Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

137. Telegram From the Consulate General in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, November 5, 1961, 10 p.m.

458. From Harriman. Reference: Department’s telegram 619.²Following is brief summary of my conversations with Tshombe, 1-1/2 hours yesterday afternoon, 2-1/2 today. More detailed report by airgram.³

Tshombe blames his bad health, heart and other internal difficulties to mistreatment during imprisonment. He is returning to Elisabethville where he will continue Swiss doctors recommended treatment for three months, after which he will return Geneva unless cured. He spoke vigorously, and appeared in good spirits, and clearly enjoyed renewing our acquaintance.

As British demarche had drawn a blank, I spent a good deal of time discussing the past and permitting him to unburden himself of his very deep-seated suspicion and resentment at UN policies and at US. Only UN official in whom he expressed confidence was Tunisian Khiari. He emphasized his American Methodist missionary education which had been used against him by Belgians during colonial period and prevented him and his brothers obtaining higher education in US in spite of his pro-American leanings.

He feels we are attempting to crush him and destroy Katanga, because of our misinformation and misunderstanding of nature of Congo problem. US Government’s mistaken policies can only play into Communist hands. He was particularly unhappy that he was not permitted to come to US last winter or to have representative at UN where decisions being made without his having hearing. He considers Loi Fondamentale Belgian-imposed and proved bankrupt. Congo too big and trained Congolese too few to permit stable Government except on basis of confederation, as proposed at Tananarive Conference. In answer to my question he told me his relations with the Belgian Government were not good and he was suspicious of Spaak influence. He feels that Congolese too politically naive to understand difference between Socialism and Communism, which therefore plays into the latter’s hands. He assured me that following UN pressure he had released all Belgian Government military personnel, totaling about 300, and paid them off in full. He maintained that he had reduced size of big Belgian concessions and had encouraged new private investment which had come from several European countries but not US. He considers himself bulwark against strong Communist influence in Léopoldville, pointing out Bocheley-Davidson, a Communist and Gizengist, had been sent to Elizabethville in September to take over in name of Central Government if UN attack had succeeded. Tshombe underlined disaster of Central Government and UN attempting military solution for both short and long run.

During course of conversation, I made all points covered Department’s telegram 619 and other messages.⁴ I attempted to allay his unreasonable suspicions of US and assured him our interest was not in his destruction but rather in his participation in future integrated Congo, if peaceful solution could be negotiated.

Finally, he made following commitments:

1. He guaranteed “on my word of honor” to see to it that no military action would be taken by Katanga forces including air outside of Katanga or against UN installations within Katanga in violation of cease-fire agreement. In reply to my question, he agreed that Ambassador Stevenson could use this commitment at UN if it would assist him in handling Congo problem.

2. He agreed to meet Adoula any place outside the Congo without preconditions. He suggested New York, as he had heard Adoula might be going there and this would be a useful setting for negotiations. Although he agreed it was better for Congolese matters to be discussed on Congo soil, he had no faith in the word of Central Government account last spring’s imprisonment and had lost confidence in UN guarantee account UN military intervention September. I declined to take this as his last word but suggested that neither of us had so far sufficient imagination to develop conditions to remove his concern over his security. I told Tshombe that Adoula was being informed of my approach to him and would be urged to create atmosphere Léopoldville to facilitate initiation of productive negotiations.

I recognized that in these few hours I have not been able to achieve immediately all Department’s objectives. I do believe however for what it is worth that Tshombe has gained confidence in good will of our approach. I told him that our conversations should not be considered concluded and urged him to talk frankly with our Consul in Elisabethville, conveying any further thoughts he may have in the future on the subjects we had covered. When I said I hoped to see him again at some future time, he said I [he] can come back to Geneva on 24 hours notice.

David McKillop’s participation has been invaluable. We both feel it worthwhile follow up with Tshombe as he is suffering from feeling of having been isolated and neglected. Throughout he showed responsiveness to any friendly comments on my part. He certainly appears deeply influenced by his early missionary education and moral and religious teachings. This may be one of reasons for his being somewhat emotional rather than practical in approaching political problems. On the whole I gained impression that he could be good friend and supporter of our objectives in an integrated Congo.

Rowell

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–561. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Léopoldville and repeated to Brussels, London, Paris, and USUN.
2. Document 136.
3. Airgram Confe A–13 from Geneva, November 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–861)
4. Reference is to telegram 623 to Geneva, November 4, which repeated telegram 1136 to USUN, which instructed USUN to try to persuade Bomboko of the dangers of a Security Council meeting at that time. (Ibid., 770G.00/11–461)