Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan⁰

Washington, November 13, 1961, 7:51 p.m.

192. Joint State-AID. Pursuant to discussions with Ambassador Merchant, Dept has reached certain tentative conclusions re future course our policy vis-a-vis both RGA and GOP with respect Pak-Afghan transit problem and on practical steps to be taken to overcome difficulties caused by continuing impasse. Basic conclusion is that since resolution of transit impasse is not an immediate prospect, adjustment of USG aid program to Afghanistan is unavoidable due to sheer physical circumstances. At same time, it is USG desire to maintain substantial US presence in Afghanistan and cordial relations with both RGA and GOP.

A. For Kabul:

Unless you perceive objection, you should at early date see Naim and speak along following lines:

1. President and USG deeply disappointed that mission of Ambassador Merchant did not result in prompt resumption of Pak-Afghan transit and beginning of new trend toward neighborly Pak-Afghan relations. In USG view, diametrically opposed public positions taken by both sides was key factor in inability to break impasse.

2. While realizing that formula proposed by Ambassador Merchant lacked number of elements which RGA considered essential, Merchant and USG felt that formula might have served as basis for making satisfactory start toward resolution of transit issue. Thus we particularly disappointed RGA found itself unable agree to this small step or any reasonable modification thereof.

3. Despite Merchant’s lack of success in resolution transit difficulties, USG wishes maintain most cordial relations with RGA. Despatch of Presidential emissary should in itself have demonstrated this USG desire.

4. USG believes situation is not without hope. Merchant mission at least discovered and affirmed certain basic elements which can serve as basis for future progress on this question: a) both sides declared their desire to develop and maintain friendly relations; b) both sides adhered to their desire to see free and assured transit for Afghan goods through Pakistan; and c) both sides agreed Afghanistan should not become Soviet satellite. USG continues willing to use its good offices in building on these elements.

5. With respect to US aid in Afghanistan, USG intends to continue its programs to extent possible consistent with physical capabilities and cost factors. We would thus hope to continue most programs except those such as Kabul-Kandahar road project which because of heavy equipment and materiel involved and unfeasibility of alternate transit routes must be held in abeyance. We shall hope to keep in close touch with RGA to assure minimum disruption of other aspects of USG aid program.¹

6. Finally, we deeply appreciative for all courtesies and assistance rendered to Ambassador Merchant. We remain undaunted in our dedication to the improvement of Pak-Afghan relations and will welcome any formal or informal suggestions by RGA as to how we might make further attempts to be helpful.

B. For Karachi:

Unless you perceive objection, you should at early date see Ayub or Qadir and speak along following lines:

1. (Insert para A-1 above).

2. While realizing that GOP made several gestures with view to achieving mutually acceptable formula for resumption Pak-Afghan trade and transit, we could not help but be disappointed by GOP’s inability to be more forthcoming with respect to restoration of normal diplomatic and consular relations. In view of fact that GOP’s closure of consulates and trade agencies was immediate cause for present impasse, GOP offer to resume normal diplomatic and consular relations might well have permitted at least slight movement toward resolution of transit problem.

3. (Insert para A-4 above).

4. With reference to precluding Afghanistan’s becoming Soviet satellite and thus bringing direct risk of Soviet military power to Khyber Pass, USG has welcomed GOP indications that USG aid program to Afghanistan should continue. In view of likelihood of lengthy delay in resumption Pak-Afghan transit route, USG program in Afghanistan will of course be seriously handicapped. Certain projects, which we consider important in preventing Afghanistan from falling to Soviets, like Kabul-Kandahar road will of necessity be suspended or cancelled. Meanwhile, it is USG intention that other projects such as education, aviation, etc. will be maintained to extent possible, utilizing air transport and existing trade routes via Iran.²

5. President deeply appreciates courtesies and assistance rendered Ambassador Merchant. While GOP and USG policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan may have some differences, it clear our objectives are the same. We remain undaunted in our dedication to improvement of Pak-Afghan relations and will welcome any formal or informal suggestions by GOP as to how we might make further attempts to be helpful.

In order avoid future misunderstanding both Kabul and Karachi might wish to record suggested points above in form of aide–mémoire to be left with respective governments.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/11-1361. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Meyer; cleared by Merchant and Gaud, and McGeorge Bundy in substance; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi.
1. Byroade presented an aide-memoire based on telegram 192 to Naim on November 16 and discussed it with him. Naim said that he saw no reason to alter the U.S. aid program in Afghanistan unless there was a political motive for doing so. He stated that Afghan Government studies indicated that it would cost no more to ship the materials involved through Iran than through Pakistan. Hence, the only purpose for altering the aid program must be to put pressure on Afghanistan to settle the dispute. Byroade denied that any such intent underlay the proposed changes in U.S. aid to Afghanistan. He stated that U.S. information indicated that the costs involved in shipping through Iran would be considerably greater than through Pakistan. (Telegram 359 from Kabul, November 16; ibid., 689.90D/11-1661)
2. Rountree saw Qadir according to instructions on October 19. Qadir reiterated Pakistan’s established position concerning the resumption of diplomatic relations and the reopening of consulates and trade agencies. But he felt strongly that the U.S. assistance program in Afghanistan should continue, by whatever means possible. He suggested that the transit problem could be eliminated by having the United States assume full responsibility for the delivery of aid materials to the Afghan border. Pakistan would do everything possible to assist the flow of the goods. (Telegram 891 from Karachi, November 19; ibid., 689.90D/11-1961)