Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

180. Telegram From the Department of State to President Kennedy, at West Palm Beach, Florida¹

Washington, December 23, 1961, 8:17 p.m.

Following represents Department’s current planning in Congo together with attempt to foresee possible difficulties that might arise.

1. Agreement between Tshombe and Adoula based on results Kitona talks would be fully satisfactory to US and could make possible fulfillment major US and UN objectives in Congo. We therefore making every effort maintain pressure on Tshombe to live up to agreement. These pressures taking three forms as outlined recent cables being repeated to you: (a) attempt mobilize Belgian, British and Congolese economic measures designed convince Tshombe that if he does not carry out agreement sources of revenue and outside aid will dry up; (b) attempt to secure Western diplomatic cooperation to convince Tshombe his future can only lie in unified Congo; and c) continue UN military presence in E’ville, without any renewal of hostilities except in self-defense.

Additionally, we should request senior UN representative, such as Khiari or Gardiner, approach Tshombe, expressing view Kitona agreement binding and expectation Tshombe will follow through. UN rep might also point out that UN intends see agreement carried out by every means its disposal and will assist Tshombe resist extremist Katanga and outside pressures. Should be made clear to Tshombe referral Kitona agreement to Katanga parliament for approval legally irrelevant. If UN spokesman unable secure Tshombe’s assent, he might make clear UN intention take practical steps support GOC integrate Katanga without him.

2. Tshombe committed himself at Kitona to return his representatives to Léopoldville parliament (27 Dec) and to participate in a constitutional review commission (3 Jan). Bunche has proposed allow him 10 days to 2 weeks from date conference (21 Dec) to implement those portions of agreement dealing with UN. Should he fail at least to meet (Jan 3) date, we should approach UN and GOC urging UN action in Elisabethville to initiate steps towards economic integration of Katanga. UN would: (a) close the Katanga national bank; (b) ensure the collection of taxes on behalf of the Central Govt; (c) assume control over means of road and rail routes to and from Angola and Rhodesia. Foregoing measures would deny to Tshombe control over tax revenues and export proceeds. Details timing and priority can be subject later discussion. Measures (a) and (b) would be greatly facilitated by Belgian cooperation but can be taken independently. We convinced that based on UN position strength Elisabethville, these steps can be taken without risk use force and without major troop movement. In particular, it would not appear necessary UN invest Jadotville and Kolwezi militarily since we believe any Katanga hold-out forces those towns could be reduced by process attrition and isolation.

We believe foregoing program should be offered UN and GOC as substitute for military action.

3. If it becomes clear Tshombe has no intention of negotiating in good faith, we believe it inevitable meeting of SC would be called at which Soviets, Africans and Asians would insist on intensified military action against Katanga. Since these demands would be vetoed by UK, French and possibly others, we would most likely find ourselves in an emergency special session of the GA as in Sept 1960. Although we would in such case hope to be able achieve res confirming previous mandate and endorsing U Thant’s phased program to reintegrate Katanga, the parliamentary situation would be extremely difficult.

4. An immediate consequence of a clear posture of intransigence by Tshombe would be a sharpened desire of Léopoldville Govt to step up military operations by the Congolese Army. We would make every attempt to delay and divert ANC action recognizing that failure to act would jeopardize stability of present moderate govt. If tangible progress is made on integration of Katanga along lines para 2 without cooperation of Tshombe, Adoula would have better possibility keep extremists under control and limit military operations to scope acceptable to us.

5. If, despite our best efforts, there is renewed heavy fighting in Elisabethville, there would most likely be disintegration of Tshombe Govt. We would then hope the UN would move energetically to maintain peace and stability and would take steps to promote establishment more cooperative but popularly-based Katanga Govt. (UN has already asked us what we would think of FonMin Kibwe as a possible alternative to Tshombe.)

6. There is distinct possibility Katanga troops, under influence mercenary extremists, might re-open hostilities against UN forces. We would in such case insist that UN confine its reaction purely to self-defense. Again, progress on integration, whether with or without Tshombe, would facilitate our task of limiting UN military activities.

7. In meantime we will take all possible measures to strengthen Adoula politically so that he is better able resist nationalist extremist pressures. These measures include: (a) increased US financial grants ($15,000,000) and budget aid; (b) pressure on UN to initiate training of Congolese National Army; (c) supply of transport planes and training of Congo Air Force as long-range project; and (d) grants for increased education program.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–2361. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Woodruff and Tron; cleared by Wallner, Miller, and in substance by Davis and McGhee; and approved by Fredericks. Repeated to Léopoldville as telegram 1117 and to Brussels, London, Paris, and USUN.