141. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- The Congo
- PARTICIPANTS
- The United States:
- The President
- Mr. William R. Tyler, Act. Asst. Sec. for EUR
- Mr. E.S. Glenn, LS
- Belgium:
- Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak
- Ambassador Louis Scheyven
- Mr. Rothschild
The President said that he would like to ask the Foreign Minister for his opinion about the situation in the Congo. The US is greatly concerned about the situation arising from the secession efforts of Tshombe and Gizenga. There is also question of the Soviets having offered Prime Minister Adoula a bilateral agreement for direct Soviet aid.2
Mr. Spaak said that the situation in the Congo was also, of course, of great concern for him. At the present moment a graver cause for concern is the policy of the UN to use force against Tshombe. Such a policy may lead to disaster simply because the armed forces of the UN are very inadequate and any attempt to use force on their part may result in their defeat. What should be done is rather to bring together Tshombe and Adoula. This can be done if action is taken with urgency and if it’s made clear to Tshombe that he must meet a certain number of conditions or otherwise he will have the entire world against him. As for the situation within the United Nations, it is by no means certain that any resolution will be voted at the present moment.3 If, however, a resolution concerning him is defeated in the Security Council, Tshombe, who is a very vacillating man may interpret this as a great triumph and become completely intransigent. What is needed is to persuade him that he must [Page 276] come to terms. In fact, the possibility exists for an accord which would establish the Congo on some sort of federal basis with unified economy, army, currency and customs. By recognizing Kasavubu as the President of all the Congo Tshombe, himself, has admitted that the Katanga is not a fully sovereign state. He has also accepted the principle of federalism. Therefore, there exists a basis for negotiations between himself and the Central Government. It is necessary, however, in order to bring about an actual negotiation, that someone lend his good offices to act as a mediator. Such a person could only be an African, as no European or American would be acceptable. An African, however, could probably be found among the members of the Brazzaville group, or perhaps even in Mr. Bourguiba.4
The President asked who could exercise the necessary influence on Tshombe to make him accept negotiation. The Foreign Minister said that it might, of course, be the Security Council. If, however, a clear action on the part of the latter is unlikely, it might be the US and the UK which, being those who would have prevented a drastic Security Council resolution against Tshombe, would then be in the position to tell him that he must negotiate.
The President said that there exists a body of public opinion which believes that the tough attitude of Mr. Tshombe is due to some economic interests.
Mr. Spaak said that such an explanation of the present situation is childish. Why should any economic group, for example the Union Miniere, get itself into difficulties by playing a political role? It is true, that at the beginning, that corporation may have provided Tshombe with funds. At the present moment, however, it has no interest in acting against the unification of the Congo as it can do business equally well in a unified Congo or in an independent Katanga.
The President said it was necessary to clarify what extent of sovereignty is demanded by Tshombe and in what manner and on what basis the latter could be brought to negotiate. With Prime Minister Adoula, the Foreign Minister said, it would be difficult to get Tshombe to come to Léopoldville for the simple reason that the latter fears for his personal safety. However, there are other places in the Congo where a meeting could be arranged especially if either the UN or rather the US and UK were to guarantee Tshombe’s personal safety. An airfield not too far from Léopoldville, for example, could be used. However, bringing Tshombe and Adoula together would not be enough. Help should be provided to both of them in negotiating. There exists, of course, a United Nations conciliation commission, but it is not a very good instrument [Page 277] since its members do not see eye to eye. It would be much better to find a prominent personality such as President Senghor, President Houphouet-Boigny, Mr. Tsiranana, or even President Bourguiba.
The President said that the Nigerians also could be considered for such a role. The more so since Nigeria has experience with a federal regime. However, in approaching them to ask them to act as mediators, it would have to be made clear that Prime Minister Adoula speaks for a common Central Government and that there can thus be no strict equality between him and Tshombe. Whatever is done should be done rapidly, so as to make it possible to deal with the situation created by Gizenga. The President expressed the hope that the Foreign Minister would go into details on this question in his conversation with the Secretary of State.5
The Foreign Minister alluded to an exchange of telegrams between himself and Mr. Tshombe which started as a request for help on the part of the latter. Mr. Spaak replied immediately that Tshombe’s situation was bad and that he must reiterate his recognition of President Kasavubu and prepare for meeting with Prime Minister Adoula. A little later a new telegram from Mr. Tshombe arrived; this telegram was very bad and expressed a totally intransigent attitude. It had been sent by Tshombe before Mr. Spaak’s telegram had reached him. Still later, a new telegram came; this time it was Tshombe’s reply to Spaak’s telegram and it was entirely in the right direction. This shows to what extent Tshombe changes his mind and to what extent he is confused by the bad advice he is receiving.
The President expressed the hope that the Foreign Minister would discuss this question with the Secretary and suggested that the Foreign Minister meet the Secretary of Defense, who was at that time in the next room discussing problems very similar in nature to those which had been discussed with Mr. Spaak in the first part of the conversation.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and Edmund S. Glenn of the Division of Language Services. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s appointment book. (Kennedy Library) The conversation also included discussion of Berlin; a memorandum of that portion of the conversation, along with additional material concerning Spaak’s visit, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1995.↩
- Telegram 794 to Léopoldville, November 11, stated that Bomboko had sent word that the Soviets had offered the Congo all necessary aid. (Ibid., Central Files, 770G.00/11–1161)↩
- Spaak had been in New York attending meetings of the U.N. Security Council, which discussed the situation in the Congo at eight meetings between November 13 and 24. Belgium and the Congo were among several non-Council members participating in the discussions by invitation.↩
- Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba.↩
- A memorandum of the conversation by Blue is in Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/11–2061.↩