73. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State0
1019. Ambassador Galbraith and I met with President Ayub at 7:30 P.M. last night and stayed for private dinner attended also by Foreign Secretary. Ayub obviously pleased to renew acquaintance with Galbraith, and relaxed discussions ranged over variety of subjects. This summary report relates only to Kashmir and Indo-Pak relations.
Galbraith told Ayub President Kennedy, when he had learned of Ayub’s invitation for Galbraith to visit with him in Pakistan, had suggested that he personally give him background of talks with Nehru in Washington and also review substance of Galbraith’s own talks with Nehru on subject Indo-Pak relations. Galbraith did so, reviewing Kashmir problem as Nehru sees it. He told Ayub that he had advised Nehru of intention and had latter’s full approval.
With respect Washington talks, Galbraith said President Kennedy had had in mind his promise to Ayub that he would make strong effort to encourage Nehru undertake discussions with Ayub to settle issue. He also had had in mind Ayub’s letter on question of military assistance to India.1 He said military aid had not to his knowledge arisen in course of talks. President Kennedy had pursued Kashmir question at some length and had urged effort to settle problem. Nehru had responded in considerable detail.
Galbraith emphasized U.S. belief some way around impasse should be found which would result in improvement in relations between India [Page 159] and Pakistan, so that both countries could concern themselves more fully with other problems. If settlement not reached at time when Indian and Pakistani officials in office who had previously served together and had basic friendship, difficulties in future would be greatly enhanced. He thought Nehru would like to settle Kashmir. Latter had indicated his concept of settlement as being partition at cease-fire line with some adjustments. Moreover, Indians now preoccupied with forthcoming elections and this did not seem propitious time to press negotiations. U.S. Government was, however, hopeful that progress might be made after elections and would continue to do what it could in line with President Kennedy’s discussions with Ayub.
Ayub expressed gratitude that President Kennedy had discussed matter with Nehru and that he had arranged to have him informed of developments. He then outlined his position on Kashmir and emphasized that settlement this issue indispensable to good relations between India and Pakistan. Until settlement reached, large portions of their armies would be facing each other and nations could not collaborate in such matters as defense against common external threat to the subcontinent in which they both should be vitally concerned.
When Galbraith reported Nehru’s comment that settlement with Pakistan would help internal communal situation in India, Ayub said this was a point he had previously stressed to Nehru and seemed pleased to hear it affirmed. Ayub said important thing in any talks with Nehru was for them to come together with a view to working things out. Talks not predicated on desire on both sides for solution would not improve matters.
Galbraith talked generally of line of settlement he had mentioned to Nehru which avoided direct clash on territorial question by mutual access arrangement to Vale. Ayub listened with interest but did not comment specifically.
Although Ayub was not specific in indicating his view of elements of settlement, he again referred particularly to importance of Pakistan controlling headwaters of rivers flowing from Kashmir upon which its economy depends. In describing dangers of possible future diversions, he emphasized only Chenab river and included territory considerably below Srinagar in the Vale of Kashmir as important for Pakistan to control. He said while problem related also to other rivers, this would not concern Pakistan greatly since possibilities of diversion were small.
Question of GOP taking matter to Security Council or UNGA did not arise. I am inclined to believe GOP will not do so at this juncture, in view indication U.S. continued interest in encouraging bilateral negotiations perhaps after Indian election
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12-1361. Secret; Limited Distribution. Received in the Department of State on December 14 at 7:15 p.m. Repeated to New Delhi.↩
- See Document 57.↩