Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Colombia¹

Washington, December 17, 1961, 4:35 p.m.

502. For the President from Ball.² The last minute reports³ indicate the following situation regarding the Congo:

1. UN has substantially achieved its limited military objectives Elisabethville.

2. As a practical matter, de facto suspension of hostilities will probably have occurred even before Tshombe leaves for Kitona. British and French understand clearly that hostilities are to stop in this de facto way rather than by formal cease-fire agreement. Believe they have already made this distinction clear to Tshombe.

3. In any event, from what British tell us Tshombe has expressed his agreement to meet with Adoula apparently without conditions.

4. At 2:00 p.m. Washington time Gullion advised that he and Bunche were waiting to begin conversation with Adoula who had just arrived from Kivu by airplane. Gullion will telephone us promptly on conclusion discussions and I shall pass on information to you.

5. If Adoula concurs in plans Gullion plans to fly tomorrow to Elisabethville to pick up Tshombe and deliver him at Kitona before nightfall.

6. Will try to advise you by telephone as soon as results of Adoula-Gullion meeting received.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1761. Confidential; Niact. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by Williams and Cleveland. President Kennedy visited Bogota December 17.
2. A December 17 message from Kennedy to Ball reads as follows: “I believe it vital that Adoula be obliged to respond immediately to cease-fire telegram. Would appreciate a report on situation there as soon as possible.” (White House message 171515Z, apparently sent from the Presidential plane en route from Caracas to Bogota; ibid.) The “cease-fire telegram” is apparently a December 17 message from Tshombe to Kennedy stating that he was ready to meet with Adoula but requesting an immediate cease-fire. (Katangan Delegation in Brussels to Kennedy; ibid.) Later that day, Bundy sent a message from Bogota to Ball, which reads as follows: “President desirous proceed cease-fire and negotiations as rapidly as possible. Do not let GOC delay us. Advise soonest plans and progress.” (White House unnumbered message; ibid.)
3. Telegram 1548 from Léopoldville transmitted a report from Hoffacker that he had delivered a message from Gullion to Tshombe, that Tshombe had agreed to meet Adoula at Kitona, and that he had not raised the question of a cease-fire. Telegram 1553 reported that Gullion was to see Adoula that evening but Adoula had called a Cabinet meeting at 8 p.m. Gullion stated that it would be “made perfectly clear” to both Adoula and Tshombe that “hostilities will suspend de facto while they talk,” but he stated that Adoula “will never be allowed to go to meeting” if a cease-fire was announced or made a condition of the meeting. (Both December 17; ibid.)