219. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State1

2621. Reference: Deptel 1729; Embtel 2539.2

1.
We would not have recommended introduction of tax collection plan in talks until Adoula had introduced a respectable proposal which would win him back the advantage. We hope document he has now submitted3 can at least be modified through negotiation to fit this requirement. Without such document I fear Adoula will not have established a record in these talks which would justify us in recommending this bold plan nor UN in running risks to back GOC in enforcing it. Adoula proposal leaves much to be desired but it does make possible meaningful negotiation.
2.
One point I was making in reftel is that Adoula’s tough line in talks, his turn to more extremist advice (e.g., Kamitatu, and Casablanca Africans, Indian Charge), the aloof act he put on for US, his quasi-ultimatum to UN, his own state of nervous frustration and irritability, in fact, the whole trend adverse to our policy which set in after Adoula’s return to Congo, all proceed from one main source—his wrong-headed notion that US and UN (which he considers as one) have no longer the will, the strategy, nor the means to help him unify Congo.
3.
No one has been able tell Adoula how or when unification could be accomplished without force. He himself has no reliable force and UN will not let him employ what he has. Meanwhile he has an exaggerated idea of Tshombe’s current build-up under screen of negotiations. Even if he reached agreement with Tshombe past experience indicates to him that Tshombe would abide by it only so long as he obliged to by preference if not use of force.
4.
Adoula has heard reports of economic pressure on Tshombe but nothing has materialized. He had hopes of the Ste. Generale and Union Miniere but these have been totally deceived.
5.
He knows that strong UN action in December was only made possible by Katangese provocation. He cannot count on recurrence of this same set of circumstances. As time drifts by he sees Tshombe playing for bankruptcy of UN and on recognition out of pure apathy of de facto independence of Katanga.
6.
Adoula feels he has failed his mandate from Lovanium Parliament and his relations with West may be responsible. In his frustration he may be required to heed persistent but hitherto ineffective voices which claim that US engineered Kitona and get Tshombe off the hook; that UN hold fire in December was converted to permanent cease-fire by apathy and division in US; that UNOC under Gardiner resists will of UN and that Gardiner is controlled by UK.
7.
As his discouragement deepens, the negative thinking which Adoula would easily reject if he were in a healthier frame of mind gains more hold on him. He might be led into rash acts. He might at the least yield to Soviet suggestion for Security Council meeting to explore alleged failure of UN executive action.
8.
When Adoula is himself, he knows well and recognizes false premises of all this thinking, is grateful for US support and recognizes his dependence on UN. Moreover, without rehearsing it here, Adoula’s basic case remains much better than Tshombe’s, if only he would make it and stop blotting his copy book by string of errors like those recently [Page 421] committed in his name by Kamitatu.4 Adoula represents a centripetal force in Congo, working for result which is in US interest, whereas centrifugal forces which would be set in motion by Katanga separatism would only profit those who are hoping this fly-wheel will break up.
9.
It was to give Adoula some ideas that US and he still had some cards to play that I wanted to tell him now about tax plan. I have given him strong hints about it. He at least knows US would back some kind of economic pressure to be exercised by GOC but unless he knows more about it he will regard it as one more illusory hope.
10.
In my opinion evidence of US support at this time is more important in a wider connection than the outcome of present round of talks with Tshombe. As for talks themselves, I do not now believe that knowledge of new factor will cause Adoula to kick his ante any higher than it already is. At least we would be in better position to advise him and keep him from going off deep end.
11.
Department asks where Adoula and Tshombe positions might meet. I told Adoula if federal govt controlled army, customs, money, foreign affairs, he had the essentials. He agreed but I would not pin hopes to this formula. I suggest that we begin to envisage consequence of failure to agree, which side we want to win, how to make that side win and how to come out on that side.
Gullion
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/4–1862. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Brussels, and USUN.
  2. Telegram 2539 from Léopoldville, April 8, reported that efforts to promote meaningful discussion between Adoula and Tshombe were so far unavailing. Gullion thought Adoula did not believe Tshombe would negotiate seriously and had no confidence in U.S. or U.N. support for unification of the Congo. He suggested telling Adoula of the tax collection proposal as a means of encouraging him to be constructive. (Ibid., 770G.00/4–862) Telegram 1729 to Léopoldville, April 10, expressed concern that this might have the opposite effect. It suggested informing Adoula of the substance of the plan but indicating that it could not be implemented unless he made serious efforts to probe Tshombe’s willingness to negotiate. (Ibid.)
  3. Telegram 2605 from Léopoldville, April 17, reported a conversation the previous evening between Gullion and Adoula during which Adoula gave Gullion a copy of a draft agreement that he had given to Tshombe. (Ibid., 770G.00/4–1762) Telegram 2606 of the same date transmitted the text of the draft agreement. (Ibid.)
  4. Kamitatu had reportedly recommended in a letter to Adoula that Tshombe shouldbe kept in protective custody in Léopoldville until the Katanga Assembly ended its forthcoming session (Telegrams 2513 from Léopoldville and 1466 from Elisabethville, both April 5; ibid.,770G00/4-562)