Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan⁰

Washington, January 12, 1962, 9:47 p.m.

255. From Secretary. Department appreciates your strenuous efforts to accomplish temporary opening border but believes if Afghans are serious in desire receive aid goods they will withdraw demand that political propaganda in their note be included in joint publication. We must bear in mind following:

1) Whatever their motives, Pakistanis have consistently given assurances they continue to honor transit agreement.

2) Afghans closed border.

3) Despite offer of practical assistance in clearance processes, Afghans have refused cooperate in opening border to normal traffic and have caused USG substantial inconvenience and expenditures in importing items for official use.

4) When Afghans offered USG opportunity move its aid goods proposal was based on amount which could be moved in fixed time rather than on total amount then in Pakistan.

While not condoning GOP’s arbitrary action designed retaliate against Afghan subversive activities in Pakistan territory, Department considers it damaging to US interests to associate USG with objectionable Afghan references to Pakistan in publication of exchange of notes. Receipt of King’s letter¹ re US offer good offices which omitted any reference to political aspects transit traffic problem was taken by USG as acceptance President’s terms of reference—i.e., transit traffic problem would be handled separately from over-all political disputes. Department clearly recognizes joint publication notes now under consideration would inevitably associate USG with any statements appearing in Afghan note. To do so would not only constitute sign of weakness which would increase difficulties in future dealings with Afghans, but would provide GOP with legitimate basis for protest, and reduce possibility early settlement transit trade problem.

USG has made substantial concession to squabbling governments by indicating willingness move certain aid goods through Iran to Afghanistan while Kabul and Rawalpindi maintain adamant positions. It is hoped this concession can be justified on ground it is in our interest to give Afghans evidence of willingness to continue aid in face of Soviet exploitation of impasse. On other hand to yield to Afghan insistence on introduction propaganda into joint publication of notes might well destroy future usefulness USG good offices in dispute and provide Pakistanis with justification for withdrawing promised cooperation in moving aid goods during temporary opening of border.

Fact Afghans have insisted on inclusion propaganda despite US insistence on dealing with transit problem without bringing in political issues as such, raises question as to sincerity their intentions. Afghans should be reminded of terms of references for USG good offices. Political clauses in their note constitute built-in time bomb which seriously threatens implementation of RGA proposal.

Department suggests you talk with appropriate officials using as much of foregoing as you deem appropriate and use best efforts convince them that publication note in present form would prove counterproductive. Remind them of flexibility and friendly cooperation manifested by USG since border closed and reiterate US willingness cooperate in moving goods from Pakistan into Afghanistan on condition that RGA note, which has not been officially accepted in toto by USG, confine itself to transit traffic problem as such.

Department would accept following in place of existing third paragraph in RGA Note (Kabul tel 429)²

“Taking note American Government’s agreement as expressed by Ambassador Byroade, Minister Foreign Affairs reiterates expression by Foreign Minister Naim regarding RGA agreement to transportation of aid goods procured under US program and consigned Afghanistan through Karachi and held up since the break in diplomatic relations September 6, 1961.”

If RGA accepts this modification in its Note you authorized agree exchange and publication.

Department recognizes possible public reactions in US if Afghans refuse alter their note, and aid goods now in Pakistan are held up indefinitely. Nevertheless Department reiterates belief that yielding to Afghan demand to publish political propaganda in these circumstances would increase difficulties of future dealings with Afghans and understand-ably affect GOP willingness cooperate in moving goods.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1-1262. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Weil and Naas; cleared by Talbot, McGeorge Bundy, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near East and South Asian Affairs Warren E. Hewitt, and with AID; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Karachi and Tehran. An attached handwritten note from the Secretary’s Special Assist-ant Emory Swank to Rusk indicates that this telegram arose out of the previous evening’s meeting with President Kennedy.
1. See Document 49.
2. Document 81.