216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations1
2467. From the Acting Secretary. Tshombe-Adoula talks not going well and prospects successful outcome appear poor.
We foresee dire consequences if these negotiations fail. It clear from developments prior to talks that Adoula considers he must resort to [Page 414] other means than UN, e.g. bilateral military requests to Africans, Belgians, if, after eight months in office, he unable deliver on cardinal point his program, which is reintegration Katanga. We anticipate that if talks fail, in addition to endangering Adoula, we will be confronted by demands from Soviets and radical Afro-Asians for forceful UN action to reintegrate Katanga. This will put UN in middle of contest between supporters radical action and Western members who will be unable agree to use of UN forces for this purpose. The Congo, the US, and the UN can only suffer severe damage in the process.
There is, therefore, critical need assure that these talks do not break down, or if they do, to provide for quick remedial measures which will prevent irreparable damage and make clear to Tshombe that his foot-dragging has been counter-productive.
We have considered numerous alternatives including renewed effort sell comprehensive program re Congo army, greatly stepped up UN economic and technical assistance program and logistic support for ANC in North Katanga. But, although all these measures believed desirable and will be pressed, they would not be adequate. Only alternative we find which likely meet minimum needs of situation is to take decision now on specific steps which would be taken to restore legality in connection foreign exchange and tax proceeds Katangan exports if Léopoldville talks do not produce results at least in these areas. So far, our efforts to prevail upon UMHK to do the necessary in this respect have failed. Remaining possibility (Stage III (2) of economic pressure program, Deptel 1648 to USUN)2 which we see would be for GOC give notice that henceforth all exports from the Congo will be contingent upon prior payment of taxes and foreign exchange proceeds to GOC. In this connection, GOC would station appropriate officials on railway in Elisabethville, which already under UNOC control, to enforce application GOC customs and foreign exchange legislation. Products from Jadotville and Kolwezi could still be exported westward through Angola, but production those cities require sulphuric acid which manufactured from zinc ore mined at Kipushi. Accordingly, GOC officials at Elisabethville could control most UMHK exports. Obviously GOC personnel, who would give all necessary orders, would require protection against Katangans, and UNOC would assume responsibility for assuring their protection.
We recognize that such move could involve renewed violence in Elisabethville since it would hit Tshombe where it hurts—in the pocketbook. We believe UN mandate covers this type assistance to GOC (Deptel [Page 415] 1818 to USUN).3 Onus for any use force would clearly rest on Katangans since UN role would be limited to self-defense and providing protection for GOC officials in exercise their legitimate functions. Doubt Katangans would react against UMHK, which would be acting under compulsion. Real object of exercise, however, would be to let Tshombe and UMHK know such decision has been taken as indication seriousness which UN and US attach to meaningful progress on reintegration in hope this would serve as deterrent to failure negotiations between Tshombe and Adoula.
We recognize that once this made known to Tshombe UN would have be prepared follow through as situation required, for if Tshombe were to find that such threat had been merely bluff, this would be end any hope securing Katangan reintegration short of armed action by GOC with whatever outside support it could muster. In this connection we also recognize that UN would not undertake such commitment without advance assurance it could depend on full US backing including airlift support within Congo in event UN attacked again by Katangans. We recognize there is calculated risk in embarking on such course but considerable degree of risk is acceptable in order avoid much more serious damage which we convinced will ensue if Katanga-GOC impasse and present deterioration situation permitted continue.
You requested approach SYG soonest describing ingredients of problem as we see them and soliciting UN agreement that it would cooperate with GOC in protection its customs officials as envisaged above if situation requires GOC assuming customs functions in Elizabethville. Suggest you draw fully on rationale as developed, indicating our full awareness implications such step and that our request based on decision give full support to UN in such action.
USUN should telephone Brussels as soon as appointment arranged with Thant or Bunche so discussion can be held with Spaak simultaneously with your discussions in New York.
Once UN agrees, Gardiner should be informed soonest and given discretion, in consultation with Gullion, to let this be known to Tshombe during negotiations if it is agreed that revealing such decision to Tshombe required in order assure that negotiations with Adoula do not conclude without agreement on division foreign exchange and tax revenue or if such agreement not promptly implemented. Gullion might also wish use info with Adoula to encourage him be conciliatory.
For Brussels: We recognize effect this proposal could have on US-Belgian relations, once word of it becomes public knowledge. Believe it specially important therefore that we take Spaak into our confidence. [Page 416] Ambassador should therefore see Spaak simultaneously with USUN approach to SYG and inform him in all frankness our rationale for this decision. In doing so, you should stress to Spaak we grateful for his most helpful message to Tshombe just prior to beginning of current Léopoldville talks and other efforts he has made persuade Tshombe re-integrate. However, his efforts and ours combined have not been successful. You may find it useful remind Spaak our continuing efforts prepare UN and GOC acceptance return of more Belgians to Congo.
For London: Dept will inform British Ambassador simultaneously with approach to SYG.
Hope both British and Belgian Govts will renew pressure on Tshombe in light foregoing which hopefully will lead him to reach agreement with Adoula on division revenues and thus avoid necessity UN taking action envisaged.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/3–2462. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Buffum; cleared by Ford, Wallner, in draft by Tasca, by EUR, and by McGhee, who cleared it with McGeorge Bundy by telephone; and approved and signed by Ball. Repeated to Brussels, Léopoldville, and London.↩
- Telegram 1098 to Léopoldville (Document 179) was repeated to USUN as telegram 1648.↩
- Dated January 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 870G.00/12–2861)↩