Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

245. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 9, 1962, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The Congo

PARTICIPANTS

• Belgian Foreign Minister P.H. Spaak
• Mr. Robert Rothschild, Chef de Cabinet to Mr. Spaak
• Belgian Ambassador Louis Scheyven
• Mr. Jean de Bassompierre, Counselor, Belgian Embassy
• The President
• The Vice President
• The Secretary
• Mr. George Ball, Under Secretary
• Mr. George McGhee, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
• Governor G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
• Mr. Foy Kohler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
• Mr. McGeorge Bundy, White House
• Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II

The President said that there were many difficulties in exerting pressure so as to bring about unity. The most critical aspects of the Congo situation are, the President continued, how to persuade Tshombe to come to an agreement with Adoula; what to do about the private economic interests; and what the governments of Belgium and the US can do to prevent the collapse of the Adoula government.

Mr. Spaak indicated that neither Adoula nor Bomboko seem to realize how serious the financial and economic situation is in the Congo. However, not only is it a question of the Congo’s needing assistance, but there has to be some form of controls over imports and the uses of foreign aid. Mr. Mladek of the IMF is also most concerned with the deteriorating economic situation in the Congo, Mr. Spaak said, and has stated that $10 million in foreign exchange will be needed in the immediate future to pay for necessary imports, as well as $15 million a month thereafter for some months. However, Mr. Spaak reiterated, it is essential that adequate controls be established so that this money will not be wasted. As an illustration of Congolese irresponsibility, Mr. Spaak remarked that the Congo Government had been pressing Belgium strongly to pay for a sumptuous “Palace of Culture” in Léopoldville. Another example of this unrealistic attitude was the fact that the Congo reacted to a recent Belgian offer of technical assistance by asking Mr. Spaak to appoint three judges to try Gizenga.

The President agreed that controls were an urgent necessity in order to prevent the drain on currency reserves and that the Congolese Government often did not act in a mature manner. The President emphasized, however, that it was of paramount importance to the West for Adoula and Tshombe to reach agreement, and pressure would have to be used, if necessary, to achieve this result.

Mr. Spaak concurred that it was extremely important for Adoula and Tshombe to reach agreement, but indicated that it was difficult to guess how Tshombe would react to pressure.

The President continued that, generally speaking, it would be disastrous to have a renewal of hostilities in the Congo. However, he went on, the US was prepared to support the use of strong pressures, if necessary, even though they might lead to the risk of hostilities which would in turn create problems for everybody, including himself. The difficulty is that Tshombe’s economic position is still quite strong, and therefore there is no great incentive for Tshombe to change his attitude. In view of the possibility that the Adoula Government may collapse if no progress is made in the negotiations, however, it is vital to act promptly, the President stated.

Ambassador MacArthur observed that it is most important to determine what concessions should reasonably be made by both Adoula and Tshombe. There must be a balanced solution and if Tshombe is to give up control of his army and half of his present revenues, there must be something in it for him. He must obtain satisfaction on constitutional issues and, in particular, he must gain a considerable degree of autonomy.

Governor Williams remarked that Adoula seems to be a reasonable man.

Mr. Ball stated that there are diverging opinions as to what Tshombe’s aspirations are, namely, whether he leans toward some form of an autonomy for Katanga or whether he wants to be a national figure in a united Congo. Recently, there had been some indications that he might favor a united Congo in the belief that he would play an important role in it. At the same time, he is disturbed over the fact that the opposition to him in the Katanga is receiving strong backing from Adoula.

Mr. McGhee said that one of the difficulties is the fact that Tshombe is being asked to give up something specific, but it is not clear what he will get in return, such as a new Constitution, which would give the Katanga some autonomy within a federal framework.

The President stressed that there was a difficult problem with the UN, because if the UNOC were to pull out of the Congo, it would be more difficult to exert pressure on Tshombe. Some elements in Katanga are under the mistaken impression that the US would not support another UN action in the Congo, the President observed.

Mr. Spaak replied that the US, the UN and Belgium should all speak in identical terms to Adoula and Tshombe, making it clear to them that unless they reach agreement, the Congo would not receive any help. Adoula does not realize how badly he needs money from the US.

The President wondered what could be done to persuade Tshombe to reach agreement. We would have to find effective means of persuasion or pressure and we should consider what both Belgium and the US could do along these lines.

Governor Williams said that as long as Tshombe had money and was receiving taxes from the private companies in Katanga, he could afford to hold out in the negotiations. It was important, therefore, to try to find means of turning off this flow of money to Tshombe. Any agreement reached between Adoula and Tshombe, the Governor stressed, should give the central government the power to levy taxes and to control the army, while allowing the provinces a large measure of autonomy.

Mr. McGhee said we should strive for a balanced proposal, whereby each party would be asked to give in on some things. Then, if Adoula accepted this compromise, but Tshombe refused to, we would have to exert pressure on Tshombe.

Mr. Spaak agreed there should be a balanced proposal, with concessions on both sides, but said that a final decision could not be made in advance as to what action should be taken in the event no agreement were reached between Adoula and Tshombe. This would depend on circumstances and on whether Adoula or Tshombe were responsible for preventing an agreement.

Mr. McGhee concluded the discussion on the Congo by saying that a balanced proposal could be an effective instrument to be used by the commissions which would be created as a result of Gardiner’s current mediatory efforts in the Adoula-Tshombe talks and that there would be further discussions with Mr. Spaak that evening at dinner as to details.²

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Belgium. Secret. Drafted by Glenn and MacArthur. The meeting was held at the White House during a lunch for Spaak, who visited Washington on June 9. He was in New York heading the Belgian Delegation for the U.N. General Assembly discussion of Ruanda-Urundi.
2. No record of the dinner conversation has been found. A memorandum of conversation dated June 9 records discussion of the Congo by Rusk and Spaak that morning and after lunch. At the afternoon meeting, Spaak and Rusk agreed that a working group would prepare papers on the problem of financial controls on aid and the tactics to be followed in obtaining a balanced political settlement. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/6–962) At a meeting that afternoon, McGhee and Rothschild agreed that a draft telegram to Léopoldville should be prepared and shown to Rusk and Spaak that evening. Their discussion of the problem of obtaining a political settlement and of the Congo’s financial situation is recorded in separate memoranda of conversation. (Ibid., 770G.00/6–962 and 870G.10/6–962)