Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

334. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India⁰

Washington, October 20, 1963, 11:04 a.m.

881. Deptel 795 to New Delhi,¹ info Karachi 549, London 2286. Following summary for information only and contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon.

Gov Harriman called in B.K. Nehru October 18 in order make known US views regarding recent Indian hard line on relations with Pakistan and in particular Bakshi’s policy directives regarding Kashmir. Grant also attended. Principal theme of Governor Harriman’s remarks was that we were engaged in effort to stem Pak flirtation with Chicoms, and India should avoid actions which make our task more difficult.

Governor Harriman noted US-Pak relations troubled because of our military aid to India. We are making serious efforts to bring Pakistan to recognize its long-run interest continues with West. Bakshi’s announcement interferes with our efforts. Furthermore appearance that India considers Pakistan has combined with China against India, which we believe contrary to fact, aggravates rather than lessens our mutual problems with Pakistan. Grant mentioned Pak Aide-Memoire² alleging Indians taking further steps integrate Kashmir; appealed to GOI avoid actions which would be treated by Paks as provocative.

In reply B.K. Nehru said Bakshi had made certain proposals to Kashmir assembly under authority Kashmir constitution. GOI had no power interfere. There was no plan integrate Kashmir National Conference with Congress. Status of Kashmir did not depend upon changes announced by Bakshi but rather on article 370 of Indian Constitution. GOI had no desire or intention to change this. He was unaware Pak Aide-Memoire on Kashmir.

In discussion which followed Harriman and Grant took line that we objected not so much to substance of Indian actions as their effect on Indian and US relations with Pakistan when we were seeking end to Pak-Chicom flirtation. Repeatedly stressed need for GOI avoid actions which would aggravate Paks. Timing of Kashmir actions unusually provocative and badly timed. B.K. Nehru took line that Pak complaints such as those in Aide-Memoire are only tactical aspects of over-all “hate India” policy which results from Pak refusal accept fact of greater Indian size and power. Nehru also said India increasingly convinced there is much greater Pak-Chicom understanding than appears on surface.

Governor Harriman said we feel we have made progress with Bhutto. Noted obsessive Pak fear of India. Said we had been telling Paks we believe this utterly unfounded but we had to accept fact of fear. We had assured Pakistan of our assistance if India attacked just as we have assured India. We would continue try handle their unfounded fears this way. We had told Bhutto that our military alliance was directed against aggression from any quarter. We did not see this as affecting India although we knew India had no intention of attacking Pakistan.

Gov Harriman said Paks are beginning to recognize some of their moves toward Chicoms have been counterproductive. We think Pakistan agreement to any type military alliance with Chicoms most unlikely. Appealed for Indian understanding of what US Administration doing on subcontinent. Our policy and attitude toward India unchanged; we firmly support India’s defense effort. But we do look to India to help in our efforts with Pakistan.

Nehru expressed full confidence in US policies in subcontinent saying India did not wish do anything to make our task more difficult. He said he would welcome suggestions as to what India could do to assure Paks. India did not endanger their security.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Schneider, cleared by Harriman, and approved by Grant. Also sent to Rawalpindi and Karachi and repeated to London and Ankara for Talbot.
1. On October 3, G.M. Bakshi, the outgoing Prime Minister of Kashmir, announced to the legislature of Kashmir a number of proposed constitutional changes designed to further the integration of Kashmir into the Indian Union. In telegram 795 to New Delhi, October 9, the Department of State transmitted its deep concern over Bakshi’s announcement, which was viewed as likely to complicate the difficult task of promoting a climate in which progress could be made toward reducing tensions on the subcontinent. (Ibid.)
2. Reference is to the October 16 aide-mémoire summarized in Document 335.