Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, November 7, 1961, 9:05 p.m.

771. Congo problems discussed in Department today between British Ambassador Ormsby Gore and Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretaries Williams and Cleveland and Ambassador Stevenson.²

Ormsby Gore stated that as Amb Riches visiting Elizabethville November 9–11 on other matters, he would attempt persuade Tshombe go to Léopoldville to discuss unification Congo in meeting with Adoula. Ormsby Gore believes in order convince Tshombe come Léopoldville Ambassador Gullion would have to persuade Adoula announce suspension military operations against Katanga during these discussions and Tshombe’s safety must be assured. You authorized take appropriate action your discretion.

If meeting Léopoldville not acceptable to Tshombe, would in your judgment meeting at Kamina, in UN plane, boat, or some neutral area, be possible?³ Hope that in such discussion Adoula would be willing meet reasonable Tshombe demands for Katanga and that Tshombe would not ask too much. Have explained to Ormsby Gore that you feel you have come to brink in appealing to Adoula to meet and take reasonable attitude with Tshombe.

Ormsby Gore emphasized London concern that Congo situation will continue deteriorate and will necessitate throwing matter into Security Council which conceivably could pass resolution ordering UN troops into action. If this resulted there would be serious outcry in London and British Parliament would refuse vote money for UN-Congo operation. According Ormsby Gore, in such atmosphere UK and US might split in UN on Congo. Therefore he instructed to urge USG new strong approach both to Adoula and Katanga.

Amb Stevenson discussed with him at length necessity for bringing Tshombe to heel in order to solve problem. While British Amb recognized this eventually necessary he pointed out British public feel Tshombe is always blamed whether he is right or wrong. Stevenson and Ball made strong case that there are limits to which Adoula can go in dealing with secessionist Tshombe and emphasized that British must bring strongest possible pressure on Tshombe to cooperate.

Request you consult soonest with British Amb Riches on what you could do support Riches’ planned approach and any other steps USG and UK could take to bring Adoula and Tshombe together in major effort bring about Central Gov’t-Katanga settlement. Act in your discretion and advise Dept.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–761. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sweeney, cleared by Eisenberg and in substance by Cleveland, and approved by Williams. Repeated to London, USUN, Brussels, and Paris.
2. Secretary Rusk was present for the first portion of the discussion of the Congo, according to a memorandum of conversation by Sweeney. (Ibid.)
3. According to Sweeney’s memorandum of conversation, Rusk recalled that in 1947, when the Netherlands and Indonesia could not agree on a site for discussions, the United States had made the U.S.S. Renville available. Maybe in the Congo, he remarked, “we could use a plane and get them together in the air.” Ormsby Gore suggested bringing Adoula and Tshombe to some neutral spot, and Rusk wondered whether an airstrip might be an answer.