Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

260. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State¹

Brussels, July 19, 1962, 10 p.m.

122. Congo—Williams visit (meeting with Spaak July 19). (Third of three messages)²

Meeting at FonOff this morning of Governor Williams, Ambassador, Herz³ and DCM with Spaak, Van Den Bosch, Rothschild and Uppers helped crystalize yesterday’s discussions (Embtels 120, 121) re means and procedures for coping with Congo problem and breaking present impasse for ending Katanga secession.

Belgian thinking as outlined by Spaak and colleagues may be summarized as follows:

There is grave danger Security Council may now intervene in Congo on terms unfavorable to Western nations and hence West must produce plans soonest to ward off this possibility. Time therefore of essence. While there seems to be general awareness of this fact, one trouble has been tendency of parties concerned to try and get someone else to take action. No one group or country, however, can produce solution. While Union Miniere, for instance, can probably do more than it has, it alone cannot end Katanga secession despite widespread belief expressed in this greatly over-simplified approach to the problem. It is equally difficult for Belgium alone or limited number of countries such as those purchasing Katanga copper take initiative or engage in economic warfare in absence of an international mandate. Even US, which has expressed determination to help in acting to end secession, as Spaak has frequently warned Tshombe, cannot act alone. Therefore, plan involving international action sanctioned by UN in which all concerned can cooperate remains essential. In general, such plan might logically consist of two basic steps: (a) first to offer both Tshombe and Adoula, through good offices or some other such means, reasonable compromise constitutional solution based on federal organization of Congo coupled with threat of effective international pressures under UN mandate being brought against party refusing acceptance of equitable solution; (b) secondly to apply these pressures in event of recalcitrance on either side.

With reference to first step of defining and presenting to Tshombe and Adoula federal compromise plan, use of FonMin Wachuku (Embtel 92)⁴ as mediator on good offices basis seems to offer good possibility which could be profitably explored on urgent basis. Spaak felt Gardiner’s approach, while sincere and helpful, was based too much on discussion of details and did not get down to essential point of defining what Tshombe position would be under federal Constitution. Katanga must naturally know its position in federated Congo before it would be willing to take measures end secession. While it true that Adoula presented Tshombe with constitutional proposals on May 16, they were undiplomatically couched [garble] substantively unacceptable, including their failure contain procedural assurances for Katanga leading to implementation of proposals. Therefore they were “water over dam” and new constitutional approach would have to be made. While admitting some use of Denis might be made along lines discussed yesterday (Embtel 120), Spaak today did not warm up to this possibility. If Wachuku willing extend his good offices, it would, of course, be necessary obtain agreement of Tshombe and Adoula together with blessing of U Thant. Action to sound out parties concerned, however, could be initiated immediately and simultaneously. Meanwhile Western ideas for compromise plan, which could be essentially those emerging from London discussions, could be formulated for consideration and use of Wachuku, even though as mediator he would have to have freedom of action to modify initial proposal in light of Adoula’s and Tshombe’s reactions.

Belgians believed second step of applying pressures to recalcitrant party rejecting reasonable solution involves complicated problems. It would be less difficult with Adoula who could be informed that only way for him to obtain fair share of Katanga revenues and recognition of central govt’s authority without involving Congo in chaos and war, would be acceptance of compromise plan. Tshombe could be informed that if he failed to accept such compromise, he would have to face economic sanctions applied on international basis, such as cutting of rail routes in Katanga in order terminate export of all Katanga mining production. Spaak however believed this action could not be taken except on basis of Security Council resolution which, of course, involved danger of possible British veto and certain legal complications. Best basis for such resolution would be central govt’s request to UN for economic sanctions to end Katanga’s secession. Even if U Thant had authority to take such steps without Security Council resolution, he had made it quite clear that he would not do so except with Security Council authority. Once approved by UN, simplest form of sanction would be cutting of rail lines which would have effect of not only drying up export tax revenue by stopping Union Miniere production but cutting Katanga off from most important source of foreign exchange produced by some of Union Miniere exports abroad. Whereas Union Miniere would not be expected to take initiative just by itself in refusing payments to Katanga govt or stopping production, it would be in much better position to cooperate on basis of “force majeure” imposed by international sanctions. Otherwise Union Miniere could be subject to Katangese retaliation against its installations and personnel laying it open to bitter criticism of stockholders and employees.

Williams expressed appreciation for outline of Belgian thinking which he thought reasonable although it was not entirely along lines he felt Department pursuing. He said he had already informed Dept of yesterday’s conversations with request that Dept consider Belgian approach in connection with consultation with Ambassador Gullion who expected in Washington shortly. He thought some more definitive US conclusion could be reached by Monday or Tuesday. Meanwhile Governor and Ambassador considered it would be most useful if Belgians would reduce to writing resume of their ideas both on substance of proposals and procedures for Dept consideration over weekend. Belgians agreed and promised paper reflecting our discussions by early tomorrow, which we will transmit promptly.

Governor commented that any Belgian-American variation in views did not concern objectives, but possible tactics. He felt Dept’s approach re sanctions emphasized UN support of tax collection by central govt and suppression of Katanga National Bank as symbolic of exertion of Léopoldville’s sovereignty in Katanga. Belgians countered that attempting to collect tax revenue in Elisabethville and other urban centers impractical and most liable result in hostilities in more heavily populated areas. In any case tax collection would have less effect than more simple process of cutting rail lines and thus depriving Katanga of all foreign exchange produced by copper and other mineral exports. Governor said this point should be considered.

Referring to Belgian recognition of need of new constitutional proposals, Governor commented that we had been giving thought to idea of presenting both sides with definite package program, as Ambassador Bunker did in case of Indonesia-Dutch negotiations, which might be difficult if Wachuku should undertake “Bantu” approach to good offices involving lengthy consultations with both sides. Spaak replied that Wachuku’s terms of reference could include definite time limit and that Wachuku would probably in any case want to present both parties with quite concrete compromise proposals, which we could try to have reflect as much of London principle as possible.

Meeting ended most cordially with agreement that Belgians would submit memo for Department’s immediate consideration giving details their thinking re compromise federal solution and procedures for effecting it.⁵

Comment: While Spaak seems prepared, if necessary, to support cutting of Katanga exports through blockade of exit routes, he remains opposed to tax collection plan for reasons cited above.

MacArthur

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.15–WI/7–1962. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Léopoldville, USUN, Elisabethville, London, Paris, and Bonn.
2. Telegrams 120, 121, and 122, all July 19, reported Williams’ discussions of the Congo with Belgian officials. Telegram 120 reported a meeting with senior Foreign Office officials on July 18. Telegram 121 reported a meeting that evening with Spaak, the U.K. and French Ambassadors, Nokin, Robiliart, and senior Foreign Office officials. (All ibid.)
3. Martin Herz was at this time Special Assistant for Planning in the Bureau of African Affairs.
4. See footnote 2, Document 259.
5. Telegram 141 from Brussels, July 20, transmitted the translation of a document that Spaak had given the Embassy with his thoughts on measures that the Western powers might take. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–2062)