Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

253. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 29, 1962, 2:33 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Congo, including Nigerian Troops in Congo

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. Henry J. Tasca, Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
• Mr. Woodruff Wallner, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs
• Mr. Wendell B. Coote, Deputy Director, Office of West Coast and Malian Affairs
• His Excellency Jaja Wachuku, Nigerian Foreign Minister
• His Excellency J.M. Udochi, Nigerian Ambassador to the United States
• Mr. D.C. Igwe, Head of the International Division of the Nigerian Foreign Office
• Mr. George Dove-Edwin, Counselor, Nigerian Embassy
• Mr. Victor Chibundu, private secretary of the Foreign Minister
• Miss Agnes Wachuku, sister of the Foreign Minister

In raising this particular item, Foreign Minister Wachuku said that he was very worried about the situation in the Congo. He asked if the Secretary agreed with him that the problem now was in London and not in Brussels. If the economic aspects of the Katanga problem could be settled, a successful solution could be found. However, as long as Katanga was assured of support by the financial interests of the Union Miniere backed by the Tanganyika Concessions, Tshombe would shy away from the integration of Katanga with the central Congo Government. The Secretary agreed that in this framework the problem was in London and not in Brussels.

Continuing, the Foreign Minister said that the United Kingdom should not be so short-sighted since it too had a lot to gain by peace and tranquility in Africa. The Foreign Minister suggested that the U.S., West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Nigeria (if asked to participate) should be able to find a solution.

The Secretary stated that he had discussed the Congo problem in detail with the British and had made clear his view that the UN must be in a position to put severe pressures on Katanga. (In this respect Spaak had been very hopeful—an opinion with which the Foreign Minister agreed.) The main difficulty with the British, according to the Secretary, was that they shuddered at the possibility of another round of fighting. The Foreign Minister did not think that any fighting would be necessary if a firm position were taken that the Loi Fondamentale provides that taxes from the Union Miniere must be paid to the central government. It would then be necessary, of course, for the central government to allocate the funds fairly among the various regions. It was important that the best developed region not suffer in the distribution of the funds. A successful arrangement was worked out in Nigeria where one region, the Western Region, was much better off than the other regions. The Foreign Minister concluded that if the British came out as forthrightly as the U.S., and cooperated as Brussels is now cooperating, Tshombe would realize he had no backing and would then be reasonable.

In response to a question by the Secretary as to whom Tshombe listened to, Wachuku quickly responded that he listened to the British. In addition, Tshombe had secret agreements with Sir Roy Welensky and South Africa. Although he might not listen directly to London, he listened indirectly through the financial interests of London. The Foreign Minister said he intended to discuss this subject with Lord Home when he was in London and the Secretary encouraged him to do so.

The Secretary then queried the Foreign Minister on the status of the Nigerian troops in the Congo. His reply was that Nigeria had three battalions at home and two in the Congo, one of which it was desirous of withdrawing as soon as possible. He said he was personally agreeable to keeping the two battalions there for a longer period, but the Nigerian military did not look at the problem with the same eyes, especially in view of the state of emergency in western Nigeria. Furthermore, the Nigerians knew what their “sister country” was trying to do, and a large country like Nigeria could not leave its borders open to possible outside aggression.

The Secretary said he understood fully the reasons why the Nigerians wanted to have the battalion back home under the present circumstances and he was not in a position to assess how critical the situation in Nigeria was. Nevertheless, if we went down the trail with the UN and the Belgians toward applying additional pressures on Tshombe, violence could result. It would not be in the interest of either of our countries to take away from U Thant the kind of help he needs if he is to do what we are urging him. Furthermore, if trouble was to break out, we would like the Nigerian troops to be there. He hoped therefore that Nigeria would be able to keep its two battalions in the Congo.

The Foreign Minister said that he was not happy about the situation and that he had to intervene personally in order to get them to stay there until the end of June despite some objections by the military. The United Nations wants the troops to remain until the end of the Adoula-Tshombe talks. However, Tshombe is back home and no one knows when the talks will resume. On the face of it the Nigerian troops should be leaving but, nevertheless, Wachuku said they would stay there a little longer and he would do what he could regarding the matter. He had not had a chance to discuss the problem with the Prime Minister yet and he also planned to have talks with the Secretary General in New York next week. He added that a personal message from the President to the Prime Minister to keep the troops in the Congo until the conclusion of the Adoula-Tshombe talks would help considerably. The Secretary promised to explore the possibility of a Presidential message further.²

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/6–2962. Confidential. Drafted by Coote and approved in S on July 24. The time of the meeting is taken from the Secretary’s appointment book. (Johnson Library) Other topics of discussion were recorded in separate memoranda of conversation. Documentation concerning Foreign Minister Wachuku’s visit to Washington is scheduled for publication in volume XXI.
2. Telegram 71 to Lagos, July 14, transmitted an oral message from the President to Prime Minister Balewa urging against the withdrawal of any troops from the Congo at that time. (Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/7–1262) Telegram 103 from Lagos, July 21, reported that Ambassador Palmer had conveyed Kennedy’s views to Balewa. (Ibid., 332.70G/7–2162) Telegram 180, August 7, transmitted the text of Balewa’s August 6 reply, which stated that he would maintain two battalions in the Congo for the time being and expressed support for the policy the United States was pursuing as the best hope for solution of the Katanga problem. (Ibid., 332.70G/8– 762)