181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo1
1128. From Secretary for Ambassador. I am greatly pleased by adroit and effective way in which you brought US influence to bear during course Kitona discussions to avoid breakdown. There is no doubt in my mind that this was done without undue pressure on either party.
[Page 347]It is vital to our interests that Kitona agreement be implemented. You aware of program of pressures we preparing apply on Tshombe if needed to bring him along to its implementation. On other hand it is very important that Adoula continue conciliatory attitude both in order that he be prepared accept Tshombe effort implement agreement if Tshombe reasonable but also to avoid giving Katangan extremists excuses for urging non implementation.
You have in past made very clear to Adoula what risks and difficulties US Govt has been up against in giving him and UN support which made Kitona agreement possible. He will therefore understand importance his avoiding statements or measures at present juncture which might jeopardize the peaceful reintegration of Katanga we both seek. Measure of success which Kitona represents for Adoula should facilitate his adopting public posture of firmness but forebearance toward Katangans and Belgian business interests that area.
I am greatly impressed by Adoula’s statesmanship and I trust that, given mutual confidence and esteem which you have been able to build up with him, Adoula will continue be receptive to our advice even where personal feelings and political pressures might suggest somewhat different course.
Suggest in your talk with Adoula you draw in general terms upon recent telegrams outlining nature of pressures we prepared apply on Tshombe in attempt convince Adoula resort to force should not be required and threats thereof could play into hands of extremists in Katanga.
Suggest you also reiterate to Adoula assistance he could give to our efforts marshal widespread support behind our Katangan policy and his if he were to move definitively against Gizenga.
Finally, it is of utmost importance that Adoula not be tempted to overreach himself in expectation of more US and UN support than can be furnished. He is not in driver’s seat to extent he supposes and must assume a statesmanlike approach to a Congo settlement.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–2661. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Eisenberg; cleared by Fredericks, Vance, McGhee, and in substance by Wallner; and approved by Rusk (McGhee initialed for him). Repeated to London, Brussels, Paris, USUN, and Salisbury.↩
- Gullion reported in telegram 1661, December 26, that he had met the previous day with Adoula, who “seemed more flexible and conciliatory than previously.” Gullion commented, “We hope to be able to keep Adoula in this conciliatory frame of mind but past experience teaches us how volatile and sometimes elusive even the most stable Congolese politicians can be.” He stated that within a week the United Nations would move a “small number” of ANC troops to Kamina, which was supposed to be their southern limit of advance, and he had prepared Adoula for a U.S. refusal to move the troops in U.S. aircraft. (Ibid.)↩