335. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Grant) to Secretary of State Rusk0
SUBJECT
- Pakistan Aide-Mémoire
Pakistan has added a new dimension to its tactics and appears to be attempting “to prove” its charge that India has aggressive intentions against Pakistan. In the last few weeks we have received three Pakistan Aide-Memoires,1 the main points of which are: (1) Recent Indian statements regarding Kashmir are contrary to U.N. resolutions and India has increased its hostile activities along the cease-fire line; (2) United States military assistance to India is being misused by India and has been issued to units facing Pakistan; (3) The radar we are giving India sweeps Pakistan territory.
A fuller explanation of the validity of these charges is given below, but in brief our view is as follows: (1) The proposals by the outgoing Prime Minister of Indian-held Kashmir would, if adopted, be contrary to U.N. resolutions. There is no evidence of increased Indian military activity in Kashmir; on the contrary, there is some evidence that Pakistan has increased its military strength in the area. (2) We have no evidence that India has diverted equipment in militarily significant quantities to units facing Pakistan. (3) The radar in Calcutta will cover portions of East Pakistan.
[Page 686]1. October 16 Aide-Mémoire
a. Complaint
The Aide-Mémoire charges that:
- (1)
- the proposals of the outgoing Prime Minister of Indian-held Kashmir would constitute further steps toward the integration of Kashmir into the Indian Union and are contrary to commitments made by India to the U.N.;
- (2)
- the Government of India has stepped up hostile activities along the Kashmir cease-fire line, particularly near the village of Chaknot;
- (3)
- these acts of defiance by the GOI “stem directly from the strength and encouragement that she (India) has drawn from the continued flow of large-scale military aid to her from the United States and Britain since November last year.”
b. Facts
- (1)
- The proposals by the Kashmir Prime Minister would, if endorsed by the Kashmir Parliament in March 1964, constitute a further integration of Kashmir into India. However, they are relatively minor moves in a series of steps by which India in the last 10 years has slowly eliminated many of the differences between Kashmir and the states of the Indian Union. There remains the basic difference embedded in Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.
- (2)
- The U.N. cease-fire line observers have reported that there is no special Indian military build-up near Chaknot, but that the Pakistanis have moved an understrength battalion into the area.
c. Our Position
- (1)
- Governor Harriman informed Ambassador Nehru that the Kashmir proposals were provocative and badly timed and that India’s hard line on Kashmir was undercutting our efforts to calm down the Pakistanis.
- (2)
- We have instructed Embassy New Delhi to inform the GOI that: (a) we expect the Indians to exercise restraint during the current tense period; (b) our position on the proposed changes on Kashmir’s status is governed by the U.N. resolutions; and (c) we expect India to make maximum use of the U.N. cease-fire line observers and to avoid unilateral, provocative actions.
- (3)
- We have also instructed Embassy Karachi to urge restraint on the Pakistan Government and to inform it that as far as the Kashmir proposals are concerned our position with the Indians is that these are governed by U.N. resolutions.
2. October 19 Aide-Mémoire
a. Complaint
The Aide-Mémoire charges that: [Page 687]
- (1)
- the GOI has issued arms supplied by the western powers to Indian military units facing Pakistan, and
- (2)
- our military mission officials in India are prevented by the GOI from carrying out their investigations.
These actions, the GOP stated, confirm “Pakistan’s contention that India plans to utilize western arms aid against Pakistan.”
b. Facts
- (1)
- Embassy New Delhi has reported that some pieces of U.S.-supplied equipment may have been misdirected during the confusion of last fall and the subsequent military regrouping.
- (2)
- Our military mission in New Delhi has not been hampered by the GOI in carrying out its inspections of MAP-supported units and it is unaware of diversion of equipment in a militarily significant quantity.
- (3)
- The military mission has confined its inspection activities to MAP-supported units.
c. Our Position
- (1)
- Embassy New Delhi has been instructed to inform the GOI that we are unaware of irregularities as charged by the GOP, but, nevertheless, we are depending on the GOI to exercise great care to see that U.S.-supplied equipment is not inadvertently diverted to units facing Pakistan.
- (2)
- Embassy Karachi has been instructed to tell the GOP in a low key way that: (a) our military mission in New Delhi is exercising its inspection responsibilities without hindrance; (b) we are not in position to check the distribution of each individual piece of equipment, but we have no evidence that militarily significant quantities have been misused; and (c) if we discover irregularities we will take appropriate steps with the GOI.
3. October 29 Aide-Mémoire
a. Complaint
The Aide-Mémoire charges that the radar being provided India (Calcutta and western India) for air defense sweeps East Pakistan and part of West Pakistan, and that, if Indian intention were not to cover these areas, the radar would have been located nearer the Tibetan border. The current location of the radar is “… confirmation of its [Pakistan’s] view that India’s acquisition of western military aid is, in India’s plans, to be utilized primarily against Pakistan.”2
b. Facts
A map in the joint U.S.-U.K. air defense report3 shows that the mobile radar in the Calcutta area will cover large portions of East Pakistan. [Page 688] This has been confirmed by the Air Force. The same map shows that the mobile set in the Delhi area reaches approximately to the border of West Pakistan.
The location of the radar units was determined following a joint U.S.-U.K.-Canadian-Australian estimate of the Chinese Communist air threat and reflects the recommendations of U.S. experts of the best sites to defend India against this air threat.
We have asked DOD for a full report on the radar coverage, both by the mobile radar now in place for the U.S./U.K./Indian air exercises and the permanent installations which will be established later.
c. Our Position
We do not presently propose to reply formally to this Aide-Mémoire.