Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, December 19, 1961, 12:54 p.m.

1064. Kitona for Ambassador. Department has been directed by President stress to you strong US interest in successful outcome Kitona conference. You are requested do utmost persuade Adoula and Tshombe conference must lead to agreement. Neither US people nor world opinion would understand why agreement could not be worked out. Breakdown of negotiations could only favor extremists and would lead whole country into chaos.

Stress to Adoula US expects him to demonstrate his statesmanship and leadership by seizing this opportunity unify Congo without further bloodshed. US has gone to extreme lengths to support UN operations notwithstanding opposition from numerous quarters in US and opposition most NATO allies. Stress impossible situation US would be placed in if doctrinaire approach led to breakdown of current talks and difficulties which would result for our ability support him in future.

Stress to Tshombe in particular that present conference presents last opportunity for him lead his people to peaceful future. Alternative clearly is civil war and chaos. View UN control Elisabethville choice for Tshombe is cooperate with Adoula or go into oblivion.

Recognize complex problems faced by conferees. Agreement in present meeting might cover only principle of reintegration and definite agreement on further approach and perhaps first integration steps to be taken while constitutional details would be deferred to subsequent negotiations.² Whatever scope of present negotiations there must not be a break down.³

The President has asked the Department to commend you personally on your excellent work in bringing about Conference.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1961. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Eisenberg; cleared by Williams, Cleveland, McGhee, and Bundy; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Brussels, Paris, and USUN.
2. Telegram 1068 to Léopoldville, December 19, conveyed the Department’s views on the substance of a possible agreement. It reads in part as follows: “Dept believes both substance and timing solution these problems must be worked out by Congolese themselves. Nevertheless in view special responsibility and relationship we have assumed toward Congo and Kitona in particular we have major stake in outcome negotiations. It in our interest extend best efforts see that final agreement contains at least minimum necessary for workability in new central govt with on the other hand enough local autonomy for provinces to satisfy Tshombe’s reasonable demands and interests.” (Ibid.)
3. At a meeting of the National Security Council from 4:10 to 5:10 p.m. on January 19, the President asked what the United States should do if the negotiations broke down. According to a telephone call from Bundy to McGhee earlier that day, the President was especially concerned with U.N. plans for further military action in Katanga, which he opposed. (Memorandum of a debriefing on the NSC meeting in Rostow’s office shortly after the meeting, unsigned and dated December 21, and attached memoranda of telephone conversations between McGhee and Cleveland and McGhee and Bundy, both dated December 19; ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting, December 19, 1961)