316. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
We’re heading for a tricky confrontation with Ayub, in an attempt to bring him around to reality before it’s too late. George Ball is to make the hard sell, but several issues need to be sorted out first. We hope to discuss these with you at 5 p.m. Monday.
Ayub’s latest talk with McConaughy (Karachi 307 attached)1 suggests that he sees Ball’s trip as showing nervousness on our part and may think his pressure tactics on us are working. We’ll have to disabuse him on this score, but his line to McConaughy shows how hard this will be.
After letting us think it was all squared away, the Paks have started stalling on our crucial Peshawar expansion. The intelligence people are all worked up, and seem to favor a simple trade with Ayub—more supersonics (as part of 3-year MAP offer) for Peshawar acreage. State feels, and I quite agree, that to succumb to such blackmail would be folly. Instead we must get across to Ayub that if he doesn’t play ball with us, our whole aid program will be at risk.
Ball inclines toward doubting that we should offer anything to the Paks just now. Let’s wait and see instead how they come around under our pressure. Harriman argues that we should tell Ayub flatly he can’t hope to defend himself against a much larger India, and that China can’t supply him, so that his only recourse is to us. But Averell thinks we should lend credibility to our assurances by telling Ayub we’ll put some [Page 632] carriers in the Indian Ocean or by doing some joint planning with the Paks.
Other issues are how hard to keep pushing Kashmir mediation, and how to handle India if we offer the Paks more supersonics.
Preliminary State/Defense thinking is in attached position paper,2 but many of us feel that the tone is too soft to move Ayub, while there are too many goodies offered to make the tough talk believable. Ayub is trying a hard line on us, while letting his own domestic situation get out of control. Unless we jar him out of these tactics, he’ll lose and so will we.
Latest word is that Ayub may not be available till later than the 20th, which will give us more time to devise our pitch.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 8/1/63-8/14/63. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “Taken from Pres. weekend reading dtd 8/9/63.”↩
- Document 315.↩
- Entitled “Scope Paper for Mr. Ball’s Mission to Pakistan;” not printed.↩