52. Memorandum of Conversation0

SUBJECT

  • Transit Difficulties Between Pakistan and Afghanistan

PARTICIPANTS

  • The President
  • The Honorable Livingston T. Merchant, United States Ambassador to Canada

After a short opening discussion on Canada, I referred to my mission to South Asia. I said that the more I examined the problem the less optimistic I was over the possibilities for an early solution. I spoke of the irreconcilable public positions already adopted by the two governments. [Page 115] The President agreed that the problem was difficult and complicated. He added that if a solution were soon found, he would be both surprised and pleased.

I went on to say that the sole ingredient for success lay in the President’s prestige and personal interest since there were obviously no benefits nor sanctions which could be applied or offered to either side with profit.

The key appeared to be whether or not there existed with both parties a desire for a solution and I said that I thought this would become apparent quite quickly. Under these circumstances I said that I hoped to restrict my presence in the area to about two weeks and had already laid the ground work for this. To risk cooling my heels for an extended period I felt would be damaging to the President’s own prestige and render more difficult the future task of Ambassadors Byroade and Rountree. The President agreed.

Finally I said that whereas there were many ideas produced by the Department for a practical formula to start the trade moving, I believed that I would have to rely principally on our people on the ground for the exact formula or formulas which might work.

Finally I said that whereas my bias was naturally in favor of a stout ally, I fully appreciated the strategic importance of a genuinely neutral Afghanistan and hence we could not lightly contemplate abandoning our effort to achieve this objective. The President expressed himself as being in full agreement on both points.

As I was about to leave I asked the President whether I could hold out to the King of Afghanistan the possibility of his making an official visit to the United States in 1962, if this appeared to be a necessary inducement to arriving at an agreement on transit trade. The President said he saw no reason why I should not do this but said he would like to check the matter with the Secretary of State who was about to enter the room with another group for a meeting on another subject. The Secretary agreed that if this in fact seemed to be the necessary final clincher for a successful outcome, I should be authorized to indicate that an invitation from the President would be forthcoming.

The President then gave me the signed letters for me to bear to the King of Afghanistan and to President Ayub.1 I told him that I was leaving with Mr. O’Donnell, as I did, a copy of my briefing book for Mr. Komer of the White House staff. I said the President himself might at some point desire to scan the documents.

The President wished me good luck and success on my mission.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10-1661. Secret. Drafted by Merchant and approved at the White House on October 19. According to the President’s Appointment Book, the meeting took place at the White House. (Kennedy Library)
  2. Copies of these letters, dated October 16, which introduced Merchant as President Kennedy’s personal representative, are ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Afghanistan, Subjects, King Zahir Correspondence, 1961-1963, and ibid., Pakistan, General, 10/61-12/61.