Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

214. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, March 15, 1962, 7 p.m.

2337. I saw Adoula last night at my request. (He had been hard to reach for last 2 days.) Asked his estimate of talks on eve of Tshombe’s arrival. Adoula said he had no indication that Tshombe was coming; noted he had just seen an emissary from Youlou who had asked that Bolikongo (sic)² give further guarantees for Tshombe safety. Adoula said this was meaningless but had at last shed light on activities of certain persons.

Adoula had received no word directly from Tshombe that he was coming. He had no date from the UN as to arrival time.³

(Adoula’s insistence on lack of any direct confirmation to him from Tshombe is pertinent to Adoula’s trip early this morning to Coquilhatville. He expects to return in good time for meeting but by trip to Coq he wished to underscore Tshombe failure declare his intentions.)

I asked Adoula whether he had had time consider papers drawn up by Embassy. (These papers pouched today include a long position paper suggesting GOC position on main issues.)⁴ Key points are disposition of revenues, command of army, series of technical conferences on administrative and financial matters. Included also is proposed agenda. Principal effort of paper is to get discussion onto nuts and bolts measures of integration on theory that Kitona largely constitutional question.

Adoula replied he had studied the paper many times and had it before him just now. He picked up two points: First, with respect to impact on Loi Fondamentale, and second, his own relationship to provincial governments. He asked what arrangements should govern if Loi Fondamentale were considered to be in abeyance pending revision. I said that I hoped he and Tshombe would make modus vivendi which in turn would be considered with representatives of the other provinces. Adoula indicated he did not think the Loi Fondamentale could be suspended by any agreement between him and Tshombe. I tried to indicate it was not a question of suspension but common sense flexibility. Adoula then invited comparison between his flexibility and Tshombe’s. Was it not Tshombe who tried to bring suit in Belgian court because Adoula had showed flexibility on the Loi Fondamentale? I acknowledged that this was so but hoped that Adoula would continue to be flexible. (In sum Adoula is still asserting that Loi Fondamentale must remain fully in effect until revised but it is possible to hope that this is merely opening position. He seemed less adamant on subject at this time.)

Adoula said our paper gave him trouble with respect to relations with other Governors. In part it asked him to do more than he could without consulting Governors but elsewhere it seemed to subject his own negotiating authority to Governors as sent. I said that I hoped he would act as if he had full authority and not as Tshombe had acted at Kitona.

Continuing the Kitona theme I emphasized strongly that if Adoula refused to discuss detailed measures of integration Tshombe would again be in a position to win the psychological battle. Just as he might have done had Kitona meeting broken off at midnight, Tshombe could claim he had been ready for wide-ranging talk but GOC refused. Adoula said there was too much concern for psychology in dealing with Tshombe. It was time to find out whether Tshombe would or would not integrate.

I urged that if Adoula had any other course of action in mind it was absolutely imperative that record show that GOC had made a supreme effort to negotiate. I reminded him of reports of Tshombe’s heavy preparation for meeting, his intention hold numerous press conferences, and presence of journalists in his retinue.

To get at relation between negotiations and ANC campaign, I asked if it were true that Léopoldville troops had re-entered Kongolo. Adoula brightened at thought but disclaimed that ANC would attack Kongola or Katanga.

I asked what was his plan. Adoula said they wished to occupy areas with fighting and that in these limited areas ANC might call on gendarmerie to lay down arms or to give them to UN. Gendarmerie would be free to return to their homes.

And if they refused, I asked. Then said Adoula, question of legitimate defense might arise.

I confessed I found it hard to distinguish line between defense and offense in such an hypothesis.

I asked if Adoula was working on position papers with UN. He replied that number of his helpers were working with Khiari, Chatti and others.

I took occasion to say I much regretted tension between Adoula and UN and said latter was GOC’s main support and its withdrawal would mean chaos. Adoula hoped this UN support would be made clearer. He said he was drafting letter to UN asking it to make its mission more precise. He then complained (much for rhetorical effect) that UN had published correspondence with Tshombe re guarantees⁵ without consulting him. I said this was probably an innocent error and only intention was to show unreasonableness of Tshombe’s demands. Adoula said UN had no right to say it would guarantee Tshombe safety whether or not GOC did and then to publish such a letter without asking him.

Finally Adoula said he was prepared to listen to anything Tshombe had to say. He said his heart “did not exactly flutter” at anticipation of positive results. He would however negotiate hard.

Comment: Although above conversation contained some of more unreasonable remarks Adoula has yet made, I did not find it as discouraging as other recent talks with him re Tshombe meeting. His mood was relaxed and he seemed not particularly disturbed at my identifying some of his points as mere bargaining counters.

Following meeting I learned that Adoula planned Coq trip which he had not told me about. Gardiner tells me he had actually encouraged Adoula to go because of dangerous discontent in provinces and fact provincial officials and Governors at Coq had summoned him. Trip might also reinforce Adoula’s position as spokesman of other provinces. It also enables Adoula to be out of town at moment Tshombe arrives. This gesture may be poorly calculated but I do not think it will cause Tshombe to walk out. Adoula wants to underscore that Tshombe did not confirm his arrival to him. Doubtless also he wants to show that Tshombe is no more important than other five provincial presidents.

Gullion

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/3–1562. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to USUN, Elisabethville, London, Paris, and Brazzaville.
2. As on the source text.
3. Tshombe had told Gardiner in a note verbale of March 5 that he would leave Elisabethville for Léopoldville on March 15. (U.N. doc. S/5053/Add.9/Section XI; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 840–841)
4. Not found.
5. The correspondence with Tshombe is printed in U.N. doc. S/5053/Add.9; a March 1 letter from Gardiner to Tshombe and a March 6 letter from Rolz-Bennett to Tshombe are also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 840–842.