142. Editorial Note
A memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Harlan Cleveland to Secretary of State Rusk, November 22, 1961, records a telephone conversation that morning between Cleveland and President Kennedy. The portion of the memorandum concerning the Congo reads as follows:
“The President asked whether we shouldn’t be doing more in the way of bilateral aid to the Central Government in the Congo; he had noted a Russian offer of aid for Adoula. I told him that we had been chary of stepping up our bilateral aid too rapidly, wanting to maintain the principle that bilateral assistance was only rendered in agreement with and support of the UN operations in the Congo. However, we were reviewing the possibility of having relatively more bilateral aid and relatively less economic aid through the UN, partly in order to prevent the UN from bleeding to death financially.
“The President asked about the Russian threat yesterday in the Security Council to veto our proposed amendments to the Congo resolution. I gave him a brief summary of what had happened yesterday in the Council, emphasizing that a Russian veto threat was aimed particularly at our paragraph on conciliation, and indicating that we might need to start a conciliation arrangement either directly from the Secretary General without a new mandate on the subject or, if not, on a non-UN basis.
“The President asked for a report on any results from the discussions with Foreign Minister Spaak about additional pressure that might be put on Tshombe.
“The President asked whether the Lumumba investigation report probably had the true story, or whether it was all hearsay. He was particularly interested in any hard indications as to whether Tshombe was present at the time of the murder. He asked for some indication of what this investigation report looked like from a lawyer’s point of view, mentioning Arthur Dean in this connection. I said there did not seem to be an authentic alternative description of how Lumumba met his death, but that one recent press report, allegedly based on eye-witness reports, corroborated some of the UN investigation report but did not place Tshombe at the scene of the killing. (The Legal Adviser’s office is preparing a comment on the investigation report, which should probably be sent along to the President for his information.)” (Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149)
The “Congo resolution” was the revised version of a draft resolution submitted initially on November 14 by Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic and in revised form on November 20. (U.N. documents S/4985 and Rev.1) The United States submitted several amendments to the revised draft resolution on November 20. (U.N. document S/4989) Stevenson set forth the amendments in a statement before the Security Council on November 21; the text is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pages 847–851.
The thrust of the draft resolution was to support the Congolese Government against Katangan secession and to expand the Secretary- [Page 279] General’s authority to permit the use of force for the apprehension and deportation of foreign mercenaries. The thrust of the U.S. amendments was to extend the applicability of the resolution to permit U.N. support of the Congolese Government against any secessionist activities, by Stanleyville as well as by Katanga, to expand the Secretary-General’s authority to permit U.N. action to neutralize aircraft or other weapons used against U.N. or Congolese Government forces, and to authorize U.N. encouragement of negotiation and conciliation to promote Congolese unity.
At the Security Council meeting on November 21, Soviet Representative Valerian A. Zorin announced his intention of vetoing several U.S. amendments. Telegram 1736 from USUN, November 21, states that the delegation’s instructions required abstention on the draft resolution without the amendments, which would have ensured the defeat of the resolution. After consultation with the Department of State by telephone, the delegation was instructed to seek postponement of the vote until November 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2161)
A November 25 memorandum from Department of State Executive Secretary Lucius D. Battle to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy summarized discussions with Foreign Minister Spaak’s staff about possible steps to increase pressure on Tshombe and stated that the Department was preparing proposals for economic actions designed to force Tshombe into negotiations with Léopoldville. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo)
A comment on the Report of the Commission of Investigation, prepared in the Legal Adviser’s Office, November 25, was enclosed with a November 28 memorandum from Battle to Bundy. (Ibid.) Concerning the Commission Report, see Document 6.