Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

169. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, December 18, 1961, 3 a.m.

1560. Paris pass CINCEUR.

1. In two-hour conference with Adoula, Bomboko, Bunche and Linner have received Adoula’s agreement meeting Tshombe at Kitona tomorrow or following day depending on whether all flying necessary can be accomplished in daylight. I take off early tomorrow landing either at Ndola or Elisabethville depending on result consultation Hoffacker.

Prior to our conference Adoula had had meeting with Cabinet and I had been tipped off they insisting string of political conditions to it.

2. As I entered conference which had already been proceeding between Adoula and UN officials, Linner indicated that Adoula was making conditions and his attendance at meeting doubtful. I rehearsed for Adoula US assistance and said that US had taken most difficult decision in support of GOC and UN with resulting great strain on our friendships and alliance. Moreover US revolted at non-combatant casualties Katanga. President Kennedy had now put his prestige and important material means (aircraft)² into effort facilitate negotiations. I told Adoula that if he did not go to the meeting US continued support could not be promised. Adoula claimed he intended to go to a meeting, but at the proper time. He could not turn down the US which had proved its friendship. He said, however, that his Cabinet had obliged him to pose a number of conditions to the meeting. After considerable argument he appeared accept concept that he should not lay down conditions to holding meeting but should reserve these for meeting itself. He adamant, however, on his government’s insistence that ANC troops be stationed Katanga. These would consist of battalion and six armored cars (possibly 900 men in all). They would not be farther south than Kamina.

3. I explained to Adoula misgivings US and world opinion on discipline ANC troops, danger of stiffening Tshombe’s resistance, strain between US and allies, etc. Since, however, it is my judgement that my government wants above all early meeting and a suspension of useless bloodshed, and that it won’t get the meeting without some understanding on ANC role, I told Adoula that I had recommended to my government that it accept the idea of token ANC participation. I am assured by the UN that it would be tightly controlled and would be under UN command with UN officers. Mobutu would be the commander and Stanleyville troops would not participate. Troops in question are near Luluabourg and would not require lift. There need be no big publicity. In this connection Bunche is making strong parallel recommendation to U Thant.

4. Adoula seemed satisfied with my statement that I was making the recommendation re ANC troops and refrained from saying recommendation had to be acted upon before he would go to meeting.

5. I then showed Adoula Tshombe’s note and proposed President’s message to Tshombe as amended. He made little objections except to observe he hoped we realized Tshombe’s communication was nothing new.

6. Next big hurdle was the idea of a tacit cease-fire during parley which Adoula said was quixotic misplaced chivalry. I countered that since UN action had succeeded GOC held the trumps; that UN troops actually needed a rest; that a cease-fire during the parley could not and did not mean application of SC mandate was at an end; that US and world opinion would not support war of revenge or unnecessary bloodshed. Adoula was skeptical but impressed with agreement that UN mandate not nullified. He repudiated any desire for war of revenge. He did not press point further.

7. Finally I told Adoula that I expected to see him and his advisers in Kitona sometime tomorrow night and he might go in either UN plane or US attache aircraft. He said he would do so. I told him I had still some worries about Tshombe who trying to make it look as if cease-fire agreed as condition precedent to talks but I hoped to handle this.

8. As Department will observe, situation is not as clear-cut as I would like especially since difficult to judge Tshombe’s reactions at long range. Since I understand, however, that there is great desire in the US that this meeting come off soonest I shall set off tomorrow in the hope of rounding up the participants. No one should, however, regard it as absolutely certain that the meeting will take place as we plan it.³

Gullion

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1861. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to Rome, USUN, Brussels, London, Salisbury, and Paris.
2. Kennedy had sent the Presidential airplane Columbine to the Congo. Gullion was planning to use it to bring Tshombe to Kitona.
3. Telegram 503 to Bogota, from Ball to Kennedy, sent December 17 at 8:01 p.m., stated that Gullion had reported the meeting with Adoula by telephone and that the results were “generally satisfactory.” It further stated: “Our understanding is that fighting will be suspended the moment Tshombe leaves for Kitona if it has not already ceased as a result of UN’s having substantially achieved its limited military objectives.” (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1761)