140. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy1
Washington,
November 11,
1961.
SUBJECT
On November 13, the Security Council will begin a series of meetings on
the Congo. This will be the first United Nations debate on this
complicated question since the new Congolese Government was formed and
since the new Secretary-General assumed office.2 Thus, the forthcoming meetings will open a new and
important chapter in the history of the United Nations Operation in the
Congo.
The fighting which broke out on September 13, 1961 between United Nations
and Katangan forces was so unexpected in its violence and extent, and so
indecisive in its outcome, that it left a large residue of doubt, both
in this country and abroad, about the United Nations’ capabilities and
intentions.
We will be faced at the Security Council with demands for a solution by
force to the problem of Congolese unity. Pressures from the Government
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of the Congo, the Soviet
Union and the more extreme Africans and Asians will be directed towards
adoption of a new United Nations mandate requiring ONUC to support the Congolese Army in a
military operation designed to bring about the reintegration of Katanga.
We will make every effort to resist these pressures. The United Nations
and the Government of the Congo could only win a pyrrhic victory if it
were to abandon the course of conciliation and persuasion.
We would prefer not to reopen the question of the United Nations mandate,
but this is unavoidable. There is general agreement among United Nations
Delegations in New York that the present mandate is deficient under
present circumstances, and some refinement and change is desirable. The
present mandate was adopted at a time when there was no
generally-recognized Congolese Government. If interpreted literally, it
would have the United Nations protect Katangan “independence” by halting
any attempt the Central Government might make to enter the Province.
Moreover, military equipment—particularly planes—have reached the
Katanga within the past few months from some companies in several
European countries. The United Nations was unable to prevent this
traffic.
Our objectives in the Council meetings will therefore be threefold:
to attain a revised United Nations mandate which reflects the
political changes that have taken place in the Congo;
to bolster the position of the Central Government and to exert
maximum pressure on Tshombe to accept the reintegration of Katanga
into the Congo peacefully;
to deflect any unacceptable demands on the United Nations which
would provoke a civil war.
In order to ensure that the session is kept under control, we are
consulting widely in advance with friendly delegations, including the
Congolese, to develop a formula which would enjoy broad acceptance
before a resolution is tabled.
To meet the policy objectives outlined in the attached paper, we will
seek a resolution which would:
- 1.
- assure the Central Government of continued United Nations
support;
- 2.
- appeal to Tshombe to
negotiate in good faith;
- 3.
- reaffirm the request to all States that military assistance
not be provided to any faction in the Congo (Katanga or
Stanleyville) except through the United Nations;
- 4.
- authorize the United Nations effectively to neutralize
materials of war which have entered the Congo contrary to United
Nations Resolution when necessary to prevent its use for
military purposes;
- 5.
- reconfirm the existing United Nations mandate to take vigorous
action to effect the evacuation of mercenaries.
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Points 4 and 5 particularly might cause Katangan forces to renew
hostilities against United Nations forces. However, we believe that
Secretary-General U Thant will
handle the new mandate with prudence and restraint and in accord with
the peaceful purposes of the United Nations. We will urge such a policy
on him. Bunche and Linner have told us it is their aim to
give top priority to negotiations, and to move carefully against
mercenaries only to the extent needed to encourage Tshombe to negotiate.
We believe the risks of inaction at this stage of Congolese history are
even greater than those connected with the type of resolution we
propose. The reasons for this belief are set forth in the attached
memorandum.
Attachment
3
Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy
Washington,
November 11,
1961.
SUBJECT
1. United States
Objectives
Our aim in the Congo is the consolidation of the country with an
essentially pro-Western orientation. Premier Adoula is the best available man to
achieve this since he has the necessary intelligence, will power,
nationwide stature and the appropriate political predilections. To
succeed he has to overcome the secession of Katanga, the threat of
ultra-nationalist anti-Western politicians whether in Stanleyville
or elsewhere and the virtual breakdown of the national economy. Our
policy is to build him up politically and to help him resolve the
difficulties he faces. A defeat of Adoula would make civil war inevitable and open the
country to Communist penetration.
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2. Reintegration of
Katanga
Tshombe’s challenge to the
territorial integrity of the country is the key to most of the
difficulties faced by the Congo. By bringing Katanga back into the
fold Adoula would gain the
necessary additional political strength to deal rapidly with
Gizenga and the other
anti-Western politicians who now exploit nationalism for their own
purposes. He could then also establish his authority on all parts of
the Army and bring security and order into the remotest parts of the
country. Reintegration of Katanga would also create a sound basis
for economic recovery and reduce the need for foreign aid.
Termination of the secession, of course, would not resolve all the
problems of the Congo; considerable difficulties would still have to
be surmounted. However, no real progress is possible as long as
Katanga continues in secession.
There is no historical, economic or ethno-graphic basis for Tshombe’s independence claims. Until
1960, Katanga was a province governed from Léopoldville like any
other. The Congolese constitution of 1960 provided that all the
provinces are parts of the new state and this was agreed by M.
Tshombe. Katanga,
moreover, does not have a homogeneous population different from that
of the rest of the Congo—over 50 percent belong to tribes bitterly
opposed to, and in fact repressed by, M. Tshombe and his Lundas.
To accept independence of Katanga would be political suicide for
Adoula. Parliament would
promptly replace him by an extremist leader (probably not Gizenga) and the new Congo
government would ask for foreign military aid, first from the UN, then the US, and ultimately the Soviet
Bloc to carry the war into Katanga. Whatever the military
developments might be, such war would engulf the Congo in even
greater chaos than it has experienced so far and Communist
penetration of the country would be a near certainty. A Katanga
reintegrated by military action of the Congo army would most likely
be an economic wreck.
Reintegration of Katanga has also become a key objective of UN policy in the Congo and the UN could not accept defeat on this issue
without serious damage to the concept of the UN as an instrument of the collective will of the
member nations.
3. Program to Promote
Reintegration in Katanga
At present, negotiations between Léopoldville and Elisabethville are
at a deadlock. Tshombe does
not want to give up any essential part of his independence while
Adoula cannot stop
military operations unless he could demonstrate clearly that the
reintegration of Katanga will be assured through other means. This
deadlock must be broken rapidly since time is not on our side. To
move events in the right direction Tshombe has to be faced with a coordinated program
of action containing credible deterrents which would demonstrate to
him the futility of
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his
refusal to re-enter the Congo. A system of escalation must be built
into this program which would create adequate incentives for prompt
negotiations and forestall any erosion of Adoula’s political position. With the help of such a
program pressure could also be exercised on the Léopoldville
government to bring both parties into the frame of mind necessary
for successful negotiations.
Tshombe must offer without
conditions to take measures bringing Katanga back into the Congo at
least in specific areas, e.g., the economic sphere, by sharing
customs and tax revenues, re-establishing a common currency, etc.
This should permit Adoula to
engage in substantive discussions on reintegration without first
obtaining satisfaction on the basic constitutional issue. Once
arrangements of the kind described above are in effect Adoula could be more forthcoming and
Tshombe would find
considerable support for his claim of greater autonomy since
Congolese political leaders are overwhelmingly in favor of greater
states’ rights.
The program we consider necessary to prevent a serious deterioration
of the situation should contain the following elements:
- (a)
-
Strengthening of the UN
mandate. Under the various UN resolutions all states are requested to
refrain from the provision of arms and military
personnel to the Congo except at UN request, but the UN has no clear mandate to take corrective
action. It is necessary that the UNOC be explicitly authorized to neutralize
all military equipment which has entered the Congo
illegally, to arrest and evacuate foreign mercenaries,
and to control effectively and prevent the entry of
further mercenaries and military materials. Such actions
should be taken even if they might be interpreted by
Tshombe and
the Western European press as a breach of the cease
fire. The principle that the cease fire agreement cannot
over-ride the UN mandate
has been accepted by Tshombe.
In the Security Council discussions there will be
pressure for a more far reaching mandate to be given to
the UN, in particular to
authorize it to support the Congolese Army directly or
indirectly. This we want to oppose.
- (b)
- The measures which the UN
could take under the new mandate might lead to Katanga’s
reopening hostilities against UNOC. However, we are confident from
discussions with Bunche and Linner that the UN will act with prudence and restraint and
will try to avoid provoking a fight. Should hostilities
nevertheless flair up this would cause problems between the
UN, US and our NATO allies. On balance,
however, we have to take this calculated risk in order to
avoid the much greater risk of full scale civil war.
- (c)
- Economic sanctions against Katanga in the form of blocking
of external assets, seizure of exports, etc. It would be
undesirable to have the
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UN adopt such a policy at this
time since it would create an instrument for possible use
against South Africa or Portugal in situations in which the
US would not want to support such action. However, the
Western powers could increase pressure on Tshombe in all forms and
apply measures which would be similar to economic sanctions
but by taking them on their own decision and, judiciously,
they would avoid creating a precedent for UN economic sanctions.
- (d)
- Accelerated retraining and rearming of the Congo military
forces loyal to the Central Government including its air
branch with the implicit objective of eventually giving the
Central Government enough power to crush Tshombe’s military forces.
The time element built into this measure would make it
possible for Tshombe
to enter into negotiations before large scale operations
could be undertaken. The Congolese government has already
asked us to sell them two to three jet fighters for which
they would hire foreign pilots. We intend to deal with this
problem by supporting a UN
operated training program for the Congo Air Force.
4. Gizenga and Lumumbism
Lumumbism constitutes a threat to Adoula only to the extent to which Gizenga or other anti-Western
politicians can exploit the nationalist fervor which permeates
today’s Congo. Gizenga, back
in his Stanleyville retreat, with no legal basis for action and
without his former colleagues who are now in the Léopoldville
government, is apparently trying to build up a political
organization which would bring him into power if Adoula should not succeed soon in
resolving the Katanga issue. Adoula’s intent is to isolate Gizenga politically and deny him the
support of General Lundula and so prepare his political destruction.
(Lundula was recently given a high rank and command in the National
Congolese Army under Mobutu.)
The prospects of Adoula’s
achieving this are good provided the Katanga issue does not blow up
in his face. We are urging Adoula to take effective action against Gizenga promptly and we are also
making sure that the new Security Council resolution will permit
UN action against external military
assistance to the Stanleyville group just as in Katanga.
5. Economic
Reconstruction
The UN has developed import and export,
public works and budget aid programs, which are financed in large
part, about 75 percent, by US contributions. These programs show
definite promise of success but funds have to be found to carry them
further. Increased foreign aid is also needed in the form of
technical assistance. The Adoula government is now drafting a medium range
economic development program the promulgation of which would be of
great political benefit to Adoula. It needs the help of the IBRD or some other international
organization in
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its
planning stage and later, foreign financial aid for implementation
of the program. Large scale economic aid is necessary to prevent
nation-wide economic misery and political unrest but economic
recovery cannot make substantial progress before law and order are
re-established all over the country and the Katanga issue
resolved.
6. US Support for Adoula
Adoula’s ability to obtain a
parliamentary mandate had made it possible for the UN to give him wholehearted support. As a
result we can channel our aid to Adoula’s government through the UN and find the UN and
UNOC in full agreement with our
policy of building up Adoula.
We are now:
- (a)
- Cooperating closely with the UN and UNOC on
all Congo matters and will attempt to obtain their full
support for the intensive Katanga program described
above;
- (b)
- Stepping up our economic aid to the Congo, expanding the
scope of the military aid to the UNOC operation and planning military aid to the
Congo government through the UN;
- (c)
- Planning to assist Adoula in his efforts to build for himself a
solid political base in his country and to promote his
international and domestic prestige through visits to
Léopoldville of African dignitaries and a visit of Adoula to New York and to
talk to you in Washington;
- (d)
- Enlisting the support of the UK, Belgium, Rhodesia and other governments for
our efforts to promote the peaceful integration of Katanga
by creating from their side effective pressures on Tshombe while we, in turn,
exercise pressure on Adoula to make a rapprochement
possible;
- (e)
- Attempting to assure military, financial and political
support by the UN members for
the Congo policy of the Secretariat and to have the Security
Council pass a resolution in line with the intensive action
program described above;
- (f)
- Attempting to educate the American public and Free World
about the basic facts involved in our Congo policy and its
reasons and objectives and ask our allies to do the same at
home.
