Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

51. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan⁰

Washington, October 4, 1961, 3:30 p.m.

141. Eyes Only Ambassador. Deptel 135 to Kabul, 647 to Karachi.¹

1) King Zahir’s letter delivered to President October 4 confirms advance information that King for practical purposes accepts USG good offices and that RGA may be willing work out transit arrangements without direct reference to “Pushtunistan” issue. President promised early reply.

2) Pakistan Ambassador at his request called on Secretary October 4 to say GOP would not permit re-opening Afghan consulates or trade agencies on ground these were centers of subversive activities—including sabotage and attempted assassination; but there was no reason why other arrangements should not be made such as using Afghan bank branches for documentation. Ambassador also said there would be no problem in making special arrangements so long as RGA refrained from introducing subject of “Pushtunistan.”

3) I continue believe overriding consideration is danger to free world security posed by actual and potential Soviet involvement in Afghan-Pak relations. Possibility USSR planning diversionary effort in this area cannot be ruled out. Loss to USG involved in stoppage of transit traffic and possible termination of US aid projects in Afghanistan constitute other major considerations. While there is no prospect of resolving emotion-laden dispute over status of Pushtuns in foreseeable future, I believe resumption of transit traffic if accepted in good faith by both parties might reduce tensions and in any case would serve USG national interests.

4) For Byroade: You should seek appointment with King at earliest opportunity. Express President’s gratification at King’s letter. As US understands position, RGA has asked US make every possible effort for reestablishment of transit trade. For this purpose, President requests King’s reaction to following proposal: In framework offer good offices President prepared send special representative to Pakistan and Afghanistan to help both sides work towards restoration transit traffic. You should inform King similar offer being made in Rawalpindi. If both sides agreeable, US will at once make available services distinguished senior official. You should impress on King that President attaches utmost importance solving transit problem and hopes King will give this proposal his immediate and most serious consideration. You should coordinate with Ambassador Rountree in order make approaches to two governments as nearly simultaneous as possible. Preferably two Heads of State should be seen on same day, although Amb. Rountree may wish consider whether it might be wiser ascertain Ayub’s reactions before King Zahir is approached.

5) For Rountree: You should seek appointment with Ayub at earliest opportunity. You should recall to Ayub your discussions in Rawalpindi and Murree September 1 and 2 in which Ayub said he had no objection to US telling Afghanistan inter alia that “GOP was prepared work out appropriate arrangements to keep traffic moving.” You should add that US understands GOP concern at previous Afghan insistence on considering “Pushtunistan” issue as integral part of dispute and GOP refusal consider any discussions with RGA on such basis. US can now report an encouraging development. Ayub will recall that President sent letter to Zahir on September 20² requesting him make every effort restore transit traffic to normal and reiterating US offer good offices. Zahir’s reply delivered to President October 4 confines itself to transit problems and makes no mention of “Pushtunistan.” We interpret this as RGA acceptance US offer good offices. In view this statement and Ayub’s previously expressed willingness work out appropriate arrangements, President would like his reaction to following proposal. You should then describe US intentions in same way Byroade instructed using same emphasis.

6. Both Ambassadors should indicate that it would be greatly helpful to success of this endeavor if respective governments could begin immediately to tone down hostile propaganda against each other and to keep public statements re this subject to minimum.

7. Both Ambassadors requested report respective reactions soonest.³

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10-461. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Gatch and Weil, cleared by Meyer, and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Karachi.
1. Telegram 135 to Kabul, also sent as telegram 647 to Karachi, October 2, noted that the Department had received advance information that King Zahir’s reply to President Kennedy’s September 17 letter would indicate that Afghanistan, in effect, was prepared to accept U.S. good offices, and was also prepared to discuss a solution to transit difficulties without reference to political issues. (Ibid, 689.90D/9-261)
2. The reference is incorrect; the letter was dated September 17.
3. Rountree saw Ayub on October 7 and reported that he was prepared to welcome a presidential emissary sent to help both sides work toward the restoration of transit traffic. Ayub made clear that his agreement did not extend to broader political issues, and he emphasized that he could not agree to reopening the consulates and trade missions. (Telegram 655 from Karachi, October 7; Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10-761) Byroade reported on October 9 that Zahir was also prepared to welome a U.S. emissary, but he indicated that the reestablishment of Afghan offices in Pakistan was essential to any transit agreement. (Telegram 289 from Kabul, October 9; ibid., 689.90D/10-961)