228. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State1
2755. From Williams.2 During Léopoldville visit I had extensive conversations with Kasavubu, Adoula, Bomboko, Koumorico, Kimpiobe, Gbenye, and others.3
While variously pointing with pride to progress on some fronts, (cabinet changes, Gizenga, parliamentary victories, plans for budget and austerity measures) every single one of these men claimed unsolved Katanga issue was continuous threat to GOC policies and stability. Consequences delay in integrating Katanga not only felt directly in such sectors as government finance and defense but was used by opponents of government to block constructive measures not directly related to Katanga. For example, some parliamentarians who oppose austerity budget for most selfish reasons are encouraged in opposition by general waning of confidence in government. Incidentally made own Gallup Poll among professional men, students and others throughout Congo: What most important problem? Katanga secession inevitable answer, some adding it was “key to all other problems”.
Some of top GOC leaders alluded openly to disaffection in army and important sectors of population.
These negative influences have constrained government to take stubborn line in Tshombe talks, thus contributing to still further delay in negotiations and detracting from GOC public posture.
In conversations with GOC leaders I have sought to impress imperative need for better position before world opinion. Have urged them to persevere in negotiations but simultaneously work with US and UN to keep time from working against reconciliation and interests GOC.
Among leaders Adoula, at least, recognized bad publicity GOC has been getting especially in Tshombe airport incident and plans do better.
We should, of course, continue to do all we can to help Adoula improve his public posture. His publicity operation is picking up effectiveness. [Page 441] Our expansion of USIS efforts and means in Congo and its aid to GOC information services should also help. Much impressed by weekly wall picture newspaper USIS puts out for and over name of GOC. Part of effort should go to exposing truth about Tshombe, i.e., how he stands to gain from delay, details on his arms deals, difference between genuine federation and what Tshombe is after. On substantive side, we should try to check GOC tendency blame everything on Katanga problem. For example, we should work against idea that army reform cannot be tackled until Katanga settled. We have made some progress in lessening tension between Congolese over whether Belgians or UN would train army.
Cleveland’s visit useful in this matter as well as in another area where US can help clear up liabilities; i.e., more effective administration by UN and GOC of US funds and goods. Embassy has impression of “scatteration” overall aid effort and priorities. Sharp look at this should be taken in near future with increased priorities and possibly funds as well for education, roads, transport, and private capital investment. I hope investment guaranty agreement will be expedited. Also there should be more US personnel in UN.
Liaison between provinces and GOC very inadequate with consequent provincial resentment of Léopoldville.
Through appropriate means we should push ahead with effort to help Adoula build political party, compose his differences with labor movement, streamline his cabinet and increase his grip on parliament. We should also encourage reasonably free press.
Embassy tells me leverage on Adoula for accomplishment these and other important objectives has been much lessened in recent weeks by his feeling nobody including US can give him clue to Katanga riddle and by own nervous exhaustion.
In my visits to Adoula with Ambassador, he did not pull punches on danger of endless negotiations but he was less ominous in his forecasts of new policies and divorce from UN than Ambassador tells me he had been. Moreover Adoula’s brief vacation seems to have given him somewhat better grip on himself.
Ambassador and I agree airport incident brought him face to face with what it means to break with UN and to antagonize world opinion. Additionally, reaction of Congo Advisory Commission to idea of GOC bilateral approach to Africans has discouraged him at least for present from dubious adventures. He has also proved responsive to Gardiner’s stepped-up mediatory effort. Latter is working with him to produce fall-back position from draft conclusions he has introduced in talks. I believe US should produce for Gardiner its own formula.
[Page 442]Gardiner is working toward presentation in talks of comparative tabulation of positions. He also expects UN to be actually present in resumed sessions and says Adoula agrees.
In summary, I found visit with Adoula and GOC leaders relatively encouraging although prolonged crisis created by Katanga secession continutes deeply disturbing. Will comment further after visit to provinces.
Embassy comments: Embassy would warn that good effects on Adoula may be only temporary while basic causes of his frustration still exist and while Congolese state of mind is what it is (i.e., overwhelming majority would have wanted government to hold Tshombe).
For reasons which Embassy has extensively described Ambassador still would like to inform Adoula of tax collection plan. This cannot be done however until Gardiner is ready to go along and he will not consider it either to keep Adoula in line or force Tshombe to negotiate unless he has at least been promised certain reinforcements as prudent reserve in case plan miscarried.
Williams summary: Our program should be to continue to urge Adoula to do more than reasonable to work out reconciliation with Tshombe. This he seems prepared to do. Moreover, he should make his position clear to world in specific reasonable proposals that Tshombe failure to accept, or reasonably counterpropose, would leave Adoula before world as going all out for peaceful reconciliation. At same time, we must recognize Tshombe tends to delay negotiations, convinced that Adoula deals from weakness and has internal political and economic problems. To increase likelihood of successful negotiation Adoula must have strengthened posture not only in fact but of complete credibility to Tshombe.
Believe Adoula meeting provincial Presidents conscious or unconscious recognition of necessity to build support more than counter-maneuver against Tshombe. Must be other collateral ways to build Adoula strength in order to increase likelihood reconciliation. Strongly believe his pushing and our support of transport solution, more spare parts, more trucks, more roads would help provincial prosperity, politics and Adoula’s position.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/5–562. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels, USUN, London, Paris, Elisabethville, and Brazzaville.↩
- Williams visited the Congo April 28–May 4 during a tour of a number of countries in West and Central Africa. He visited Stanleyville and Luluabourg as well as Léopoldville. Additional information concerning his trip is scheduled for publication in volume XXI.↩
- His conversations with Adoula and Kasavubu were reported in telegrams 2753 and 2754, both May 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/5–562)↩