Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

218. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, March 30, 1962, 2:58 p.m.

1676. From the Secretary. Deptels 1650² and 1657.³ We note UN has given Gardiner authority (USUN 477 to Leo)⁴ communicate substance program set forth Deptel 1650 to Tshombe and Adoula if he believes such mention would create useful pressure. Dept wishes stress that actual implementation this program by UN would be a second step and we hope that knowledge UN prepared take such step would act as deterrent and that measures this type will never have to be taken. Per Deptel 1650 you have standby authority use this information if, after consultation with Gardiner, you believe this necessary assure negotiations do not break down. If it necessary convey knowledge possible UN–GOC cooperation re tax collection in Elisabethville to Tshombe; this should be described to him as type of situation which we feel would be forced on UN and US if negotiated settlement on Katangan integration not achieved. In considering whether convey this to Tshombe and Adoula you should be guided by following considerations:

1. Our objective is achieve peaceful reintegration Katanga and sole purpose this standby authority is assure that present efforts achieve negotiated settlement do not break down since failure of talks would probably have fatal effect on chances achieving peaceful reintegration.

2. Since our ability support implementation such measure would be affected by attitudes legislative branch this government and of our allies (with whom consultations have already begun in a general way) we will need as much advance warning as possible if you and Gardiner decide to use this information. Moreover, circumstances surrounding your decision use this information should be conducive to favorable outcome of these consultations. That is, it must be possible make a good case that this information was used only as last resort to assure that negotiations between Adoula and Tshombe did not fail. In this connection, it particularly important Adoula establish a clearly conciliatory posture in negotiations, which it should be emphasized he can do without prejudicing an early liquidation Katangan secession.

For USUN: Suggest you convey sense foregoing to Thant or Bunche soonest expressing hope this consistent with instructions to Gardiner.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/3–3062. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Ford, Buffum, and Vance; cleared by Williams, Wallner, Tyler, and McGhee; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Brussels and London.
2. Telegram 2467 to USUN (Document 216) was repeated to Léopoldville as telegram 1650.
3. Telegram 1657 to Léopoldville, March 26, also sent to London as telegram 5149, summarized a conversation that day in which McGhee briefed Ormsby-Gore on the tax collection proposal. The telegram concluded with the statement that if the United Nations approved the proposal, and if it was necessary to assure a satisfactory conclusion of the Adoula-Tshombe talks, information concerning it could be conveyed to Tshombe by Gardiner. Because the question of U.S. purchase of the U.N. bond issue was expected to reach the Senate floor that week, however, it was preferable to delay public knowlege of the plan. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/3–2662)
4. Dated March 17; also sent to the Department as telegram 3187. (Ibid., 770G.00/3–1762)