Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, November 9, 1961, 5:32 p.m.

1178. USUN’s 1527, rptd Leo 191.² Dept understands and sympathizes with Bomboko concern about need for GOC to demonstrate military superiority vis-a-vis Katanga but believes unilateral USG provision of jet fighters to Adoula government at this time would raise difficulties and might have unfortunate repercussions. Apart from the provision of UN resolutions intended to interdict bilateral supply of military equipment, these aircraft presumably would be flown by outsiders. Even if masked as “instructors,” these pilots would in fact be “military or para-military personnel not under UN command” within meaning of Feb 21 SC res and would undercut vigorous action by UN to rid Congo of mercenaries. In this respect, res did not distinguish between secessionists and legitimate government of Congo, and to provide pilot “instructors” would be widely regarded as violation tending to justify Tshombe actions.

We believe GOC objectives can be advanced following way without bringing undesirable side-effects. If UN reaction favorable you should discuss with Bomboko along following lines.

1. US is prepared give appropriate support to program for UNOC retraining and strengthening of ANC capabilities, including air arm. We would assume such program would include provision of pilot instructors. Under this rubric US would consider making a few planes (probably trainers in first instance) available GOC at UN request. While such move would have no immediate effect on GOC capacity to cope with KAF threat, it would give morale boost to ANC, reaffirm UN recognition of GOC/ANC legitimacy, and have salutary psychological effect on Tshombe’s assessment of situation.

2. Although UN cannot engage in “collaboration in police action against Katanga,” UNOC now has will and capacity to cope with Katanga air threats. As we declared in statement released Nov 1, we understand UN acting in accordance with clear mandate, including if necessary military action against offending Katanga aircraft, and US fully supports this position of the UN in its effort restore the peace.³

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–761. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of United Nations Political Affairs Nathan Pelcovits, cleared by Eisenberg and Buffum and in substance by Colonel Greene of the Department of Defense, and approved by Wallner. Repeated to Léopoldville.
2. Telegram 1527 from USUN, November 7, reported that Bomboko had made an urgent plea that the Congolese Government be enabled to buy two jet fighters at once, arguing that Adoula needed to be able to demonstrate tangible U.S. support for his government in order to counter pressure to readmit Communist Embassies to Léopoldville. He further argued that the fighters were needed to counter Katangan air attacks on Congolese forces in Kasai. If the Congolese Government had such air power, the Katangan and Stanleyville secessions would collapse, but without it, the Adoula government would collapse within 3 weeks and be succeeded by a Gizenga government with Communist support. (Ibid.)
3. For text of the statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 842.