Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

215. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, March 24, 1962, noon.

2417. Adoula/Tshombe Talks.² Both Adoula and Tshombe sides insist that rupture has not occurred. Show-down nevertheless at hand. Adoula plans declare his position on radio or at Parliamentary ceremony today. Tshombe engaged in writing draft which could be valedictory or detailed statement Katanga position as requested by Adoula. Tshombe has not requested aircraft and Gardiner is determined to delay as much as possible in acceding to any such request.

Adoula will inform country and Parliament that Tshombe refuses to agree that he has full powers to negotiate. As I understand it he will also say that he is prepared to submit his government to vote of confidence in Parliament.

In view reliable reports reaching us of impasse in talks I arranged with considerable difficulty to see first Bomboko and then Adoula around 8 p.m. last night. Kamitatu was present at latter conversation, Bomboko joined us about half way through and Kimbimbi and Chatti intermittently present as they worked on draft Adoula speech. Gardiner later saw Tshombe.

I asked both Adoula and Bomboko information on rupture report. I stated that no matter what Adoula objectives were in talks they were bound to be favored by persevering. We were particularly anxious that the GOC case be well documented for public and for record. Tshombe should not be allowed, as he might have done at Kitona, to declare he had been ready to discuss all measures of practical integration but GOC abstained. I said that from what we knew of Tshombe’s position on economic matters, Adoula case was certainly not any less convincing or constructive. Whether or not agreement was reached, Adoula could only gain by having issues discussed and inviting public comparison.

Emphasized as strongly as I could that if GOC meditated any new line of conduct or recourse to direct measures it must show that it had been patient in negotiation even beyond reasonable expectations. I pointed out that fact that Tshombe came to Léopoldville and that he had swallowed a number of stiff Adoula requirements with respect to meeting might indicate he was more flexible than in past. At any rate he had acquired leg-up in public opinion stakes.

In earlier meeting with Bomboko, I told him I knew GOC “air force” had broken down through failure of pilots to fly and failure of maintenance. Said that ANC now had 4,000 men left hanging in north Katanga without means of support. GOC would be in bad position if hostilities resumed.

(Bomboko’s responses were later reiterated by Adoula not deal separately with them.)

Adoula was courteous and correct but assumed tone of someone addressing public meeting. This partly for effect on Kamitatu but probably was preview of speech he plans to make over radio. He began his remarks with rhetorical claim that US and UN were in final analysis aiding Tshombe.

Adoula rejected with vigor idea that a rupture had occurred. Claimed our source was Mobutu who had no right make such statement. He said after experience of Kitona he was obliged to insist that Tshombe declare whether he could or could not speak with full authority for Katanga. In six days of talks Tshombe had refused to declare himself. He had finally submitted a paper which reaffirmed that Katanga Assembly would have to ratify his acts and moreover made false claims that fundamental law made this requirement. Yesterday Tshombe had gone so far as to declare that Katanga was an independent state and he spoke as head of an independent state negotiating with the head of another state. Nevertheless, Léopoldville delegation had been willing (illogically) to proceed on basis of last Katanga Assembly resolution which recognizes Kitona³ and [garble] forthcoming that Tshombe’s statement of mandate. Adoula had moreover invited Tshombe to present in writing or orally his full detailed position even while constitutional point remained unsettled (this is formula we discussed with Gardiner). To date Tshombe had failed to do so. Adoula now feared that any moment he would be sent for by his own Parliament who he implied would censure his conduct.

Adoula then declared US was aiding Tshombe because in effect it and UN prevented ANC from acquiring air force, did nothing to hinder Tshombe, and in fact free world press wrote nothing critical of Tshombe’s acquisition of such a force nor of his methods. He complained UN not only did not carry out its duties under mandate but prevented him from carrying out his. Tshombe was being reinforced all time even during negotiations and nothing done to stop or condemn him. This could not continue and Adoula had to do something “even if he had to turn to Satan himself.” (I do not believe he has made any overtures to Satan.)

Kamitatu and Bomboko added their own expressions of disappointment at failure UN to support policy central government.

In reply I stated wholly incorrect that nothing being done to stop or arraign Tshombe. Very special effort had been made by US as they well knew to acquaint world public with issues of Katanga secession. As to Katanga aircraft purchases we tried to curb these. Success incomplete because not all Western powers had full understanding of situation nor means of stopping shipment. Publicity on these purchases had also been developed but was hampered by fact much of it gained from intelligence sources.

It was mere “facon de parler” to say we were supporting Tshombe and not aiding GOC. US had after all supported Assembly resolution, supplied sinews of December action, had continued and would continue to aid GOC. We had done all this at cost of some strain on our alliances.

We continued extensive diplomatic campaign to mobilize most effective pressures on Tshombe which were economic. We had hope of cutting deeply into his revenues and his capabilities.

I expressed grave concern at GOC relations with UN. Breach between GOC and UN or withdrawal UN would not only be fatal for Congo but possibly for UN and for those small nations who placed particular reliance in it. Congo example was capital [crucial?] for Africa.

I then developed importance of bond issue now pending⁴ and its influence for caution in UN decisions at this time. (Although GOC meditating their contribution to bond issue this seemed first time it had occurred to them this was factor affecting UN actions. Point seemed impress them.)

As to US denial of air force we had never (as Adoula contended) said we were against air force. We continued believe Congo should have small effective force developed in cooperation with UN but not under latter’s command. It should start with school and training planes and eventually develop transport capability but no mercenary pilots. (This provoked some hair-splitting discussion role UN in relation to air force.) Pointed out press stories on abortive Bohulu mission were GOC leaks. This one more evidence great need for Congo Embassy in Washington which should have handled matter more effectively. Embassy also needed in public opinion matters.

I touched on Adoula’s ill-timed visit to Coquilhatville and regretted we had not been informed in time to give press full story. This had given Tshombe psychological advantage (Adoula and Bomboko so that fault in different ways on this one and latter murmured this was fault GOC “Information Service”).

Bringing conversation back to course of talks stated my understanding there was no rupture, that door still open. GOC spokesman said there was adjournment and no rupture. It appeared to be in effect up to Tshombe.

In reading foregoing, point for point give and take sounds more heated than it was. Discussion was tense but friendly. Congolese enjoy this kind of debate.

Gardiner earlier saw Tshombe. Told latter he would cut sorry figure if meeting broke down because Tshombe could not speak for Katanga or admitted he unable influence Katanga decisions. Told Tshombe it was up to him to take initiative tomorrow, i.e. 25th, in requesting new session. Tshombe told Gardiner he would do so. Gardiner confirms that Tshombe made no request for transport back to Elisabethville.

Gullion

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/3–2462. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to USUN, Brussels, London, Elisabethville, Paris, and Brazzaville.
2. Talks between a Congolese delegation headed by Adoula and a Katangan delegation headed by Tshombe were held March 18–April 16 and May 24–June 26. For a summary, see Gardiner’s report of June 27 to Thant (U.N. doc. S/5053/Add.10); also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 863–869.
3. Reference is to a resolution adopted on February 15 by the Katangan provincial assembly, which accepted the Kitona Declaration of December 21 as a “potential basis of discussion” and authorized the Katangan Government to establish contact with the central government “with a view to ensuring a solution in the spirit of the draft declaration.” For text, see U.N. doc. S/5053/Add.8/Annex I; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 836–837.
4. President Kennedy’s request for congressional authority to purchase U.N. bonds up to $100 million was pending before Congress. For text of his January 30 message to Congress, requesting authority to purchase the bonds, see ibid., pp. 90–92. For text of U.N. Resolution 1739 (XVI), adopted by the General Assembly on December 20, 1961, which authorized the Secretary-General to issue bonds up to $US 200 million, see ibid., 1961, pp. 111–113.