Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

143. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 25, 1961, 11 p.m.

1803. Congo. Despite Soviet veto of key US amendments,² SC action yesterday, as well as extensive negotiations and debate accompanying it, have produced several net gains for US position. Fol are some of highlights:

1. Bomboko (Congo-Leo) and all his associates were brought up against Soviet disregard of their views both in private and public. Bomboko at one stage believed his public appeals and private talks with Zorin would get Soviet agreement for US amendments covering rebuilding of Congolese armed forces and for tougher UN action against Katangan air force and other weapons in and out of Katanga. Zorin, of course, completely disregarded Congolese views on these two points. Even two of less receptive members of Congo Delegation, Mandi and Lema, went out of way to express appreciation for US efforts to strengthen res and then when these efforts partially failed, our acceptance of eventual text as gesture to Congolese wishes for whatever res could be obtained.

2. Sovs were effectively isolated in opposition to stronger SC action proposed by US. Liberia appealed to Sovs in debate to accept our amendments and expressed confidence unanimity was approaching, whereupon Zorin made his most violent speech in opposition. Ceylon tried in public SC session to get Sov agreement to modified version of retraining and conciliation paras and was rebuffed for his pains in sharp reply by Zorin. Indians, Ethiopians, etc., who followed behind scenes negotiations closely, saw and approved direction our amendments as contrasted with Soviet efforts to restrict res solely to Katanga and to mercenaries, despite wishes of other members of SC and Congolese themselves. Liberia voted for all US amendments and Ceylon for all but one.

3. Position of UAR became clearer as negotiations went on. UAR position stood out in contrast to that of other sponsors, Ceylon and Liberia. As general willingness to accept changes proposed by US (and favored by SYG and Bomboko) became clear, UAR forced to take clear stand in opposition to prevent inclusion by co-sponsors our proposals in text of res. Even India and Ethiopia finally realized “special” character of UAR position in trying to limit res solely to Katanga and prevent any provisions directed against events in other provinces. However, even Loutfi during final day became exasperated with Soviet obstructionism and ended by voting for all but one of US amendments. On para authorizing SYG “to remove or to prevent use” aircraft and other weapons which have entered Congo illegally, following defeat Soviet sub-amendment (for which UAR voted and which received only Soviet and UAR votes) which would have restricted para only to Katanga, UAR joined UK and France in abstaining.

4. Possibly most important result in long run was scarcely concealed duel which emerged between Thant and Zorin. Thant was receptive to US suggestions, strongly encouraged those relating to training ANC and to neutralizing aircraft and other weapons, and made effort with co-sponsors to obtain inclusion of them in some form in res. Despite failure of this [garble] due to rigidity of Loutfi (UAR) and pressure from Zorin, Thant made very forthright and clear statement of his intentions³ after res passed in which he put forward essentially same points covered by vetoed US amendments except for that calling for removal or prevention of use of aircraft, etc. Although focusing on Katanga, Thant said problem not limited to Katanga (as Zorin maintained) and UN would help in dealing with armed action and rebellion elsewhere; that UN would assist in retraining Congolese army; that UN would “continue and even re-double its attempts to achieve reconciliation” (which Zorin had in effect rejected). Thant also mentioned possibility of appointing special representative if desired by Congolese Govt to devote himself exclusively to that effort. (Bunche tells us he drafted statement but that Thant accepted controversial points without demur despite foreknowledge Soviet intention to veto, and even strengthened conciliation para.) In later statement Zorin gave obvious warning to SYG not to “deviate from the specific content of the resolution as adopted” and not to interpret it “in spirit of various statements by individual representatives who made proposals which failed of adoption.” Zorin also expressed hope SYG would replace certain staff members because UN staff in Congo is “one-sided ...” “recruited in specific direction” . . . “a staff of a certain character”.⁴ He also reminded SYG of his agreement before his election to consult certain of his immediate advisers on important questions.

5. UK and Belgian efforts to press ideas of “conciliation and negotiation” and resist reference to use of force had effect of differentiating US and UK positions; this became most clear in vote on res as whole in which UK abstained. UK Del somewhat embarrassed by their abstention, would have preferred to vote in favor, and did best to offset by statement after vote. We discussed with UKDel reasons for US position which they understood fully. In order to offset whatever damage done UK position by their vote, we suggested to them UK Ambassador in Leo call on Adoula and explain UK position. We will probably get incidental advantage in Leo by having separated from UK and French in final vote.

6. Spaak (Belgium) and Robiliart (Union Miniere) both observed debate and may help to bring home to Tshombe extent to which he isolated in UN and danger of force being used against him if impasse continues. Spaak after meeting told us “it was not a good resolution but it was not a bad resolution.” He made similar comment about U Thant statement. Incidentally, Bunche reported Robiliart, following yesterday’s talk with Thant, now “one of our agents” in trying to get Tshombe to negotiate with Adoula.⁵

Stevenson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2561. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Léopoldville, and Brussels.
2. At the November 24 meeting of the Security Council, the United States withdrew its amendment on negotiation and conciliation in order to prevent its defeat. Three U.S. amendments were adopted, two were vetoed by the Soviet Union, and one failed to receive sufficient votes. The amended draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 9 (including the United States) to 0, with 2 abstentions (France and the United Kingdom). For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 851–853. For the record of the Security Council meeting, see U.N. doc. S/PV.982.
3. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 853–855, and Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, vol. VI: U Thant, 1961–1964, pp. 51–54.
4. Ellipses in the source text.
5. Stevenson met with Robiliart on November 22. Telegram 1769 from USUN, November 23, reported that Robiliart said his observations at the United Nations had led him to conclude that Tshombe had to come to an early negotiated settlement with the Congolese Government. Stevenson urged him to advise Tshombe strongly along those lines. Robiliart said he intended to send an emissary to Elisabethville for that purpose, but he emphasized that Union Miniere was “far from being able to control Tshombe completely.” (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2361)