182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1
3505. Following based uncleared memcon.2
During conversation with British Amb Dec. 28, Secretary asked him summarize UK policy and objectives in Congo. Secretary said US and UK were diverging on details. Ormsby Gore replied UK as anxious as US to see Katanga rejoin Congo and come under authority central government. However, necessary proceed slowly to prevent local collapse; destruction local government would be very serious; without Tshombe there would be no local administration. UK would not like ad hoc UN administration. If reasonable pressure maintained Africans will reach modus vivendi in their own fashion. Too much pressure may lead to collapse. Amb doubted economic pressure on Katanga would have much effect as economy already in bad shape.
Secretary said objectives agreed but US was less sanguine than UK if Tshombe left to drift. Western action necessary to balance advice, aircraft, arms, leadership for forces, and propaganda from private “Western” sources. Amb. interjected these have counterbalanced advice Tshombe has received from governments. Secretary agreed time required, but too much time would convince Tshombe secession or something like it possible.
Ormsby Gore affirmed Tshombe must be convinced secession is out. Amb did not know who could convince him full consequences his activities. HMG had told its Consul to tell Tshombe he must comply with Kitona agreement, but Amb. said we cannot really expect full compliance in a few days.
Secretary said our hope was we could keep Adoula on right track and on his feet while British, French and Belgian pressure on Tshombe would bring them together. Pointed out US unpopular with Tshombe.
Ormsby Gore emphasized UK concern re UN officials on ground. Ivan Smith has no control over Brig. Raja who gets advice from Krishna Menon.3
In discussing Kitona agreement British Amb said that as end product of extensive negotiations it would have been fine, but coming after [Page 349] only 36 hours of negotiations it was obviously unlikely Tshombe could get approval in Eville in time allowed. UK was concerned US thought Tshombe must be held to letter of Kitona.
Secretary responded that only a few points were of immediate importance: 1) financial arrangements; 2) Adoula’s and Tshombe’s armies should not fight each other; 3) constitutional talks; 4) mutual support against Gizenga.
Amb said he would query London on how hand was to be played in detail. British Consul Elizabethville had already told Katangese Tshombe ought to observe eight points fully.
Secretary then raised question of Sir Roy Welensky’s statements in view HMG’s responsibility for foreign relations of Federation. British Amb. pointed out Sir Roy’s responsibility for internal security. Consequently, Welensky feels he has right to speak out on questions, e.g., those involving border, affecting internal security. HMG has considered giving more direct orders to Northern Rhodesian authorities but this would lead to tremendous rows.
Secretary summed up by saying US would welcome candid and detailed interchanges on Congo. Expressed concern that words sometimes don’t mean same thing. Recognized possibility disagreements might exist, but did not want to see them arise accidentally.
Ormsby Gore reiterated HMG concern over UN reps. Said did not wish to see UK policy identified with them. UN military people in Elizabethville not under civilian control from New York.
Secretary agreed difficult to underwrite some of things UN has done, but we were highly satisfied with UN New York. Pointed out that if UN weren’t in Congo US and UK would have to be there with forces and money.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–2961. Confidential. Drafted by Alf E. Bergesen of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs and approved by Vance. Also sent to Léopoldville, Brussels, Salisbury, USUN, and Paris.↩
- Drafted by Bergesen and dated December 28. (Ibid., 770G.00/12–2861)↩
- Brigadier K.A.S. Raja, commander of the U.N. forces in Katanga, and Indian Defense Minister V.K. Krishna Menon.↩