Office of the Historian

242. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State1

Léopoldville, May 30, 1962, midnight.

2951. 1. This is to confirm (as indicated summarily in Embtel 2901)2 that I did on May 22 inform Adoula after consulting Gardiner, that US prepared to give full support to UN mediatory effort, even at risk of hostilities if necessary to achieve agreement on reasonable proposal. To make this assurance more meaningful to Adoula in his own environment, I explained in terms of Embtel 28953 that if GOC took reasonable line and Tshombe refused to negotiate, or if reasonable and responsible agreement reached which Tshombe refused to honor, we considered UN would back GOC and US would back UN; on other hand if GOC demanded simple capitulation or could not show it had made every reasonable effort to reach agreement, US could not help.

2. Effect of these assurances on Adoula so far has been what we desire: He has become more accessible to suggestions, more friendly to us and to Gardiner, more reasonable in negotiations, has moderated restrictions on Katanga delegates, and has tried to meet us half way on subjects of concern to us not directly related to Tshombe talks, e.g., Congolese purchase of aircraft at exorbitant prices, retraining ANC, et cetera.

3. In presenting position to Adoula, it turned out not to be necessary to diagram for him just how GOC might assert authority and how UN might back it up in event negotiations failed. I had thought since my previous hints to him had been necessarily vague I would have to be more specific and had therefore requested authority in paragraph eight [Page 470] of Embtel 28954 to tell Adoula about tax collection plan. Did not intend to suggest it be introduced into talks until these headed for failure as seemed case last week.

4. Paragraph eight of Embtel 2895 is in effect formula for eventual implementation of design presented in paragraph one above, moving from negotiating impasse to action. I contemplate Adoula would put Tshombe on notice (A) that GOC intends to take tax collection action, but (B) plan will take into account legitimate interests Katanga and technical experts would work out practical steps to put arrangement into effect.

5. Such advance notice might give Tshombe few days to get set to resist. On other hand it would give him final chance to avoid show down by force. If after this notice, tax collection plan resulted in hostilities, Katanga apologists could not claim this result of precipitate, provocative action (as they did last September). At last moment even UMHK might prefer to bring decisive pressures on Tshombe rather than risk unilateral assertion of GOC rights.

6. Adoula has himself obviously thought about how he would assert GOC authority if agreement failed. I am confident tax collection plan with UN backing has not occurred to him. He tends rather to think in terms of unleashing ANC operations in North Katanga. Possibly, therefore, he could interpret our assurance as backing for North Katanga scheme.

7. I should still like therefore after checking with Gardiner and when we know where collection points would be installed to inform Adoula about tax plan. I repeat that I would not propose anyone introduce plan into talks unless and until these were clearly headed for failure.

Gullion
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/5–3062. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels, Paris, London, New Delhi, and Lagos.↩
  2. Telegram 2901, May 22, reported a conversation in which Gullion outlined for Adoula the results of the London talks, telling him there was agreement on objectives but not on methods. He urged Adoula to give serious consideration to Gardiner’s proposals and told him the United States was prepared to back the United Nations but Adoula must be flexible and prepared to make concessions. (Ibid., 770G.00/5–2262)↩
  3. Telegram 2895, May 21, reported that Gardiner was deeply discouraged at the prospects for talks. Tshombe had returned to Léopoldville on May 18 and had professed willingness to take Gardiner’s proposals as a basis of discussion, but Adoula had declared that he was awaiting a Katangan reply to his April 16 proposals. Gullion proposed telling Adoula that if he took a reasonable approach and Tshombe rejected it, the United Nations would support the Congolese Government with U.S. backing, but that if he insisted on Katangan capitulation, the United States could not help him. (Ibid., 770G.00/5–2162) Telegram 1961 to Léopoldville, May 22, authorized him to talk to Adoula along these lines. (Ibid., 770G.00/5–2262)↩

  4. It reads as follows:

    “Provided Department does not perceive objection to specifics I should like further to suggest GOC advise Tshombe that at some firm date GOC will assume its responsibilities for customs collection and that tripartite commission GOC–GOK–UN will work out practical steps implement this agreement in accordance fundamental law. Adoula should also specify GOC undertaking supply appropriate portions Katangese budget excepting such things as gendarmerie, foreign representation, et cetera.”

    Telegram 1961 to Léopoldville (see footnote 2 above) requested clarification as to how this would fit in to Gardiner’s negotiating program.

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