Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Geneva¹

Washington, November 3, 1961, 9:51 p.m.

619. For Harriman from Ball. Would appreciate your seeing Tshombe Geneva soonest and making strong presentation USG views Congo. President is concerned at lack progress peaceful reintegration Katanga and threat spread hostilities.²

As you have not of course had opportunity follow developments Congo, hope Brussels can send David McKillop³ Geneva immediately brief you and be helpful during meeting with details background.

Please make following points with Tshombe:

1. Katanga independence has no future. Separate Katanga unacceptable to all other Congolese who will not rest until it is integrated. UN, supported by entire membership, favors integration and large number of nations including US will so direct their energies in Congo.

2. Opinion Leopoldville and UNGA clearly moving in favor UN active assistance present GOC military effort reintegrate Katanga. While USG hopes for peaceful resolution Katanga-Congo differences, this movement opinion may well become irresistible soon. FYI: this over simplifies situation UN but we see real difficulty in controlling developments there unless progress made bringing Tshombe Adoula together. End FYI.

3. USG has never wished removal Katanga and Tshombe from position political influence Congo. Katanga has constructive economic and political role play; however we believe role should be national one, and if Tshombe does not seize present opportunity collaborate with Léopoldville, he may alienate Congo opinion to such degree it will no longer be possible for him to join GOC on attractive terms. If Tshombe will make genuine effort negotiate reasonably USG will endeavor facilitate rapprochement at Léopoldville.

4. Tshombe should not be misled by isolated expressions opinion in US favoring Katanga. Present US policy Congo approved by President.

5. Urge Tshombe send message Adoula offering come Leopold-ville immediately order explore differences with Adoula, expressing assumption both sides will cease hostilities during negotiation. Preconditions should be avoided by both sides. UN will guarantee security.

You may also draw on British demarche to Tshombe sent you separately.⁴

You should make every effort seek avoid any publicity regarding your meeting with Tshombe, but if it unavoidable state sole purpose is to urge Tshombe enter into negotiations for peaceful reintegration Katanga. Urge Tshombe keep meeting confidential pointing out effective negotiations cannot occur in press.

For Brussels: Hope McKillop can proceed first available plane, after telephonic coordination with ConGen. Travel orders follow.

For Léopoldville: When meeting takes place you should inform Adoula Harriman has seen Tshombe and explain reason for and substance of approach.

With respect problem civil war and need Adoula be statesmanlike re negotiations, we fully aware difficulties (your 1114)⁵ presenting Adoula lines suggested Deptel 734⁶ on these two subjects in present highly charged atmosphere Léopoldville. However see no alternative to all out attempt convince Adoula along those lines.

More GOC attempts pursue military solution, more difficult it becomes seek peaceful means resolve Katanga impasse and if Mobutu attempts penetrate too far in direction hard core Tshombe area he clearly risks serious defeat, humiliation GOC and fall of moderate leadership. As long as action limited to permitting Léopoldville CNA blow off steam and as long as it permits Adoula and Mobutu pre-empt role champions Congo unity at expense Gizenga–Lundula, current action has some merit. These advantages clearly eliminated however if Mobutu’s troops badly defeated as they almost certainly will be if attempt penetrate South Katanga without outside assistance.

Other addressees except Geneva should inform in confidence new UN SYG or Bunche as available and respective FonOffs this approach being made and purpose thereof.

Bowles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–361. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Vance and Woodruff; cleared in substance by Wallner, Burdett, Williams, and Ball; and approved by Vance. Also sent to Brussels and repeated to USUN, London, Paris, and Léopoldville. Ambassador at Large Harriman was in Geneva attending the Conference on Laos.
2. In a telephone conversation between the President and Ball that afternoon, Kennedy suggested that Harriman might see Tshombe. Notes of the conversation record Kennedy’s remarks in part as follows: “This thing about his prestige does not matter. We should explain our concern that it is necessary he and Adoula work something out.” Ball replied that he was not averse to this. Kennedy had raised the subject in a conversation with Ball on October 31, but Ball had told him the general feeling was that a high-level approach would “just inflate Tshombe’s ego and make him more difficult to deal with.” (Telephone conversations, November 3, 3:35 p.m., and October 31, 1:15 p.m.; Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Congo)
3. Embassy Counselor.
4. Sent in telegram 620 to Geneva, November 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–361)
5. In telegram 1114 from Léopoldville, November 2, Gullion stated that he had on three occasions suggested to Adoula that he meet directly with Tshombe but it was extremely difficult to urge this while fighting was going on in north Katanga between Congolese and Katangan forces. (Ibid., 770G.00/11–261)
6. Telegram 734 to Léopoldville, November 1, instructed Gullion to press Adoula to make a “statesmanlike gesture” by offering to negotiate directly with Tshombe. (Ibid., 770G.00/10–2761)