Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

63. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, November 21, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Krishna Menon’s Call on the President—Discussion of the U.N., Laos and Vietnam

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• His Excellency, Krishna Menon, Defense Minister of India
• His Excellency, B.K. Nehru, Ambassador of India to U.S.
• NEA—Phillips Talbot

The President received the Indian Defense Minister to fulfill informal commitments that had arisen in a brief encounter between them at the United Nations last fall and in the course of the President’s recent meetings with Prime Minister Nehru. The role of the United Nations and the situation in Southeast Asia figured prominently in their talk, which exposed significant differences in their views. In particular they debated whether the external penetrations are responsible for current troubles in South Vietnam. Countering the President’s analysis, Krishna Menon asserted he would have to see the evidence to support any view but the domestic opposition to the Diem regime explains South Vietnam’s difficulties. After their meeting Krishna Menon met the press before leaving the White House. Without saying what he had discussed with the President, in response to questions he extensively restated his known views on many issues.

In response to the President’s inquiry about the Defense Minister’s health following his recent operation, Krishna Menon said he was feeling quite well now apart from headaches and pains along his left side and his left arm and leg.

The President mentioned Prime Minister Nehru’s meeting in Cairo with Tito and Nasser. Commenting that these meetings are not as important as the press makes them out to be, Krishna Menon observed that the meeting was possibly useful to Nasser, who had been somewhat shaken by the loss of Syria (which of course he had not wanted in the first place) and had encountered some opposition to his new land reform and other economic programs—opposition not among the people, but among the more privileged groups.

Krishna Menon told the President he had suggested that disarmament discussion at this session of the U.N. General Assembly be terminated, as continuation would only generate more bitterness and reduce the chance of an agreement between the great powers. The United Nations cannot write contracts between countries, he said; it can only formulate principles. After they have been formulated, the next step is to find modalities by which the affected parties can negotiate agreements. The President observed that if this argument were carried far the U.N. might sink to merely urging that disputing powers meet bilaterally and solve their problems. In his view the U.N. has a more important role. Krishna Menon replied that the United Nations cannot do everything. It has no sanctions. It is not a parliament of man. It is a place where people come together to talk and to that extent it is a concert of nations. Its effectiveness is in laying down certain principles, as when the U.S. and USSR agreed on principles of disarmament which had grown out of last year’s twelve-power resolution. If the great powers agree on any motion, it will go through. The President noted that, whereas in 1945 the U.N. had been built on the presumption of accord among the great powers, the situation had changed since then and the U.N. could not ignore these changes.

The President raised the question of Vietnam. He urged the importance of doing an effective job in Vietnam now, else that country will disintegrate into an arena of actions and counter-actions that could have serious consequences. There have been problems about the International Control Commission, but if the ICC could function effectively now and identify the forces from the North that are operating in South Vietnam, that would help the situation. Krishna Menon asserted that effective operation of the ICC in Vietnam has been jeopardized not by its own actions or by positions taken by its Polish or Canadian members but by Diem, who had refused to let the ICC function freely. As to the presence of forces from North Vietnam in South Vietnam, Krishna Menon was skeptical. He would like to see the evidence. He believes that North Vietnam does not have the forces to send south. Even when the Viet Minh were fighting the French their forces were in a bad way. What South Vietnam has in fact is a lot of locally-based Communists who are adherents of Vietnam by day and of the Viet Minh by night.

Without impugning Krishna Menon’s approach to the problem, the President stated that we would be delighted to participate in any objective examination of the facts in the situation and in any real observance of the Geneva accords. Indeed, we ourselves had observed the Geneva accords on entry of personnel into South Vietnam until the last few days. Krishna Menon asserted that the Geneva accords had allowed a certain number of French to remain in South Vietnam, but had not transferred this allowance to other countries. Rightly or wrongly, India had subsequently agreed to let Americans be substituted for French, even though India had been criticized by some for taking this position. What is really needed, Krishna Menon added, is the neutrality of all areas in Indochina. In Laos it is a question of the three Princes. Souvanna Phouma knows that his future depends upon his not being absorbed by either the left or the right. The sooner he gets a government functioning, the better it will be. Souphanouvong is not a Communist but rather a “left-nationalist” like some of India’s progressive former Maharajahs. Phoumi is just a vagabond, though of course he must be included in the government. The three Princes are brothers and aristocrats and they ought to be able to get along. Once the government is set up, the ICC in Laos can be helpful, though it can only function with the good will of the government and as India has said from the beginning cannot become a super-government. That conception is not practical. If Laos can be settled, that will be a factor of stability in the whole area. The President agreed that the latter point was correct and that we would have to rely on Souvanna Phouma. He made it clear he did not share Krishna Menon’s estimate of Souphanouvong.

Returning to the question of South Vietnam, the President explained that he would like to see the United States out of that area, but would not want its withdrawal to leave control to the North. If South Vietnam should fall under the Viet Minh in the next few months, a wave of domination by Communist China could then sweep over South East Asia. Krishna Menon, without commenting on this point, urged the President to recognize that the United States can deal with the Russian Communists, who have been in office for fifty years and are settling down. Unless the U.S. settles the Indochinese issues while the Russians are still there, however, it will have the Chinese to deal with and that would be much worse.

Krishna Menon said that India is sending a new man as Chairman of the ICC in Vietnam and that the Chairman had told him he is quite clear that the North does not want to unify Vietnam by warfare. Like Germany, Vietnam will remain divided for a long time to come. The President observed that under present circumstances the best thing is for Vietnam to remain divided. Our interest is to get a neutral government in Laos and to avoid an unfavorable shift of power in Vietnam.

There followed a further exchange on the role of the North in South Vietnam’s troubles. Krishna Menon insisted he had no evidence of penetration from the North into South Vietnam, although he had heard that some people from the South had gone North for training and then returned South. He felt that the troubles in Vietnam result from popular discontent with Diem’s government and from militaristic opposition in the South. The President agreed that in some parts of the world there are popular movements against governments, as originally Castro’s campaign represented a popular movement against the Batista government. Such movements do not, however, need to rely on terrorism, mutilation and assassinations of the sort now going on in South Vietnam. This is not just popular opposition to the Diem regime; this is a calculated attack intended to undermine and destroy the South Vietnam Government. Our judgment on this does not depend merely on Diem’s reports; our intelligence on these points is hard.

With the allotted half-hour overrun, the President saw the Indian Defense Minister out of his office with the comment that if time allowed they could obviously go on discussing these matters for a good deal longer.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 11/21/61-11/31/61. Secret. Drafted by Talbot on November 24 and approved in the White House on November 30, according to a note on a November 29 covering memorandum from Battle to Bundy. The meeting was held at the White House.