164. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State1
1525. On basis two conversations with Bomboko and one with Kasavubu can anticipate numerous difficulties to be surmounted before we can bring Adoula to the table. I am confident he eventually go along with us. Kasavubu at first obdurate but was highly impressed with four points made by President in telecon to me:2
- 1.
- Appeal had come from Tshombe not President;
- 2.
- Operations continue;
- 3.
- US supports UN;
- 4.
- No change unless Tshombe shows reason.
Pulled out all stops with Kasavubu. Said US had made enormous decision in favor of Congo with considerable strain on our alliances. We had undertaken dangerous and costly mission flying thousands of UN troops and munitions to Katanga without which success impossible.
It was Tshombe who was asking for terms and Tshombe who would be coming to spot dictated by GOC. Here was finally opportunity for Congo to gain its aims. There could be no excuse for continuing war merely for revenge and blood, US could not support this. I strongly counselled Kasavubu to urge colleagues act now because US could do no more.
Told Kasavubu as head of state he responsible for integrity of state. He was also above faction and man of known charity. It was up to him to act like Lincoln.
Kasavubu insisted Adoula could not meet unless there was some understanding about mercenaries and some agreement about what they were to meet about. On second point I reiterated situation had nothing comparable to September nor to various maneuvers by Tshombe since that time. UN/GOC were winning and therefore could afford to receive Tshombe for talks, holding of which did not commit GOC. Kasavubu said something vague to effect peoples here and in Katanga had to decide on peace. I replied Parliaments declared war but it was envoys who made peace. (I hope but am not confident we can keep this out of Parliament.)
None of these points impressed Kasavubu as much as my statement that U Thant and UN were in unison with US on proposed negotiations.
It will therefore be necessary for Bunche and me to act in closest support of each other and perhaps in concert. Trust Amb Stevenson can keep up parallel work on U Thant. With both Adoula and Kasavubu I shall continue emphasize that President Kennedy has taken audacious moves in these interests, and this is time when they must stand with US.
Meeting with Kasavubu was exceedingly friendly, despite all its arguments.