Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

165. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Venezuela¹

Washington, December 16, 1961, 5:14 p.m.

706. For President from Acting Secretary. Congo. Gullion reported by telephone today Dec 16 at noon here and nightfall there that Adoula cannot now return to Léopoldville from Kivu until tomorrow because he has grave domestic political crisis with Gizenga attempting again take over Kivu Province and 2 or 3 ex-Gizengists in cabinet including Gbenye again threatening return Stanleyville. As Gullion could also not get to Adoula and communications with him not secure he could not send Adoula full text of proposed message to Tshombe.² However, Gullion has had exchange messages with Adoula³ leading Gullion be confident that once he sees PM he will be able talk him into our proposal on meeting Kitona, although Adoula still mentions desire obtain assurances on mercenaries. Gullion has had satisfactory meetings with Kasavubu and Bomboko. View excitement prevailing in Léopoldville consider Gullion has brought GOC long ways towards conciliatory mood. They now tend recognize need preserve Tshombe’s political structure locally, avoid carpetbaggers and be more reasonable.

Gullion states he fully aware urgency getting meeting started but has simply not been able do more than described above. He states our retaining Adoula’s good will and even more importantly Adoula as PM would be prejudiced if message to Tshombe delivered or released before Gullion can show to Adoula and get his concurrence. Gullion emphasizes essential his own role be that of facilitator, not mediator (which word has come there to imply Tshombe’s equality), that it is Tshombe who initiated request for talks and that UN prepared continue pressure with US support if Tshombe not reasonable and refuses profit from arrangements you and UN prepared make.

Tshombe has been approached by British, French and US consuls, latter drawing on unspecified portions but not entirety your message to Tshombe which as yet undelivered, urging him agree meet Adoula at Kitona. Tshombe told British Consul he would be willing do so if British give written guarantee his personal safety and truce effective upon Tshombe’s departure Elisabethville for meeting. Accordingly, elements necessary to meeting are beginning to coalesce although not as rapidly as we had hoped.

Gullion also reported UN military operations Elisabethville virtually completed. City practically surrounded, Camp Massart, tunnel and Lido taken and Kipushi road cut with small number casualties either side. Stories civilian casualties and damage installations exaggerated by Katangans as usual. Massart is principal Katangan military camp Elisabethville.

We recognize fact Adoula in very real domestic political difficulty which may necessitate his stay in Kivu but do not exclude possibility he stalling while military operations continue in Elisabethville.

UNNY Narasimhan tells us military objectives have already been largely achieved. UN now intends to “rest on our oars” on purely military grounds (ONUC troops need rest after 12 days fighting). It will return any fire on its troops and will not tolerate any interference with its movements in Elisabethville, but it does not at present plan further military action beyond securing the objectives previously set.

British are pressing UN for some kind of forward declaration that it is ceasing hostilities. Africans and Asians in the SYG’s Congo Advisory Committee (which held long meeting today) are urging the UN to press on and carry out by military means the purposes set forth for the UN by Security Council resolutions, i.e., elimination of mercenaries and unity of Congo. UN’s quite practical way of dealing with these conflicting pressures is to stop fighting de facto but make no formal moves toward cease fire. This posture will probably also suit Adoula better than any more formal cease-fire arrangement.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–KE/12–1661. Confidential; Presidential Visit Eyes Only. Drafted by Vance, cleared in draft by Williams and Cleveland, and approved by Ball. Repeated to USUN, Léopoldville, Brussels, London, and Paris. President Kennedy visited Caracas December 16–17.
2. The draft message transmitted in Document162 had been revised. Telegram 1036 to Léopoldville, December 15, transmitted the text of a new draft message written in the third person, which was thought preferable in order to avoid inflating Tshombe’s position by a personal message from the President. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-561) Telegram 1049 to Léopoldville, December 16, made further changes, incorporating suggestions from Bunche. (Ibid., 770G.00/12-1561)
3. Telegram 1547 from Léopoldville, December 17, transmitted the text of a message Gullion had sent to Adoula stating that the U.S. Government had received a message from Tshombe proposing a meeting with Adoula, that there was no question of a cease-fire before a meeting, and that Kennedy had instructed Gullion to ask Adoula to meet him for consultation. In the telegram, Gullion added that he “drew a very long bow” in some of his statements in order to obtain Adoula’s consent to a meeting then being described on the radio “in terms he could not possibly accept (prior cease-fire; mediation; no prior consultation GOC, etc.)” (Ibid.,770G.00/12-1761) Gullion reported in telegram 1546, December 17, that Adoula had agreed to a meeting with Tshombe. (Ibid.)