Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

72. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India⁰

Washington, December 14, 1961, 5:40 p.m.

2041. Embtel 1754¹ (not repeated info addressees). We appreciate great efforts you are making to stop Indians from a decision to use force against Goa and we wish we could help with Portuguese. Unfortunately, unanimous estimate here is that Portuguese will not give an inch on this in any time span that would help you, and an approach from us would only bring recriminations and bitter comparisons to our consistent stand on negotiating in face of threat of force in Berlin and elsewhere. So we have few cards to give you.

Moreover, we believe you should make it clear to Nehru now that, if Indians attack Goa, issue will certainly be brought to UN and we would, to our great regret, be forced to take a position against India just as we took position against UK and France in Suez matter.

Nevertheless, the USG recognizes that Goa is a colonial issue, and recognizes that colonial age is passing, and has and will continue to urge Portugal to recognize this fact (for example, Deptel 532 to Lisbon,² repeated New Delhi 1977).

FYI: Foregoing message has been discussed with and approved by the President, who specifically commends your efforts and expresses his regret that we cannot offer any more help. He did not create Portuguese intransigence. End FYI.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12-1461. Secret; Niact. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and McGeorge Bundy; cleared by Talbot, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs William R. Tyler, Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs Joseph J. Sisco, and President Kennedy; and approved by Johnson. Repeated to Paris for the Secretary, to Lisbon, and to London.
1. In telegram 1754 from New Delhi, December 14, Galbraith reported on a conversation with Nehru that evening. He found Nehru weighing a heavy decision. Galbraith felt that he could still influence that decision if he had “a card to play.” A strong card would be knowledge of a U.S. approach to Portugal in support of India’s position on Goa. (Ibid., 753D.00/12-1461)
2. Telegram 532 to Lisbon, December 9, instructed the Embassy to stress to the Portuguese Government that U.S. diplomatic support in the emerging crisis over Goa was tied to the position that Portugal must accept and proclaim self-determination as a goal for its overseas territories. The United States was not prepared to assume the posture of appearing simply to protect the status quo. (Ibid., 753D.00/12-961)