority in federal constitution.

3. Unfortunately Gardiner’s attempt keep palaver alive through commissions, despite its potential value, has simply not worked. Accordingly, we wish SYG re-examine possibilities taking “package” approach to problem. After reviewing various possibilities open to us we continue believe package described Deptel 2073 to Léopoldville² remains logical and valid approach.

4. We recognize SYG has preferred not engage UN in negotiating constitution since this internal affair of Congo. If he prefers not have package advanced by UN this can of course be done by third party or parties. However, we believe U Thant should consider Congo crisis now at stage where upgrading of effort necessary and desirable. Moreover in view tremendous stake UN has in Congo would seem appropriate SYG personally engage himself at this point in mediation effort, including possible trip to Léopoldville after appropriate preparations with parties. Prestige his office supplied to this situation would mean increase of pressure on both Adoula and Tshombe and his skill and patience as negotiator likely make significant difference in prospects for success. FYI. U Thant’s personal involvement would also help forestall radical pressures for SC meeting. End FYI.

5. We recognize SYG unlikely wish undertake this difficult task without (a) general agreement among outside parties most concerned on the constitutional framework into which we should push Tshombe and (b) clear understanding of just how far US, Belgians, British and French are willing to go in backing up the leverage he will have to exercise in pressing two sides reach agreement. We continue believe that tax collection scheme, to be applied by UN in support GOC Customs Collectors on railway lines used for export of copper from Katanga is adequate “ultimate weapon” vis-a-vis Tshombe. Belgian agreement requires this scheme be implemented outside major population centers such as Elisabethville. We recognize this poses major logistics problem and would require maximum effort of UN forces in Congo. US would stand ready provide all necessary additional logistics support required carry out operation. We continue see advantage this scheme lying in fact that UN would be acting in support of GOC exercise its legitimate authority, initially any use of force would have to be by Katanga, and in our view can be undertaken within scope existing UN mandate without further reference to SC.

6. If SYG unwilling undertake this task personally we wish know if he willing designate an individual on behalf of UN undertake task. This would, of course, raise question relationship to Gardiner, who should retain present position. Nevertheless we believe there is advantage in injecting new element in this situation to supplement Gardiner effort by designating some prominent individual or individuals of higher level than Gardiner (including perhaps Wachuku) who could take appropriately tough line with both Adoula and Tshombe. We think U Thant would wish have this task undertaken by individual or individuals designated by UN since essential ingredient his negotiating effort will be threat to commit UN to more far reaching measures than it has taken in past.

7. If SYG still prefers not engage UN in this exercise, then some of major govts concerned would have to select individual or individuals to undertake third party role with full UN knowledge and acquiescence. But our strong preference is for direct mediation by UN, which is already so deeply committed in this affair that any SYG reluctance commit his full prestige seems out of keeping with his responsibility under Charter.

8. Supplementing work of any mediator could be an individual or group of political-level experts in constitutional law from countries with federal structure such as India, Nigeria, Canada, and Australia.

For Geneva: Secretary may wish comment before our meeting with UK, Belgium, French here July 24.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–2162. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Buffum; cleared by Cleveland, Tasca, and Burdett; and approved and signed by Ball. Also sent to Geneva for Rusk and repeated to Léopoldville, Brussels, London, and Paris. Rusk was in Geneva for the conclusion of the conference on Laos.
2. Document 246.